Does P have capacity to make decisions as to his care, support and education?

In the recent case of ‘A Local Authority v GP (Capacity – Care, Support and Education) [2020] EWCOP 56’, an application was brought by a Local Authority in respect of P’s capacity to make decisions as to his care, support and education.

By way of background, P is a 19-year-old man with a diagnosis of autism, who also suffers from anxiety and severe learning difficulties.

Following P stopping attending his placement at a specialist school, concerns were raised by the Local Authority as to P’s access to the community and engagement in activities. The feeling was that P required targeted support to develop his social skills, and to prevent him from becoming isolated.

A hearing was listed to assess whether he had capacity to make decisions such as accepting or refusing care, education and support. The Local Authority requested interim declarations stating that P lacked the capacity to refuse an assessment of his care needs (pursuant to s11 Care Act 2014), to make decisions as to his care and support needs (pursuant to s9 Care Act 2014), to request or refuse an assessment of his education and health needs for the purposes of an EHC plan (pursuant to S36{1} Children and Families Act 2014), and to make decisions as to his education and health needs (pursuant to the Children and Families Act 2014).

The conclusion was that P did not have the required capacity to make decisions as to his care, support and education, as P could not understand and weigh up the relevant information.

Ella Wilkinson is a Legal Apprentice in the Costs & Litigation Funding Department at Clarion. You can contact her on 0113 288 5693, or by email to

Should P continue to have contact with her abusive partner?

In a recent case, A County Council v LW & Anor [2020], an application was brought by a Local Authority in relation to the Protected Party’s capacity. The Protected Party was 60 years of age, and three years prior to the application, the Protected Party was admitted to a unit. The Protected Party was initially detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. When the Protected Party was admitted to the unit, she was described as being in a ‘truly parlous condition’ and it was clear that her personal hygiene was neglected.

In 1991, the Protected Party had been diagnosed as having Bipolar Affective Disorder. However, the main concern in relation to the Protected Party’s life seemed to be the long term relationship she had formed. The judge described the relationship as being abusive, exploitative, coercive and wholly inimical to the Protected Party’s welfare. It became clear that she was emaciated due to her partner restricting her food intake, limiting her to one potato and salad per day. The abusive partner had also forbidden the Protected Party from wearing underwear and engaging in activities she enjoyed, such as playing the piano, in order to meet his distorted perceptions on religion.

Whilst the Protected Party had been residing at the unit, her partner had still been living in her property, which had been neglected and was in a state of disrepair. The Protected Party’s partner has declined various requests from the Local Authority for them to meet with him or to assess the property.

The entire team who surrounded the Protected Party had a shared view that she would benefit considerably from a complete cessation of contact with her abusive partner. An application was made to decide where she should live and whether or not she should continue to have contact with her abusive partner.

If the Protected Party was allowed to return to her property with the partner, it was considered that the Court would be exposing her to a regime of controlling and abusive behaviour which was certainly not within her best interests. It was agreed by the Court that contact should be ceased between the Protected Party and her abusive partner and that the Local Authority and the Property and Affairs Deputy would progress the matter in order to evict the partner from the Protected Party’s property, in her best interests.

Please contact Casey for more information at

Update your CFAs now: decision may make thousands unenforceable

The outcome of Belsner v Cam Legal Services Limited [2020] EWHC 2755 (QB) is critically important to lawyers specialising in RTA and EL/PL work subject to fixed costs and will have an immediate effect. However, the consequences may be much more far-reaching, and any lawyer undertaking CFA work would be well-advised to consider whether their terms require amendment.


On 5 February 2016 the claimant, Ms Belsner, was a pillion passenger when the motorbike she was riding was involved in a collision. Following the accident, she instructed the defendant, a law firm, to pursue damages. The defendant offered to act under CFA terms and sent a client care letter which set out the basis on which they would charge her. The relevant details of the CFA are contained at paragraphs 9 to 16 of the judgment. However, importantly (as noted at para 15) “none of the documents provided for an overall cap on the amount recoverable by the defendant from the claimant…”

The defendant did not advise Ms Belsner of the value of her claim, but completed a risk assessment which indicated that the defendant considered the likely value of the matter was less than £2,000.

