Category: Court of Protection

THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE – WHAT IS IT? IS IT IMPORTANT?

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What is the Indemnity Principle?

A long-established principle which effectively means that a successful party cannot recover more in legal costs then they are liable to pay their solicitor under the terms of the contract with their solicitors.

Why does it exist?

To indemnify the winner for the reasonable legal costs incurred on the matter. In practice, the loser contributes to those costs.

If the indemnity principle did not exist, then a losing party could face a costs liability higher than the winner is liable to pay his solicitor. This would mean that a client would make a profit from the costs of the litigation which is not the intention of costs awards. The intention is to reasonably compensate the winner for the legal costs they have incurred.

Please note that there are some exceptions to the indemnity principle, for example, inter-partes claims for costs where the matter was funded by way of a Legal Aid Certificate, and fixed costs claims i.e. where the costs incurred are lower than the costs that can be claimed inter parties.

Key Case Law

Harold v Smith [1860] 5 H & N 381

Costs orders inter-partes are awarded as an indemnity to the receiving party. They are not awarded to impose a punishment on the party who pays them.

Gundry v Sainsbury [1910]

The Court of Appeal confirmed the underlying principle set out in Harold v Smith. The solicitor had acted for no charge and tried (unsuccessfully) to seek costs from the opponent. The court held that the solicitor was not entitled to recover costs as there was no agreement from the client to pay.

J H Milner & Son v Percy Bilton Limited [1966] 1 WLR 1985

Retainer (contract for services by the solicitor) is fundamental to the right to recover costs. No retainer equals no entitlement to recover costs from clients (and therefore no entitlement to costs inter-partes).

Is the Indemnity Principle important?

Taking into account the above cases (which remain good authorities) the indemnity principle is clearly very important and something which every contentious lawyer should have a sound knowledge and understanding of. Failure to do so can lead to serious professional consequences.

The importance of the indemnity principle is best illustrated by the case of Bailey v IBC Vehicles Limited [1998] 3 All ER 570 where the Court said that the signature of a Bill of Costs is that of an officer of the Court and that mis-certification of the Bill is a serious (disciplinary) offence.

In that case Lord Justice Henry said:

“the signature of the Bill of Costs under the rules is effectively a certificate by an officer of the Court that the receiving party’s solicitors are not seeking to recover in relation to any item more than they have agreed to charge under a contentious business agreement. The Court can (and should unless there is evidence to the contrary) assume that his signature to the Bill of Costs shows that the indemnity principle has not been offended”.

When lawyers sign costs budgets, statements of costs for summary assessment and Bills of Costs it is therefore fundamentally important to ensure that there is no breach of the indemnity principle.

I am now going to consider two recent cases regarding the indemnity principle:

Gempride v Jagjit Bamrah & Law Lords of London Limited [2018] EWCA CIV 1367

In this matter, the receiving party’s bill of costs claimed hourly rates higher than those which the client had agreed to pay their solicitor within the retainer. Furthermore, misleading information was provided in Replies to Points of Dispute in respect of the availability of before the event insurance.

The matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal where the Court imposed a penalty for the mis-certification of the Bill of 50% (Part 1 of the Bill of Costs only). Whilst the penalty in the end was not too severe, the real damage for the law firm was to its reputation.

HMRC v Gardiner and Others [2018] EWHC 1716 (QB)

This matter related to an appeal by HMRC in respect of an order for them to pay the Respondents’ costs in tax appeal proceedings. The Respondents were amongst several tax payers challenging penalties imposed by HMRC for incorrect tax returns.

The Respondent’s tax advisors were at the forefront of the work carried out. Counsel was instructed to represent the Respondents and the fees were paid by their tax advisors. HMRC alleged a breach of the indemnity principle (no direct retainer). That argument failed and the key points were as:

  1. There was never an agreement that the Respondents would never pay Counsel’s fees;
  2. Counsel was there to represent the Respondents, not their advisors;
  3. No difference to a trade union funding arrangement; and
  4. The key is a liability to pay (the Respondents were liable to pay the fees that were incurred, but the tax advisors paid them).This is a useful case to rely on where costs have been paid by a third party and a challenge is raised that there has been a breach of the indemnity principle as a result.


    Summary

    As you can see from the authorities, the indemnity principle has been with us for some time. Lord Justice Jackson recommended the abolition of the indemnity principle in his Final Report in 2010. He was of the opinion that the indemnity principle caused more problems than it solved. However, in my view the indemnity principle should always be in place whilst we have a cost shifting environment in England and Wales. Otherwise, it could encourage inflated claims for costs and allow clients to profit on the costs of litigation and therefore increase claims for costs – which would be contrary to the whole purpose of the Jackson Reforms!

    Do you have any views? – please feel free to share them.

    This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team. Andrew can be contacted at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com or on 0113 336 3334 or 07764 501252.

