Costs of Attending Inquests: Looking at more than just the financial value of the claim

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Fullick & Ors v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 1941 (QB)

This case, which was before The Honourable Mrs Justice Slade BDE, related to an appeal from the Judgment of Deputy Master Keens from October 2018, wherein the costs were assessed at circa £88,000.00; reduced from just over £122,000.00. The Claimant’s Bill of Costs included costs of attending two Pre-Inquest Reviews as well as the Inquest itself.

The claim was for damages for breach of Article 2 of the ECHR, negligence and misfeasance in public office following the death of a relative of the Claimants. The claim was settled for just over £18,000.00 prior to any Letter of Claim.

In respect of the costs litigation aspect of the claim, the Defendant appealed the Judgment of Master Keen on two grounds:

  1. Deputy Master Keen erred in law in concluding that the £88,356.22 ordered to be paid by the Defendant was proportionate within the meaning on CPR 44.3(5) and that Deputy Master Keen failed to take into account CPR 44.3(2).
  2. Deputy Master Keen wrongly accepted the Claimants’ argument that the ‘general costs of the inquest’ were recoverable costs of the action. By wrongly holding that the Inquest was ‘the battleground’ for the claim, Deputy Master Keen was led into the error of allowing the vast majority of the Inquest costs as costs of the claim.

The Defendant contended that the costs were to be assessed by reference to Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc v Zhunus [2015] EWHHC 404, wherein it is provided that the costs payable are;

“the lowest amount which [the receiving party] could reasonably be expected to spend in order to have the case conducted and presented proficiently having regard to all the circumstances”

The  Defendant also contended that the court was not bound by decisions made prior to the introduction of the Jackson reforms, Mrs Justice Slade disagreed at paragraph 44.  

“I disagree. In my judgement there is no reason to disregard previous authorities where and insofar as they deal with considerations in the current rules of court which are to be applied when assessing costs”

At Paragraph 46 Mrs Justice Slade referred to guidance provided in Roach and Anor v Home Office [2010] 2 WLR 746 and Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts [1981] Ch 179.

“These authorities emphasise the need to identify the issues raised in the civil claim and the relevance of matters in other proceedings, the inquest in Roach, or procedures, in Gibson, to determine as a first question, whether any of those costs can in principle be claimed in the civil proceedings. Once the threshold of relevance has been passed, the costs judge will decide whether the costs claimed in respect of, in this case, the Inquest, were proportionate to the matters in issue in the civil proceedings. As for the amount of those costs, those which are disproportionate may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably and necessarily incurred.”

This confirmed that the cost of attending an Inquest had to be relevant to the civil claim before the issue of proportionality was considered. Rather than the costs as a whole being assessed under the proportionality test.

Further, it was confirmed that no two cases are the same when assessing the recoverability of the costs of an Inquest in a civil claim, “It is trite but important to emphasise that each application for costs in a civil claim and related to an Inquest must be determined on its own facts”. This is as per Roach.

Mrs Justice Slade later differentiated the current claim from that of Kazakhstan Kagazy, due to this claim being about more than money.

When providing her Judgment, Mrs Justice Slade allowed ground 2 of the appeal in so far as two specific items within the Claimant’s Bill of Costs (items 68 and 69, which were documents time), where Deputy Master Keen had undertaken a broad-brush assessment rather than assessing the relevance of each cost ( the documents time claimed at items 68 and 69 had not been split into categories or subjects).

In relation to ground 1 of the appeal, Mrs Justice Slade confirmed “Deputy Master Keen did not err in taking into account the issues raised in the civil claim were not only financial but were of important to the deceased family”. The Defendant themselves acknowledged this claim was not just about the money,

By virtue of allowing ground 2 of the appeal, ground 1 of the appeal was also allowed in so far as the total costs awarded following re-assessment of items 68 and 69 were to be assessed.

This decision makes sense, as the relevance of the costs of attending the inquests are to be considered; this is established law. However, this was not undertaken as Deputy Master Keen adopted a broad-brush approach in relation to items 68 and 69 of the Bill of Costs without considering the relevance of the time claimed within the documents schedule.

Furthermore, the Court recognised that the claim was much more than just a financial claim to the Claimants. This will be welcome news to Claimant lawyers dealing with low value matters; which carry  that element of importance or justice for the Claimant which cannot be truly quantified in monetary terms.  

This blog was written by Matthew Waring who is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Team at Clarion. Matthew can be contacted on 0113 288 5639 or at Matthew.Waring@clarionsolicitors.com

A Complete Chronological guide to budgeting case law

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There are many case authorities in relation to budgeting since the process was implemented, it is hard to keep track of them all. Here is a complete list of cases.