Matters progressed and the insurer settled Ms Belsner’s claim for £1,916.98 damages, plus fixed costs and disbursements totalling £1,783.48. The defendant then paid on to Ms Belsner the sum of £1,531.48 (the amount of damages less £385.50 in respect of the success fee) but did not send a bill of costs or invoice.

Ms Belsner instructed Limited and on 10 May 2018 a claim form was issued seeking an order for delivery of a statute bill. The defendant served a statute bill on 24 May 2018 which totalled £4,306.07 comprising:-

  1. Basic Charges of £2,171.90 plus VAT
  2. 100% success fee capped at 25% damages of £385.50 plus VAT
  3. GP Report of £225 plus VAT
  4. Psychology report of £806 plus VAT
  5. Total £3,588.40 plus VAT

On the defendant’s case therefore, it had been entitled to charge the claimant £4,306.07, which would have left her £605.90 out of pocket. The defendant had therefore chosen not to charge the whole of the fees they were strictly entitled to, and instead charged only the sum of £2,168.98, being the fixed costs recovered plus the success fee.

The court subsequently carried out a provisional (on paper) assessment and at first instance held that the claimant had not given “informed consent” as required by CPR 46.9(2), and on this basis limited to the basic charges to the £500 plus VAT being the amount actually paid in respect of costs by the insurer relating to costs. The court also reduced the success fee from 100% to 15%. Commenting on whether informed consent had been given, District Judge Bellamy said “given the differences in hourly rates and the lack of detailed explanation of the various costs scenarios it is hard to see how informed consent could be given”.

At a subsequent oral hearing the defendant argued that the CFA was sufficiently clear that the amount they could charge were not limited, and that accordingly it was clear that circumstances could arise in which the claimant would have to pay more than they recovered from the opponent. The Claimant argued that it was not sufficiently clear, and that in order to give express permission she should have been given enough information to balance the likely liability with the likely recovery.

Ultimately, the court assessed the defendant’s costs in the sum of £1,392 plus VAT for base costs and £208.80 plus VAT for the success fee.

As such, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to:-

  1. Base Costs: £1,392 plus VAT
  2. Success Fee: £208.80 plus VAT
  3. GP Fee: £255 plus VAT
  4. Psychology report fee: £806 plus VAT
  5. Total £2,661.80 plus VAT

However, in total Ms Belsner had only ever paid £2,168.98 because the defendant had only charged the amount recovered from the defendant plus the success fee. As such, the provisional assessment did not result in any financial recovery for Ms Belsner.

The Appeal

Ms Belsner appealed the decision on the basis that she had not given “informed consent” to the agreement that she would (or could) pay more to her solicitor than the amount recovered from her opponent in the court proceedings.

Summary of Decisions

  1. The fact that the defendant had not sought to charge everything it was entitled to was not relevant; it was not a part of the agreement.
  2. Had Ms Belsner been provided with sufficient information about the likely damages and the likely costs recoverable from her opponent, it might have affected her decision to enter into the CFA.
  3. The general terms used by the defendant in its CFA were not sufficiently clear to enable Ms Belsner to understand that she might end up with a shortfall.
  4. This case was distinguishable from Herbert v HH Law [2019] EWCA Civ 527 because in Herbert the solicitor had stated in the CFA that the amount recoverable from the client was capped at 25% of damages. There was no such limitation in this case.
  5. As a result of the above findings, Ms Belsner did not give her informed consent to enter into the CFA and it was therefore unenforceable unenforceable to the extent it required the client to pay more than was actually recovered from her opponent.

Protecting Yourself

All lawyers practicing in cases subject to fixed costs, including EL/PL and RTA, as well as those acting in Intellectual Property subject to scale costs and tribunals which may be subject to specialist costs regimes should urgently review their CFAs and ensure that they:-

  1. Make clear that the client may be charged more than they could recover from their opponent; and
  2. Include a cap on the amount which will be taken from damages in the event of success as in Herbert; or
  3. Provide an estimate of the level of damages which the client can expect to recover (and this should be bespoke to each case) and set out the details if what costs are recoverable from an opponent under Part 45. This could be as simple as including tables 6B / 6C / 6D (and the relevant tables for “portal” costs) within a schedule to the CFA.

