Author: Katie Spencer

When High-Value Claims Still Require Budgeting: Garry White & Ors v Uber London Limited & Ors

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

The Claim

In the case of Garry White & Ors v Uber London Limited & Ors, approximately 13,000 London black cab drivers issued group proceedings against companies within the Uber group, claiming losses of around £199 million. A further claim, valued at approximately £141 million, was brought by the assignee of two private hire operators, Kabbee and Iride.

Although the total value of the litigation is around £340 million, each driver’s individual claim is relatively modest (circa £15,000), making group litigation a proportionate approach.

The claims arise from allegations that Uber unlawfully obtained a private hire vehicle operator licence by misrepresenting its operating model. It is said that this enabled Uber to compete directly with licensed black cab drivers while undercutting regulated fares, causing substantial financial loss between 2012 and March 2018.

The Preliminary Limitation Issue

Uber denies liability and argues that the claims were issued outside the six-year limitation period.

The Claimants rely on Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, arguing that time did not begin to run until they could reasonably have discovered the relevant facts, which they say occurred in June 2018 following a licensing appeal hearing.

The court has ordered that limitation be determined at a standalone five-day preliminary trial. A representative sample of 20 Claimants (10 chosen by each side) will be used to assess when sufficient knowledge arose. If the Defendants succeed, the litigation may conclude at that stage.

The Costs Budgeting Decision

A significant procedural issue to be determined was whether costs budgeting should apply.

Although claims valued at £10 million or more are ordinarily excluded from the costs management regime, the court retains discretion. The Defendants sought to disapply budgeting, relying on the overall high value of the claim, the existence of litigation funding and ATE insurance, and the alleged additional burden budgeting would impose.

The Claimants argued that, despite the aggregate value, the case is fundamentally a mass claim by individuals of limited means. They required clarity regarding potential adverse costs exposure and future funding requirements.

The Court agreed with the Claimants. While acknowledging that very high-value claims are generally unsuitable for costs management, this case was considered materially different. The modest individual claims and group structure justified greater costs oversight and transparency.

Why This Matters

This decision reinforces that the £10 million threshold is not decisive. Courts will look beyond the headline value of proceedings and consider the nature of the parties and the practical impact of costs exposure.

In large-scale group actions involving individuals with limited financial resources, costs budgeting may be viewed as an important tool to promote fairness, proportionality and effective case management and there are steps you can take ahead of the first CMC if you consider a CMO to be useful in your case.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors and can be contacted on 07741 988 925 or at Katie.Spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.

Since costs were to be assessed on the indemnity basis, the Court declined to determine an application to vary the Claimant’s approved costs budget

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

In the case of Xtellus Capital Partners Inc v Dl Invest Group Pm S.A. [2025] EWHC 2168 , Judge Bird found that the Defendant’s unreasonable conduct during the proceedings justified ordering that the Claimant’s costs be assessed on the indemnity basis for all phases of the case.

The Claimant had applied to vary its approved budget because its actual costs exceeded the approved amounts, but the Judge considered whether it was necessary to decide that application since the assessment would be on the indemnity basis.

CPR 3.18 governs departures from approved budgets when costs are assessed on the standard basis; it does not apply where the assessment is on the indemnity basis.

CPR 44.4(3)(h) requires the court, on detailed assessment, to have regard to the receiving party’s last approved or agreed budget. Budgets therefore remain potentially relevant even on an indemnity basis assessment, and the Court may depart from them without requiring a “good reason’.

However, the Judge decided that it was best not to deal with the budget variation application at this stage. He gave two reasons:

  1. On an indemnity assessment the Court can depart from approved budgets, so leaving the matter to a detailed assessment would not prejudice the Claimant; and
  2. Deciding the variation now would involve applying the “reasonable and proportionate costs” test, which is appropriate for the standard basis, not for the indemnity basis.

In conclusion, an application to vary an approved budget is not automatically necessary where costs are to be assessed on the indemnity basis. The Court may instead leave the issue to be resolved at the detailed assessment stage.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors and can be contacted on 07741 988 925 or at katie.spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.

Part 36 consequences following judgment, where judgment is given in a sum other than sterling

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

The Claim

It is not unusual for claims in the Commercial Courts to be denominated in currencies other than sterling. However, that gives rise to challenges where an effective Part 36 offer has been made by a Claimant, as Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules assumes that judgment will be given in sterling. Recent case law has given an indication of how the Court may exercise its discretion whilst respecting the importance and intention behind Part 36 offers.