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The Local Authority seeks orders to restrict the Husband’s contact with the Protected Party.

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The case of SR v A Local Authority & Anor (2018), involves the Protected Party (SR), who was an 83-year-old woman who suffered from late onset Alzheimer’s, which was of moderate to severe intensity.

The Protected Party resides at a care home and lacks capacity to decide who she has contact with and to decide on any arrangements for such contact. The Local Authority raised awareness that the Protected Party may be at risk of harm in her husband’s sole care, due to his expressed views on euthanasia, which involved reference to throwing himself and his wife into a river and supplying her with tablets. The Protected Party’s husband also had restrictions placed on the care that he could provide to the Protected Party, such as having to be accompanied if he took her out of the care home. The Protected Party’s family wished for her to return home and the Protected Party has allegedly stated her wishes to be with her husband as she becomes distressed when he leaves her.

In determining whether the Protected Party would be at risk, the court reached the conclusion that the restriction sought by the Local Authority was neither justifiable, proportionate or necessary. They therefore declined to make the Order sought. It was believed that the Protected Party’s husband would most likely not harm the Protected Party, as he had been previously been with her many times unaccompanied. The Protected Party’s daughter also stated that her mother and her father were a happy and loving couple with no allegations of domestic violence ever having been made between them.

Unusual Granting of an Order to Prevent the Protected Party from knowing the full details of his Personal Injury Settlement following an application made by his Professional Deputy.

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In this personal injury case, the judge had to grapple with an unexpected question – should a Deputy, appointed to manage the personal injury payment made to a brain-injured claimant, be allowed to not tell the claimant the exact amount that was awarded to him?

The case of EXB v FDZ

The case of EXB v FDZ (2018) was very unusual in that it involved an application by the Protected Party’s professional Deputy, and his mother as Litigation Friend, to prevent the Protected Party from knowing the full details of his personal injury settlement, which was deemed to be in his best interests.

This was a complex matter, as the Court recognised that withholding such information inadvertently affected the Protected Party’s rights. Judge Foskett explained in his judgement that he had never come across this issue before and he called upon assistance from Ms. Butler-Cole as a ‘friend of the Court’.

The Protected Party

The Protected Party sustained orthopaedic injuries, alongside a severe brain injury following a road traffic accident. The Protected Party was a backseat passenger in a car driven by the First Defendant. The Protected Party was not wearing a seatbelt and his damages were reduced accordingly, following an admission of contributory negligence.

Why was it in the best interests of the Protected Party to withhold settlement info?

The applicants submitted evidence from both themselves and professionals which detailed the reasons as to why it was in the Protected Party’s best interests to withhold the settlement information.

The Protected Party’s neuropsychologist stated that “Such knowledge would translate and impact upon his behaviour”. It was believed that the Protected Party would become fixated by the sum of money, that it would lead to him being extremely vulnerable and placed into a situation where he was likely to be financially exploited. Interestingly, the Protected Party himself expressed to his Deputy and the Court that he would be better off not knowing the sum; however, he also stated that he was conned into making such a statement. Following the accident, the Protected Party was very impulsive, and he often became very anxious when it came to money, struggling to budget and often living beyond his means.

The Judge gave careful consideration to the evidence submitted, as well as reviewing the relevant legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Following this, the Judge held that the Protected Party lacked the relevant decision-making capacity, finding that it was in the Protected Party’s best interests not to be told the value of the reward. The Judge also considered whether it was within the scope of a normal Deputy Order not to reveal the sum; however, the Deputy argued that it would make the Deputy’s life more difficult if the Protected Party believed that he was personally withholding the information and it was considered more appropriate for the Deputy to state that the Court prevented him from doing so.

Costs of the application

The next issue that arose was in respect of the costs of the application. The Claimant sought the costs of the application to be paid by the Third and Fourth Defendants of the Personal Injury claim, as their tort had necessitated. The Third and Fourth Defendants objected to paying the costs. Their defence stated that “they should not be responsible for the costs because all of the issues between them and the Claimant were concluded by the Settlement which was approved in April 2018” and that this particular issue was a ‘solicitor/own client’ dispute. Within the remit of the initial Personal Injury claim, there was no claim for costs attributable to this issue within the Schedule of Loss and there was also the fear that there may be an “open-ended commitment to pay the costs associated with any repeat applications”.

As the issue had been dealt with under the Court of Protection, it was necessary to apply the Court of Protection costs rules. The general rule being that where the issue concerns financial matters, the costs of all parties are to be borne from the Protected Party’s estate (Rule 19.2). The Court does have a broad discretion to depart from the general rule, if circumstances made a different order more appropriate (Rule 19.5). In this case, the Third and Fourth Defendants had not been made formal parties to the application, but they had been provided with an opportunity to make representations regarding the Costs Order being sought.