Of course, if the CFA is not compliant then it will be necessary to take remedial action in relation to ongoing cases. It may be sufficient to send a letter to your clients providing (1) an estimate of their damages, and (2) details of what they may recover from the opponent. It may then be possible to argue that by continuing to provide instructions they have given their “informed consent” to proceed on that basis. However, it may be necessary to go further and give the client an option to terminate. It is also possible that, were it to “get out” that such a letter had been sent, it may put firms which specialise in recovering legal fees for consumers on notice of a potential goldmine of cases.

Therefore, if you find yourself in this position, you should seek advice as soon as possible to protect yourself from potential future claims.

Matthew Rose is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at and 0113 222 3248. You can contact the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

Part 36 – is it unjust to award CPR 36 consequences when the defendant does not have the money to pay? (Rawbank -v- Travelex)

This article supplements and updates one titled Consequences of Beating a Part 36 Offer: Injustice published on 12 June 2019.

The case of Rawbank SA -v- Travelex Banknotes Limited [2020] EWHC 1619 (Ch) related to a contract that the Defendant would provide banknotes totalling in excess of $40 million to the Claimant. Due to the Coronavirus pandemic the Defendant was suffering from financial difficulties such that it could not fulfil its contract with the Claimant, and required restructuring. However, the Defendant had no defence to the claim, it was simply unable to fulfil its contractual obligations. Judgment was entered against the Defendant which was more advantageous to the Claimant than the terms of a Part 36 offer the Claimant had made.

Giving judgment in relation to the consequences of CPR 36, the Court allowed some of the consequences under CPR 36.17(4), but declined to allow an “additional amount” as provided for by CPR 36.17(4)(d). This decision reinforces a number of previous judgments in relation to the application of Part 36.17, specifically:-

  1. That the Court may adopt a cherry-picking approach and allow some of the consequences of CPR 36.17(4) but not others; and
  2. The court does not have discretion to award an “additional amount” at a rate other than 10% – it is all or nothing,

What is interesting about this case, however, is why the judge declined to make the award of the additional amount.

The Part 36 offer was made on terms that “the Defendant paid £48,290,000 within 14 days of accepting the offer…” At paragraphs 35 – 37 of the judgment, Zacaroli J held that “…acceptance of the Part 36 offer could only be made by actually paying the sum referred to in it…” and that because the Defendant was insolvent, “…it would be unjust to make at least some of the orders identified in Rule 36.17(4)”. The Court effectively found that because the Defendant did not have the money to pay the settlement sum, it could not have accepted the offer, and furthermore the fact of the Defendant’s impecuniosity meant that it would unjust to award the additional amount set out in CPR 36.17(4)(d).

In summary: a party’s financial position is a relevant consideration when considering the injustice test.

This decision appears to contradict, at least in part, the earlier authority of  Cashman -v- Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1312 (QB), in which it was held that the court cannot take into account the amount of the additional amount when considering the test on injustice. It is a logical extension of that principle that the fact of a defendant’s ability or inability to pay is not a relevant consideration for the court to consider.

Furthermore, the judge appears to have erred in finding that the Part 36 offer ” could only be [accepted] by paying the sums referred to in it…” as CPR 36.14(7) provides that if the settlement sum “is not paid within 14 days of acceptance of the offer… the claimant may enter judgment for the unpaid sum”. It is plainly wrong to say that a party which accepts a Part 36 offer will then be bound to prioritise payment of the settlement sum above secured creditors (as was suggested at paragraph 35 of the judgment); the defendant will simply become liable to pay the amount of the settlement sum. If the defendant does not do so, then the claimant will be entitled to enter judgment. That judgment will be an unsecured debt and will be dealt with in an insolvency in accordance with the usual order of priority.