In the recent case of Sanlam General Insurance Ghana Ltd v Sustainable Growth Fund II SCSP SICAV-SIF [2025] EWHC 559 (Comm) (14 February 2025), a claim was made for $1 million said to be due under a promissory note or corporate counter guarantee governed by English law.

On behalf of the Defendant, Ms Wick acknowledged the debt through a series of letters, either explicitly or implicitly confirming the obligation to repay the claimed sums. Despite repeated promises to pay, the Defendant failed to do so, prompting the Claimant to initiate legal proceedings.

Jurisdiction and Defence

The proceedings were served in Luxembourg in accordance with local law. The Defendant filed an Acknowledgment of Service, indicating an intention to defend the claim and contest jurisdiction. However, no formal application to challenge jurisdiction was made.

Claimant’s Application for Summary Judgment

The claimant sought summary judgment on multiple grounds:

  1. Entry of default judgment against the Defendant,
  2. Striking out the Defendant’s Defence,
  3. Summary judgment on the basis that the Defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim.

In response, the Defendant submitted another document incorrectly labelled a ‘Defence’ despite having already filed one.

The Defendant raised various points, including an assertion that it was not a legal “person” and therefore could not be sued, and that Ms Wick lacked authority to sign legal documents alone.

The Court considered these arguments but was ultimately satisfied that the Defendant had no real prospect of success.

 Court’s Ruling on Costs and Interest

The Claimant had made a Part 36 offer to settle the claim for $1 million, inclusive of interest, plus costs. The Defendant did not accept the offer, which was subsequently beaten.

Although the Court declined to order that all the Claimant’s costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis, it did award the usual Part 36 consequences following judgment, including costs on the indemnity basis following expiry of the offer, enhanced interest on costs and the judgment sum, and an uplift on damages capped at £75,000.

However, the claim was denominated in US dollars and Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules assumes that a judgment will be given in sterling. To quantify interest on the judgment sum, the Court therefore used the US dollar prime rate as the starting point, rather than the Bank of England base rate, and awarded an uplift of 7.5%. In doing so, the Court followed the guidance given in OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG [2017] 1WLR 3465, where it was recognised that the Court has a discretion as to interest, but it was nevertheless important to incentivise Defendants to engage in reasonable settlement negotiations.

There were fewer difficulties regarding interest on costs, which were denominated in sterling, and a 10% uplift was awarded. However, the uplift on the judgment sum presented the same difficulties as interest on the judgment amount as it was denominated in dollars. The Court rejected a submission that the uplift could not be awarded where the judgment was denominated in a currency other than sterling, as that would defeat the purpose and intention of Part 36; the approach adopted therefore was to notionally convert the judgment sum into sterling at the applicable exchange rate on the date of judgment and to calculate the uplift on those sums.

Costs Assessment for the Summary Judgment Application

Costs were assessed on the indemnity basis following expiry of the Part 36 offer and on the standard basis up to expiry of that offer . The Court therefore had to take both bases of assessment into account in the summary assessment of the Claimant’s costs:

  • Hourly rates: The Claimant claimed £700/hr for a Grade A fee earner, £528/hr for a Grade C fee earner, and £260/hr for a Grade D fee earner. The Grade A hourly rate was assessed at the London 1 rate (£566). The Defendant’s delay and the cross-border aspect involving Luxembourg law supported this rate. Other fee earners were compensated at London 2 rates (£269/hr for a Grade C and £153/hr for a Grade D).
  • Work done on documents: Document preparation costs were reduced by £3,000 to reflect that the Witness Statement and Application Notice were prepared at a time when the assessment should technically have been on the standard, not indemnity, basis. All other document-related costs were allowed as claimed. Additionally, a £7,000 brief fee was found to be reasonable as it included work on documents.
  • Attendance at the hearing: Only the Grade A fee earner’s attendance at the hearing was deemed reasonable. The Grade C fee earner’s attendance time was disallowed as it was unreasonable, even where costs were being assessed on the indemnity basis.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors and can be contacted on 07741 988925 or at katie.spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.

Defendant Barred from Arguing Costs – Except Wasted Costs

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

In the recent judicial review case of Ayinde, R (On the Application of) v The London Borough of Haringey, the Defendant was barred from making submissions on general costs after failing to comply with key procedural requirements.