Judge Foskett held that the costs were to be borne by the relevant Defendants, as the need to make the application arose directly from their actions following the injury caused to the Protected Party, therefore departing from the general rule.

It will be interesting to see whether there will be any similar applications and what the outcomes will be. The Judge has invited the appropriate bodies to consider these matters and decide whether a consultation on this issue will be required.

This blog was prepared by Danielle Walker who is a Costs Lawyer within the Court of Protection Team. Danielle can be contacted at Danielle.walker@clarionsolicitors.com

 

 

Impersonating a Protected Party grounds for imprisonment – Dudley v Hill

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Court of Protection orders imprisonment of a Respondent for falsely impersonating the Protected Party and breaching an injunction.

In the case of Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council v Hill (2018), the Court of Protection made an Order for committal to prison after the Respondent was found guilty of impersonating the Protected Party and incurring costs on the Protected Party’s behalf without the authority to do so.

The Court of Protection were concerned for the Protected Party, both in relation to his health and welfare and also his property and financial affairs. There had been a provisional declaration made within the proceedings that the Protected Party lacked capacity. The Protected Party resided in his own home with his support workers, and the Local Authority were heavily involved in the matter.

The Protected Party was an 82-year-old man who suffered from dementia and the Respondent had been impersonating the Protected Party for a significant amount of time. The Respondent was served an injunction which forbid him to directly or indirectly contact the Protected Party or come within 100 meters of his property. The Respondent breached the injunction by attending the Protected Party’s property on 25th November 2017 and in January 2018, the Respondent fraudulently arranged for the installation of BT equipment without the required authority. Furthermore, the Respondent made a large number of telephone calls from the Protected Party’s property, which incurred unnecessary charges and proved that he had entered the Protected Party’s property.

The Respondent was required to attend a hearing, which was to determine whether he had breached the Order for injunction. The Respondent failed to attend the hearing and the Court then found him guilty as a result of the breach of the Order of injunction. The Respondent was sentenced to 4 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Casey McGregor or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

All you need to know about Counsel’s Fees in COP – How are they assessed?

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Deputyship management is not always plain sailing, and on occasions, professional Deputies may be instructed to take on a case whereby the background is complicated, the circumstances are unusual and where Counsel are required to progress the matter. We have investigated the general rules applied when Counsel’s’ fees are to be assessed, and here is everything you need to know.

On what basis are the reductions made?

Firstly, it is important to recognise that in Deputyship matters, all costs are open for assessment. When a Deputyship Order is issued, it provides the authority for the professionals involved in the case to have their costs assessed. This includes the Professional Deputy, Counsel and in some instances, if a translator is required, their costs would also be subject to assessment.

What do the SCCO look at when deciding whether Counsel’s fees should be allowed?

Following a conversation with an experienced Costs Officer, advice was obtained regarding what aspects they consider when reviewing Counsel’s fees, once a bill of costs had been submitted for assessment. As there are no clear “black and white” guidelines for the assessment of Counsel’s fees, the Costs Officers are able to use their discretion on a case by case basis to review what would be a reasonable and proportionate amount to allow. Approximately, £300.00 per hour is allowed for a hearing, and £250.00 per hour for general work, however based on the complexity, volume of work undertaken, geographical location of Counsel and the breakdown of work outlined on Counsel’s fee note, these hourly rates could be revised by the Costs Officer.

It is important to note that it is your responsibility to work with your costs provider to include a detailed narrative within the Bill of Costs, explaining and justifying Counsel’s fees and involvement. For example, the Costs Officer would question why a Leeds based firm would instruct a London based Counsel. Details of the facts of the case, any hearings that have taken place, and the necessity of the work conducted should be included within the bill. Furthermore, when the bill is submitted for assessment, a Counsel’s fee note should be provided with the Bill of Costs. A further point to take into account is that not all Counsel’s fee notes are detailed enough, and therefore this increases the importance of including information relating to the complexity and background of the case when preparing the Bill of Costs.

A general understanding is that if Counsel had claimed for overall “refreshing themselves on the case” as they have not worked on the matter for a prolonged period of time this would not be allowed upon assessment as it would be deemed disproportionate and unreasonable.

Are the Deputyship firm expected to cover the reductions?

Counsel and professional Deputies are both aware that their costs are to be assessed and therefore, they are also aware that their costs could be reduced upon assessment. It is recommended for Counsel and the professional Deputy to make an agreement before the Bill of Costs is sent for assessment, whether the Deputy’s firm would cover the shortfall if reductions are made, or Counsel agrees to refund the reductions. Secondly, it was advised to wait until the Bill of Costs has been assessed before settling Counsel’s fees.

Do Counsel have a right to dispute the reductions?

If Counsel’s fees have been reduced upon assessment, they have a right to dispute the decision. This would be done in the format of a Request for Reassessment, prepared by your costs provider, outlining the reasons why you disagree with the reductions made and evidence in support of this.