This decision appears to be a departure from previous authority and raises some significant uncertainty surrounding the meaning of “injustice” in the context of CPR 36.17, which many lawyers had hoped had been settled by a number of judgments in 2018 and 2019. It remains to be seen whether Rawbank will set a new standard by which the test of injustice is measured, or whether future courts will distinguish the case on the basis of its somewhat unique factual background. In either case, it can only be hoped that a case will find its way to a higher court to give some clarity on the question of what precisely “injustice” is.

Matthew Rose is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at and 0113 222 3248. You can contact the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

What is classed as a net-asset?

Following the case of Penntrust Ltd v West Berkshire District Council & Anor 2020, the ambiguity of whether property is classed as a net-asset when considering a Protected Party’s estate was clarified.

For the purpose of context, the Applicant was appointed as the Protected Party’s Deputy in October 2014 in relation to property and financial affairs.

In January 2019, an Application was made to discharge the of professional Deputy. The Deputy sought the authority for detailed costs assessment by the Senior Courts Costs Office for the work conducted to the date of discharge, even though the asset value (according to PD19B) was below £16,000, because the Protected Party’s property – valued in excess of £300,000 – was disregarded

The Deputyship Order in which the Applicant wished to rely upon contained authority that stated ‘The Deputy is entitled to fixed costs in relation to their application and to receive fixed costs or the general management of affairs of the Protected Party. If the Deputy would prefer the costs to be assessed, the order is to be treated as authority to the Senior Courts Cost Office to carry out a detailed assessment on the standard basis’.

The Protected Party’s liquid assets were substantially less than the £16,000 requirement for costs to be assessed and therefore only provided the Applicant with the fixed costs provision under Practice Direction 19B. It was imperative for costing purposes that the Protected Party’s property that they lived in be established as an asset to increase the asset worth, in order for the Applicant to seek detailed assessment and recover costs incurred throughout the management periods. Ordinarily, the property would be disregarded if the Protected Party or a dependent lived there.

Following the hearing, it was concluded that the term ‘net-assets’ in PD19B effective from April 2017, falls to be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the phrase, ‘total assets minus total liabilities’. This meant that the Protected Party’s property would be included within net-assets which resulted in the £16,000 threshold being exceeded, allowing for detailed assessment. It was also noted the Protected Party’s occupation of the property did not exclude it from quantification of assets in this case.

Following this inclusion of the property, the Applicant had sufficient authority to seek detailed assessment from the Senior Courts Costs Office.

In cases where fixed costs are not appropriate, professionals may apply to the Court for clarification if their order gives them authority for a detailed assessment of costs. However, it is noted that the use of fixed costs is still encouraged by the Courts. The provision of the £16,000 threshold does continue to apply if the net-assets of a Protected Party are below the specified amount.

It is positive that the Court recognised that it is not always appropriate to disregard the property as an asset and this case enables Deputies to apply to amend their Order allowing the property to be included as an asset, regardless of whether the Protected Party or a dependent lives there.

Please contact Ellis Tolan at 0113 288 5679 or email for more information.

5 reductions in COP assessments that you need to know about!

At Clarion, we deal with over 2,000 COP bills of costs per year and we monitor common reductions. Every case is completely different, but you do not need to simply accept the reductions made to your bill of costs and you can request a reassessment, if appropriate to do so. We recognise the hard work that COP practitioners put into their matters and are passionate about working with our clients to help them recover fair and reasonable costs. Based on our experience, we have identified 5 recent reductions which we think should be on your radar.

Document time reductions

It is common for time spent on documents to be reduced or struck out where the Costs Officer considers it to be excessive, but it may be necessary to challenge these reductions. If you can provide reasonable justification as to the time spent, the necessity of the task at hand and the grade of fee earner undertaking the task, then it can be beneficial to provide more information to the Costs Officer and request that the reduction is reconsidered. A good example of this is time relating to the OPG102 in exceptional cases, where the Protected Party’s liquid assets are high or their estate is particularly complex.

Contact with internal teams

It is not uncommon for the Deputy to require support from another area of expertise in a management period or application. Examples could include the Conveyancing Team in respect of property matters, or the Employment Team regarding the directly employed care staff. The contact with internal teams is commonly reduced as ‘inter-fee earner’, however it is often essential in progressing the matter. If an external team were to be instructed, the time would likely be much more costly, therefore the instruction of the internal team can often be in the Protected Party’s best interests. It can be beneficial to advise the Costs Officer of the situation and the necessity of the internal teams’ assistance, to allow them to reconsider reductions appropriately.