Background

Following the Claimant’s issuance of judicial review proceedings, the Defendant failed to acknowledge service and did not file a statement of facts and grounds of defence. As a result, the Defendant applied for relief from sanctions in an attempt to participate in arguments on costs.

Costs consequences for the Defendant

The Court refused the application, underlining the importance of strict compliance with procedural rules. Consequently, the Defendant was barred from making submissions on general costs.

Wasted Costs

However, the Court did allow the Defendant to make submissions on wasted costs. This exception arose due to the Claimant’s legal representatives citing five fictional legal authorities in their application. In response, the Court issued a wasted costs order, describing the actions as professional misconduct.

Despite being restricted from general cost arguments, the Defendant was still permitted to address the issue of wasted costs—a distinct category aimed at compensating parties for costs incurred due to improper or negligent conduct by legal professionals.

Summary

This ruling serves as a strong reminder that non-compliance with court orders or procedures can lead to severe consequences, including the loss of the right to contest key aspects of a case, particularly on costs.

Practitioners must act promptly and diligently in complying with court directions. Failure to do so risks being excluded from critical elements of litigation, especially those with significant financial impact.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors and can be contacted on 07741 988925 or at katie.spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.

Oakwood Solicitors Ltd v Menzies [2024] UKSC 34

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

Case overview

The case of Oakwood Solicitors Ltd v Menzies [2024] UKSC 34 explores a client’s right to request an assessment of legal fees, focusing on the interpretation of “payment” in Section 70(4) of the Solicitors Act 1974. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favour of the client, reinforcing protections that allow clients to review and negotiate billed costs.

Initial Proceedings

The Respondent, Oakwood Solicitors, were instructed by the Appellant, Menzies, following his involvement in a Road Traffic Accident, under a Conditional Fee Agreement.

The claim settled for £275,000, after which the Respondent issued a ‘Final Statute Bill’ outlining the fees incurred throughout the case, totalling £73,711.20. The Respondent deducted from the damages an amount to cover the shortfall in costs after deducting costs recovered from the Defendant, as agreed in the CFA.

On 1 April 2021, the Appellant initiated proceedings to request an assessment of the final bill. To determine whether the Appellant could bring these proceedings, the Costs Judge assessed the date on which payment of the bill was made. The Costs Judge decided that payment had occurred over 12 months before the assessment (apparently taking the date as being when the Final Statute Bill was delivered).

Legal Issue

Section 70(4) of the 1974 Solicitors Act states:

‘The power to order assessment conferred by subsection (2) shall not be exercisable on an application made by the party chargeable with the bill after the expiration of 12 months from the payment of the bill.’

Applying this rule, as the payment of the bill occurred over 12 months prior to the assessment application, the Appellant was barred from seeking an assessment.

Appeal to the High Court

The Appellant appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal on the grounds that there had been “no sufficient settlement of account” to warrant treating the deduction as payment under Section 70(4).

Appeal to the Court of Appeal

The Respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which found that, because the Appellant had agreed in the CFA to the deduction of monies and had been sent a Final Statute Bill no further agreement on the bill amount was necessary. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

The Appellant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Decision and Reasoning

Lord Hamblen delivered judgment on the matter, considering several key points to reach a conclusion. Section 70 was concerned with the right to assess solicitors’ bills of costs with a focus on the proper amount to be charged, having regard to whether costs have been reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount.  The client needed an opportunity to consider the bill and decide to what extent it should be paid. Section 70 envisages payment after the delivery of the bill and rather than by delivery of the bill.

 

The right to have the bill assessed is intended to protect the client’s interests, which are compromised if the client is not given the opportunity to consider the bill of costs.  Consideration of the meaning of ‘payment’ in Section 70(4) and previous authorities supported the Appellant’s case.

In considering the requirement for a settlement of account, the cases of Re Bignold (1845) and Harrion v Tew (1987) were referenced, both of which were found to support the Appellant’s position that an agreement to the bill is necessary. Lord Hamblen said, “the authorities show a long established understanding as to what payment by deduction or retention requires…both generally and with specific reference to section 70…The need for a settlement of account has been consistently stated…This requires an agreement to the sum taken or to be taken by way of payment of the bill of costs.” Therefore, there needed to be agreement as to the amount to be paid in respect of the bill of costs and mere delivery of the bill was not sufficient.