 

2014

Appeals

Havenga -v- Gateshead NHS Foundation Trust [2014] EWHC B25(QB)

General guidance

A & B (Court of Protection: Delay & Costs) [2014] EWCOP 8)

Hegglin -v- Persons Unknown & Google Inc [2014] EWHC 3793 (QB)

Thomas Pink Ltd -v-Victoria’s Secret UK Limited [2014]

Yeo-v-Times Newspapers Ltd  [2014] EWHC 2853 (QB)

 

2015

General guidance

BP -v- Cardiff & Vale University Local Health Board [2015] EWHC B13 (Costs)

(GSK Project Management Ltd -v- QPR Holdings Ltd [2015] EWHC 2274 (TCC)

Stocker -v- Stocker [2015] EWHC 1634 (QB))

Tim Yeo MP -v- Times Newspapers Limited [2015] EWHC 209 (QB))

Various Claimants -v- Sir Robert McAlpine & others [2015] EWHC 3543 (QB)

Judicial guidance cases

GSK Project Management Ltd -v- QPR Holdings Ltd [2015] EWHC 2274 (TCC)

Tim Yeo MP -v- Times Newspapers Limited [2015] EWHC 209 (QB)

Late filing of a budget

Simpson -v- MGN Limited [2015] EWHC 126 (QB)

Overspending on the budget

CIP Properties (AIPT) Limited -v- Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd [2015] EWHC 481 (TCC)

Excelerate Technology Ltd -v- Cumberbatch [2015] EWHC B1 Mercantile)

Parish -v- The Danwood Group Ltd [2015] EWHC 940(QB)

Simpson -v- MGN Limited [2015] EWHC 126 (QB)

Proportionality in budgeting

(BP -v- Cardiff & Vale University Local Health Board [2015] EWHC B13 (Costs)

Various Claimants -v- Sir Robert McAlpine & others [2015] EWHC 3543 (QB)

 

2016

General guidance

Agents’ Mutual Limited -v- Gascoigne Halman [2016] CAT 21

Campbell -v- Campbell [2016] EWHC 2237 (Ch)

Group Seven Limited -v- Nasir [2016] EWHC 629 (Ch)

Merrix -v- Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC B28 (QB)

Signia Wealth Limited -v- Marlborough Trust Company Limited [2016] EWHC 2141 (Ch) –

Agents’ Mutual Limited -v- Gascoigne Halman [2016] CAT 21

Late filing of a budget

Jamadar -v- Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2016] EWCA Civ 1001

Murray -v-BAE Systems PLC (Liverpool County Court, 1st April 2016)

Outcome of budgets and costs of assessment

Sony Communications International AB -v- SSH Communications Security Corporation [2016] EWHC 2985 (Pat)

Proportionality in budgeting

(Considers Agents’ Mutual Limited -v- Gascoigne Halman [2016] CAT 21

Group Seven Limited -v- Nasir [2016] EWHC 629 (Ch)

Revising the budget

Warner -v- The Pennine Acute Hospital NHS Trust (Manchester County Court 23rd September 2016)

The budgeting procedure

Agents’ Mutual Limited -v- Gascoigne Halman [2016] CAT 21

Merrix -v- Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC B28 (QB)

 

2017

Departing from the budget on detailed assessment

RNB v London Borough of Newham [2017] EWHC B15 (Costs)

General guidance

Harrison -v- University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire Hospital NHS Trust [2017]  EWCA Civ 792

MacInnes -v- Gross [2017] EWHC 127 (QB)

Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd & Ors [2017] EWHC 1433 (Pat)

Judicial Guidance cases

Findcharm Ltd -v- Churchill Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 1109 (TCC)

Woodburn v Thomas (Costs budgeting) [2017] EWHC B16 (Costs)

Late filing of a budget

Asghar -v- Bhatti [ 2017] EWHC 1702 (QB)

Mott & Anor v Long & Anor [2017] EWHC 2130 (TCC)

Outcome of budgets and costs of assessment

Harrison -v- University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire Hospital NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 792)

Merrix -v- Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWHC 346 (QB)

Part 36 in budgeting

Car Giant Limited -v- the Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Hammersmith [2017] EWHC 197 (TCC)

Proportionality in budgeting

Rezek-Clarke -v- Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWHC B5 (Costs)

Revising the budget

Asghar -v- Bhatti [2017] EWHC 1702 (QB)

Sharp v Blank & Ors [2017] EWHC 3390 (Ch)

Sir Cliff Richard OBE -v- The BBC & Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2017] EWHC 1666

 

2018

Departing from the budget on detailed assessment

Jallow v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC B7 (Costs)

Nash v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC B4 (Costs)

General guidance

Yirenki v Ministry of Defence, [2018] 5 Costs LR 1177

 

 

The court ratified past and future gifts from P’s estate according to the Official Solicitor’s submissions

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In FL v MJL (By His Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) [2019] EWCOP 31, an application was made to the Court of Protection to ratify gifts that had been previously made on MJL’s behalf, and also for authority to make prospective gifts on MJL’s behalf. MJL’s brother, FL, was appointed as Deputy pursuant to the Orders dated 21 July 2008 and 23 January 2012. The Official Solicitor acted as MJL’s Litigation Friend in the proceedings.