Lack of evidence

Whereby the Costs Officer strikes out time due to the ‘lack of evidence’ or ‘no file note’, this should be challenged by simply providing the relevant file notes. Evidence for all work done should be on file, but if something is missed, this can be provided retrospectively which allows the Costs Officer to reconsider the time they disallowed.

Excessive contact with the Protected Party/Family/Case Managers

A common reduction is excessive contact with the Protected Party, their family or the Case Manager.  A high level of contact may be necessary for a number of reasons. The Protected Party might call the fee earner very regularly, or there might be issues with directly employed care team which would be vital for the Case Manager to deal with, communicating with the Deputy to resolve them properly, or a family member may act as the main point of contact. If there are reasons behind the high levels of  contact, they should be set out to the Costs Officer to justify it and show that the time spent was proportionate to the matter. We regularly see blanket reductions to high levels of contact, which can often be resolved during reassessment in the right cases.

Travel Reductions

Reductions to travel time aren’t common, however they do still occur. Travel reductions should be challenged if they are not reasonable. The Protected Party can often live very far from the Deputy and if the meeting is reasonable, the mode of transport is appropriate and the time spent is justified, a reduction of this kind should not be accepted.

We are happy to advise any professional Deputy who is unhappy with the outcome of their assessment and continue to work with law firms nationally to help them recover fair and reasonable costs. Please contact Casey for more information at

Solicitors Hourly Rates: Shulman -v- Bogolyubov

In Shulman -v- Kolomoisky & Bogolyubov, Senior Courts Costs Office (24/06/20) the Second Defendant (Bogolyubov) had instructed solicitors in Canary Wharf (postcode E14), which would place it within London Band 3 of the Solicitors Guideline Rates. The Claimant, who was liable to pay the Second Defendant’s costs, argued that the court should allow rates falling between the guideline rates for London 1 and London 3, taking into account the nature of the work.

Referring to the judgment of Mrs Justice O’Farrell in Ophen -v- Invesco [2019] EWHC 2504 (TCC) that “the guideline rates are based on rates fixed in 2010 and reviewed in 2014… they are not helpful in determining reasonable rates in 2019”, Master Rowley of the Senior Courts Costs Office considered the Claimant’s proposed starting point to be “entirely opportunistic”. The Master went on to point out that “the Guideline Rates were originally provided to judges when the Civil Procedure Rules arrived in April 1999 and the concept of summary assessment of costs first came into being. Many judges had little or no experience of costs and the guideline rates were there to provide assistance on summary assessment. They were not intended to replace a more thorough consideration of appropriate hourly rates in detailed assessments… it is something of an indictment on the evidence usually provided at detailed assessment hearings that the Guideline Rates have often been used… without variation. Although Master Rowley did point out that the Second Defendant had provided no explanation as to how the level of the hourly rates had been arrived at, he commented that the guideline rates re “is really the roughest of rough guides as to what might be allowed”.

In light of these comments, Master Rowley considered that in the absence of any evidence, the Court is required to consider the “pillars of wisdom” at CPR 44.4(3) in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the rates claimed are reasonable.

One further comment of note is that Master Rowley pointed out that “there is a very fluid market in terms of what hourly rates can be obtained” and that there are many factors which affect this which fall outside the remit of CPR 44.4(3), such as the solicitor’s appetite for such work or the potential for future work to be obtained from the same client.

Based upon the above, Master Rowley allowed rates of £750 for Grade A, £400 for Grade C, and £200 for Grade D.

It is important to note that this case related to firms practicing in London, which paying parties (and some judges) in regional courts consider to be a “special case” with no application outside the M25. It therefore adds to a growing volume of case law that the Guideline Rates are no longer suitable as a starting point, but until there is guidance from a higher court this should be treated as supportive but not a guarantee for receiving parties outside London.

Matthew Rose is a Solicitor in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion. You can contact him on 0113 222 3248, or by email to