 

Lord Hamblen felt that the Respondent’s submissions as to practical implications of this conclusion were overstated, in any event these could not dictate the correct interpretation of ‘payment’ in the legislation, and the need for agreement by way of a settlement of account was long established.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed which restored Bourne J’s order for assessment.

 

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

QOCS and Fundamental Dishonesty: where are we now?

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

The rules surrounding qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS) were first introduced in April 2013, with the general rule being that a Claimant who has suffered a personal injury cannot be ordered to pay the costs of a Defendant, even if they lose their claim. QOCS applies in all personal injury claims, apart from when the Claimant is found to be fundamentally dishonest.

Fundamental dishonesty is an argument that can be raised by a Defendant when they believe the Claimant has not been truthful when bringing a claim.

Howlett v Davies [2017] was the first Court of Appeal case where the exception to QOCS was considered, supporting the procedure that should take place when a Claimant has been fundamentally dishonest. In this case, the Claimants alleged that they were passengers in the vehicle at the time of a road traffic accident. However, this was disproven factually as they were found to be lying regarding their presence. The Claimants were found to be fundamentally dishonest within the meaning of CPR 44.16(1) and costs were awarded against the Claimants as an exception.

Changes to the rules on QOCS were introduced on 6 April 2023, applying to any cases issued thereafter.

A main effect this has had relates to Part 36 offers; Part 36 offers now have the added incentive that costs after the 21-day period can be enforced against damages, without an Order from the Court.

It has been over 10 years since the rules on QOCS were introduced and more than a year since the changes were implemented, so where are we now?

In the recent personal injury case of Hamed v Ministry of Justice [2024], the Judge found the Claimant to be dishonest when exaggerating the injuries sustained. Therefore, no damages were awarded and QOCS were disapplied pursuant to the provision of CPR 44.16.

Practice Direction 44, Paragraph 12.4 states:

“In a case to which rule 44.16(1) applies (fundamentally dishonest claims) –

(a) the court will normally direct that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim is fundamentally dishonest be determined at the trial;

(b) where the proceedings have been settled, the court will not, save in exceptional circumstances, order that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined in those proceedings;

(c) where the claimant has served a notice of discontinuance, the court may direct that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined notwithstanding that the notice has not been set aside pursuant to rule 38.4;

(d) the court may, as it thinks fair and just, determine the costs attributable to the claim having been found to be fundamentally dishonest.”

 

Different courts are therefore adopting a consistent approach to exceptions to QOCS, despite the rule change of April 2023. The same outcome was drawn in both Howlett v Davies [2017] and Hamed v Ministry of Justice [2024].

Similarly, in the case of Shaw v Wilde [2024], the Defendant raised the argument that the Claimant had been fundamentally dishonest where the Claimant had lied to experts and the Court about the extent of his injuries. It was found that the Claimant should pay the Defendant’s costs due to this dishonesty. Again, CPR 44.16(1) was used to support this decision.

In conclusion, despite the progression of time, the rules surrounding QOCS and Fundamental Dishonesty are applied consistently.

Rahman v Hassan & Ors: guidance from the High Court on the effects of Part 36 offer in non-monetary claims and applications to vary costs budgets after Trial

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

The recent case of Rahman v Hassan & Ors (Re Consequential Matters) [2024] EWHC 2038 provides a useful insight into what constitutes a ‘significant development’ for the purposes of cost budget variation and the application of Part 36 offers in non-monetary matters

The case concerned the beneficial ownership of significant assets of a deceased relating to transactions alleged to have taken place between the Claimant and the late Mr Al-Hasib Mian Muhammad Abdullah Al Mahmood. It was held that these transactions amounted to donationes mortis causa, or “gifts in contemplation of death”.

Application to vary Costs Budget after Trial dismissed

The Claimant sought to vary his costs budget, which had previously been approved in the sum of £320,648.50 in accordance with the procedure under CPR 3.15A, after the trial had concluded and judgment had been handed down.

The matter was proceeding to a consequential hearing following written submissions which were ordered following the final hearing, when an increase of £134,931.55 was sought by the Claimant.

Five significant developments in the litigation were advanced by the Claimant in support of his request.

CPR Rule 3.15A Explained

Under CPR rule 3.15A, “a party must revise its budgeted costs upwards or downwards if significant developments in the litigation warrant such revisions.”