MJL is unmarried and has no children, and also has four siblings, who each have their own children. His estate was valued in excess of £17 million. MJL receives care funding from the NHS, and as a result has an annual surplus of over £100,000.00.

A Statutory Will was executed in 2010, in which FL and RL, MJL’s siblings, were appointed as executors. The estate was to be divided up as follows; 60% split equally between MJL’s siblings, with the remainder of the estate to be divided equally between several organisations, including Oxfam, Amnesty International, and War on Want.

FL, the Applicant, made an application to the Court authorising the retrospective authorisation of previous gifts made by FL as Deputy, including Christmas gifts to MJL’s siblings, as well as gifts to the Labour Party, The Red Banner, and Charter 88, continuing the standing orders set up by MJL when had capacity. FL also requested authority to make gifts in the future to the taxable and charitable beneficiaries under MJL’s will, however the Official Solicitor did not agree with the proposals.

The Official Solicitor instead proposed that a gift of £1,184,387.00 be made from MJL’s estate, to be split equally between the siblings and the charitable beneficiaries in the ratio agreed in the Statutory Will (60% between the siblings, and 40% to the charities). They also proposed that gifts be made in the future from MJL’s surplus income in the same proportions as above. It was believed that the gifts would be beneficial to MJL in respect of reducing inheritance tax.

It was agreed between the parties that MJL could afford to make the proposed gifts. The Judge agreed with the proposals made by the Official Solicitor, and also noted that the standing orders set up by MJL when he had capacity should continue and were in MJL’s best interests.

THIRD PARTY FUNDING – A VIABLE OPTION FOR 21ST CENTURY LITIGATION (Part 3)

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This series of blog articles will address the increasing viability of third party funding as an alternative to traditional litigation funding methods. It will look at how the law has developed historically and how the Court now approaches third party funding and the potential liability of third party funders.

The third part of this series will explore the liability of third party funders in the matter of Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2005] 1 WLR 3055.

Background

This matter related to an unsuccessful action in respect of anti-competitive practices which resulted in the collapse of the Claimant’s company, and which severely affected his finances. The Claimant entered into an agreement with a professional litigation funding company (MPC) to provide funding for the expert evidence and litigation support services for the expert. MPC did not agree to pay any of the Defendants’ costs or to provide finances for an ATE premium due to the significant amount of the premiums available.

The claim was unsuccessful at Trial and the Claimant was ordered to pay the Defendants’ costs. The Defendants’ then sought a non-party cost order against MPC for the entirety of the Defendants’ entitlement to costs. However, this was refused at first instance.

The Defendants subsequently appealed the decision.

Decision

The Court of Appeal considered the balance that needed to be struck between the access to justice provided by third party funding and the general rule that costs should follow the event. It was considered that a funder who purchased a stake in an action should then be protected from all liability of the opposing party’s costs in the event the claim fails.

The Court of Appeal commended the following approach:

‘a professional funder, who finances part of a Claimant’s costs of litigation, should be potentially liable for the costs of the opposing party to the extent of the funding provided’

This has become known as the Arkin cap. This approach has provided clarity and transparency to funders as they can now quantify their liability should the matter fail.

Whilst the cap has been readily adopted by the funding industry, it has also not been without criticism. The main criticism being that the cap creates an uneven playing field in favour of the third party funder as they will only ever be liable for the amount of their investment, whilst the opposing party would be liable for all of the costs of the funded party.

In the next part of the series…

The next blog in this series will take a look at the recent decision which has built upon the ‘Arkin cap’ in the matter of Davey v Money [2019] EWHC 997 (Ch).


This blog was prepared by Kris Kilsby who is an Associate Costs Lawyer at Clarion and part of the Costs Litigation Funding Team.  Kris can be contacted at kris.kilsby@clarionsolicitors.com or on 0113 227 3628.

INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE ON AN ADDITIONAL AMOUNT AWARDED UNDER CPR 36.17(4)(d)

Matthew RoseLeave a comment

Where the Court awards an “additional amount” under CPR 36.17(4)(d) as a claimant / receiving party beating its own Part 36 offer, the additional amount will not attract “enhanced” interest under CPR 36.17(4)(a).