If revisions cannot be agreed between the parties, “the revising party must submit the particulars of variation promptly to the court, together with the last approved or agreed budget, and with an explanation of the points of difference if they have not been agreed.” The effects of failing to submit variations promptly were considered at length in the decision in Persimmon Homes Ltd and Anor v Osborne Clarke LLP and Anor [2021] EWHC 831 (Ch) and are discussed here.

Claimant’s application

The Claimant contended that there were five significant developments which warranted the costs budget to be changed. These are summarised as:

(1) Involvement in a road accident after the close of evidence and before closing submissions in the trial. The latter were postponed by just under a week.

(2) The fact that the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim were amended during the trial and additional costs were incurred.

(3) Additional costs were incurred as a result of the order made for written submissions at the conclusion of the trial

(4) There was an interval of some 5 1/2 months between the end of the closing submissions of the circulation of the draft judgment, and additional costs were incurred by the Claimant once that draft judgment was circulated.

(5) Work on the judgment in the period 29 May 2024 to 14 June 2024 resulted in additional costs being incurred by the Claimant.

The Court’s decision

The Court refused the Claimant’s request to vary. It was acknowledged that each of the five grounds referenced by the Claimant could be considered a development, they were not significant.

HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court), confirmed, “I do not regard any of these five matters any of these five matters as a “significant” development in the litigation which should justify a variation of the budget. The use of the word “significant” in the rule is deliberate. It is not every development that requires variation in the budget. Otherwise large amounts of pre-trial preparation time would be taken up with making applications for budget variations.”

The application of CPR Part 36 in non-monetary claims

HHJ Matthews also considered the application of CPR 36.17 to non-monetary claims. Initially the Court had determined that the Claimant had been the successful party in view of him taking beneficial ownership of significant assets of a deceased.

The claimant had made a Part 36 offer in January 2023 Part 36, in respect of the whole claim and counterclaim. The offer was that the Claimant would receive furniture and personal chattels of a property, as well as some bank accounts. At trial, the Claimant was awarded two properties, which were deemed to be significantly more valuable than the contents of the offer. The 21-day period applicable to the offer expired on 13 February 2023. The offer was not accepted, but the defendants agreed that this offer was a claimant’s Part 36 offer within CPR rule 36.17.

CPR 36.17 explained

The rule provides that where a Claimant obtains judgment against the Defendant is at least as advantageous to the Claimant as the proposals contained in a Claimant’s Part 36 offer, then the Court must, unless it considers it unjust to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to:

(a) interest on the whole or part of any sum of money (excluding interest) awarded, at a rate not exceeding 10% above base rate for some or all of the period starting with the date on which the relevant period expired;

(b) costs (including any recoverable pre-action costs) on the indemnity basis from the date on which the relevant period expired;

(c) interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above base rate; and

(d) provided that the case has been decided and there has not been a previous order under this sub-paragraph, an additional amount, which shall not exceed £75,000, calculated by applying the prescribed percentage set out below to an amount which is—

(i) the sum awarded to the claimant by the court; or

(ii) where there is no monetary award, the sum awarded to the claimant by the court in respect of costs—

Amount awarded by the court Prescribed percentage
Up to £500,000 10% of the amount awarded
Above £500,000 10% of the first £500,000 and (subject to the limit of £75,000) 5% of any amount above that figure.

 

CPR 36.17(2) states that, “in relation to any money claim or money element of a claim, “more advantageous” means better in money terms by any amount, however small, and “at least as advantageous” shall be construed accordingly.”

The decision

The Defendant had disputed the application of CPR 36.17(4)(a), on the basis that no monetary award had been made and the provisions of (2) restricted the application of the rule to money claims only.

The Court disagreed with this approach, and that they did not “read rule 36.17(2) as so restricting the scope of rule 36.17. I read that rule saying that, in the application of this rule to money claims, ‘more advantageous’ and ‘at least as advantageous’ have a money-based meaning, and no other. That is a far cry from saying that no other kinds of claims are within the rule. On the contrary, it means that, in non-money-based claims (such as this one) the phrases ‘more advantageous’ and ‘at least as advantageous’ do not have a money-based meaning but are to be construed in the ordinary sense of the words. Any other reading would mean that the words “or money element of a claim” were redundant.”

Assessment of costs on the indemnity basis, and the other benefits outlined in CPR 36.17 were subsequently agreed by the Defendants, save for a dispute on the amount of interest.

Conclusion and discussion

This case underpins the importance of demonstrating not just ‘developments’, but significant developments when seeking to vary a costs budget under CPR rule 3.15A, and the Court’s decision highlights the high bar for such applications. The Court did comment in this matter that, whilst no formal application to vary was required, the lack of evidence in support of the variation was troubling and suggests that parties seeking to vary in future cases, could prepare short witness statements in support of requests.

Comments were also made obiter dicta regarding the fact that costs budgets are not limits on costs being incurred, and there was nothing to prevent additional sums being sought at an assessment is which takes place later. This would be on the grounds of there being ‘good reason to depart’ from budgeted sums, pursuant to CPR 3.18 (b). Albeit it can be argued that the bar for seeking such departure is a high one to overcome.

The fact that the costs which were subject of the request for variation were to be assessed on the indemnity basis, brings into question the benefit to Claimant in making requests pursuant to CPR 3.15A after Trial. It should be remembered that prima facie, cost budgeting is only relevant when costs are to be assessed on the standard basis, and reference is made to the decisions in Lejonvarn v Burgess & Anor [2020] EWCA Civ 114 and Denton and Others v TH White Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906.

This blog was co-written by Daniel Murray.

We are regularly instructed to advise on costs budgets and variations. Please contact us if you have any questions.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Team and can be contacted on 07741 988 925 or at katie.spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.

Daniel Murray is a Senior Associate and Costs Lawyer in Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Funding Team and can be contacted on 07918 271 397 or at daniel.murray@clarionsolicitors.com.

A Party’s impecuniosity is not a reason to depart from the normal position on costs

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

In the case of K v W (Respondent’s Costs on Application for Permission to Appeal) [2023] EWFC 300 (B) (25 October 2023), HHJ David Williams outlined the costs implications for unsuccessful appeal attempts within the Family Court. The ruling ordered the Mother to pay the Father’s legal costs totalling £6,021.

The Appeal

Within the judgment, HHJ David Williams referred to the Appellant and Respondent as the Mother and Father. The Mother made an oral application to appeal the decision of the District Judge at the handing down of judgment hearing, which was refused. The Mother filed an Appellant’s notice for leave to appeal.

The Father was required to file a skeleton argument in response to the appeal and attend the hearing. At the permission to appeal hearing, the Appellant’s notice was refused on all grounds.

Costs of the Appeal

The Father filed a Schedule of Costs in advance of the hearing seeking a costs order against the Mother in the sum of £6,021. The Father submitted that as his attendance at the hearing was requested by the Court and due to the application being unsuccessful, a costs order should be ordered in his favour. The Father’s Schedule of Costs included £2,000 for Counsel’s brief fee and £1,000 for drafting the skeleton argument.

The Mother opposed the costs order and submitted that she had already paid the sum of £20,000 to Dr Proudman for drafting her skeleton argument and a £8,000 brief fee for attending the hearing. The Mother further submitted that she had been struggling financially and had only £100 in her bank. Nonetheless, her financial contributions to her own legal costs raised questions about her ability to pay the costs submitted by the Father.

Paragraph 4.24 of Practice Direction 30A states:

“Where the Court does request –

  • submissions from; or
  • attendance by the respondent,

the court will normally allow the costs of the respondent if permission is refused.”

In this case, the Court requested that the father file a skeleton argument and attend the hearing. For the Court to depart from the usual position as set out in the Practice Direction above, there must be a compelling reason. The Court held that “The mother’s alleged impecuniosity is not a reason to depart from the normal position on costs, although it may be relevant to how or when any costs order is to be satisfied.”

Furthermore, HHJ David Williams stated “it is clear from the mother’s own case that she either had or has been able to access funds of circa £30,000 in order to pay the fees of her counsel, Dr Proudman. If the payment of those fees has brought about the mother’s impecuniosity, as alleged, that cannot be a reason not to make a costs order in favour of the father.”

The Judge held that as the Mother was previously refused permission to appeal and knew the risks of having to pay the Father’s costs, there was no reason for the Father to be left out of pocket. When assessing the costs, the Judge concluded that the costs claimed by the Mother were significantly higher than the costs claimed by the Father. The Judge made reference to both fees for the skeleton arguments, noting that the Mother’s was 10 times more than the Father’s. An order for costs was ordered in favour of the Father and the full sum of£6,021 was held to be reasonable and proportionate.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal Apprentice in Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Funding Team. You can contact her on 07741 988925 or at katie.spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.