In FZO -v- Adams & Anor [2019] EWHC 1286 (QB) the court allowed an additional amount under CPR 36.17(4)(d), but held that interest under CPR 36.17(4)(a) – enhanced interest at 10% above base rate – was not payable on that amount. Giving judgment, Mrs Justice Cutts found that the construction of CPR 36.17(4)(d) was that the “additional amount” was not a “sum awarded” and that the words “additional” and “amount” mean that the award is in addition to the enhanced interest at CPR 36.17(4)(a).

It should be noted that CPR 36.17(4) states that where the claimant has beaten their own offer the court “…must, unless it considers it unjust to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to…” and thereafter lists the consequences (enhanced interest, additional amount, etc). This does not appear to accord with the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s submission that the additional amount is not a “sum awarded”. On the construction of CPR 36.17(4) it seems that those consequences are sums awarded by the court, albeit they are sums which the court is bound to award save where it considers it to be unjust.

Notwithstanding, the second strand of the judge’s reasoning appears wholly sound insofar as the “additional amount” is additional to the other consequences and therefore not itself subject to those consequences.

However, practitioners should be aware that this applies only to interest arising under CPR 36.17(4)(a). As the additional amount is a sum which a party is ordered to pay, and (as above) is a sum which the court orders that party to pay, it is a judgment debt and thus interest will, in the author’s opinion, arise under section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 at the rate of 8% should payment not be made within the prescribed period (14 days pursuant to CPR 40.11 unless otherwise ordered)

Matthew Rose is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at matthew.rose@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 222 3248. You can contact the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

Court of Protection Court Fees: An Update

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In order to have a bill of costs assessed, it is necessary to pay a Court Fee to the Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO). Depending on the type of the bill, the fee amount varies. Currently, within the Court of Protection, the cost to have a bill assessed is £225 for a detailed bill and £115 for a short form bill of costs. A short form bill is a bill with profit costs up to £3,000 and a detailed bill of costs is a bill with profit costs above £3,000.

From the 22nd July 2019, these fees are due to change. By way of The Court Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019 there is due to be a reduction to the Court Fees due to have a bill of costs assessed. S4 (3)(a) of the Act states that the fee for filing a bill of costs to be assessed will be £85.00. This is dramatic change within the rules and something that will affect all professional Deputies who wish to have their bill of costs assessed, making it cheaper to do so.

The most significant aspect of the Act is that going forward, there will be no distinction between fees for filing short form and detailed bills of costs. As stated, this will be taking place from the 22nd July 2019 and so all professional Deputies should be aware of this when sending any bills to the SCCO to be assessed on or after this date.

There will also be changes made to application, appeal and hearing fees for all Court of Protection matters. These can be found in s3 The Court Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019.

 

Yirenki v Ministry of Defence [2018] 11 WLUK 53 – Are hourly rates a good reason to depart from the budget?

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When budgeting cases, the Civil Procedures Rules (CPR) under Practice Direction (PD) 3E para.7.3 provides that, when the Court is approving figures, the approval should “only relate to the total figures for budgeted costs of each phase”.

In this claim, upon costs management, the Judge approved both a number of hours for each phase, as well as individual disbursements in the budget. This approach is clearly contrary to the CPR. Parties often reserve the position in relation to their incurred costs, and the hourly rates on the incurred costs, to be dealt with at detailed assessment. Interestingly, Master Davison reserved the issue of the hourly rates for the future costs to also be dealt with at detailed assessment.

Reduction to the hourly rates

Now, we know from the case of Jallow v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC B7 (Costs) that, where there has been a reduction to the hourly rates for the incurred work, this is not a good reason to depart from the budgeted costs. Master Davison clearly differs in his opinion, given that he has reserved the position of the hourly rates specifically for the estimated costs.

This decision has since been appealed and has, not surprisingly, been allowed. It was said by Mr Justice Jacobs QC that the approach of Master Davison was contrary to the CPR. Relying on rule CPR 3.15(2)(b) specifically, he provided that the correct approach is clearly that the approved figure is meant to be a final figure, rather than a provisional one which the other side could later attempt to reduce.

Mr Justice Jacobs QC advised that the cost budgeting process is not meant to be a detailed assessment in advance and that the job of the Court is to approve a proportionate figure which can be relied on. The principle of reserving the position as to the hourly rates of the budgeted figures weakens the reliance that can be placed on the budget itself, supporting the case of Jallow v Ministry of Defence  [2018] EWHC B7 (Costs), in that hourly rates are not a good reason to depart from the budgeted figures.