It is noteworthy that Counsel are considered to be an “interested party” and therefore the professional Deputy would have to serve a copy of the provisionally assessed Bill of Costs on Counsel, and receive confirmation that they accept the amount allowed before the SCCO will issue the Final Costs Certificate, which provides authority for the Deputy and Counsel to be paid.

If you have any queries, or require any further information then please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke at georgia.clarke@clarionsolicitors.com

Court of Protection denies Official Solicitor the recovery of costs

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“In 2017, the NHS Dorset Clinical Commissioning Group launched what were intended to be four test cases seeking clarification of the law concerning the deprivation of liberty of mentally incapacitated adults. For various reasons, however, all of those applications, or in some cases that part of the application relating to the deprivation of liberty issue, were withdrawn, but not before the Official Solicitor had agreed to act for two of the respondents with the benefit of publicly-funded certificates and had incurred some legal costs. Subsequently, the Official Solicitor has applied for all or part of those costs to be paid by the applicant.” [2018] EWCOP 7 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2018/7.html)

This is the opening of the judgement delivered by Mr Justice Baker before rejecting the application by the Official Solicitor to recover the costs incurred in dealing with the test cases that were eventually dropped in relation to the Deprivation of Liberty of mentally incapacitated adults.

The four test cases mentioned were to seek clarification on whether mentally incapacitated adults whom lived at home with care plans devised and administered by the applicant, were being deprived of their liberty. In each application the applicant sought a declaration from the Court of Protection that the respondent was not being deprived of their liberty.

In respect of two of the four cases the Official Solicitor declined to accept the invitation, that by reason of their means, they did not qualify for public funding. It was considered not appropriate to utilise their own funds to support a test case and therefore it was agreed these two cases would be stayed. In respect of the remaining two respondents who qualified for public funding, the application continued. Inter-party discussions led to the Official Solicitor withdrawing the applications for declarations and instead sought consequential directions in all four cases.

The grounds for withdrawal were; reconsideration in light of the Official Solicitor’s analysis, difficulties and delays meant only one of the four cases was capable of proceeding on the preliminary issues and the recent publication by the Law Commission reduced the justification of the declaration sought.

The two publicly funded cases, by this point had amounted costs of approximately £30,000.00. The Official Solicitor applied for all or part of the costs accrued to be the responsibility of the applicant by arguing that the case should not have been viewed as a typical welfare case but more as a civil claim. For various reasons, this was rejected.

When considering the Applicants conduct in the matter, it was successfully pointed out that three of the four test cases were unsuitable to be included from the outset which should have been identified. The remaining test case was not pursued due to the ineligibility of public funding, it was viewed by the Court that the applicant should have funded the matter. The Law Commission’s report in which the Official Solicitor relied upon when responding to the application was published prior to the case management hearing so the outcome of the Official Solicitors response should have been reasonably considered. Thus, rendering the costs incurred by the Official Solicitor in responding for the most part as unnecessary.

In response, the Applicant submitted that the application was in good public interest due to the uncertainty of the area of law in respect of the Cheshire West’s “Acid Test”, that withdrawing the application was justified due to the lack of a “sufficiently broad range of facts to give the applicant sufficient guidance to the 100+ incapacitated adults for whom it is responsible for providing healthcare services at home” and the budget constraints which made funding the application without public assistance unattainable.

It was concluded that a costs order against the applicant in this matter was inappropriate save as to those of the Official Solicitor’s costs that were publicly funded.

Bridie Sanderson is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department.

You can contact Bridie on 0113 336 3350, or alternatively email at bridie.Sanderson@clarionsolicitors.com

Can The Court of Protection Keep a Patient Alive?

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It is well known, and often the cause of heated debate, that assisted suicide is illegal within the United Kingdom. If a person is terminally ill and wishes to die, that person would have no rights under UK law to end their life with dignity. However, recent case law suggests that there may be a slight shift in how the Court of Protection handles a terminally ill patient.

Recently, the Supreme Court judged that a 52 year old man (Mr Y) with an extensive brain injury should be allowed to die without Mr Y’s family being forced to apply to the Court of Protection. At the time of the application, Mr Y was receiving clinically assisted nutrition and hydration and although Mr Y had died at the time of the appeal, it was deemed necessary for the appeal to proceed due to the importance of the issues raised.

For clarity, once clinically assisted nutrition and hydration is withdrawn, a person is generally expected to survive no more than two weeks. Following on from the Supreme Court ruling, it has now been agreed that where the family and medical practitioners are in agreement, it is no longer necessary for an application to be made to the Court of Protection.

This decision had also been taken in another case where a woman (M) who had suffered with Huntington disease for over 25 years was permanently residing in hospital and was in a minimally conscious state. The Supreme Court judged that the clinically assisted nutrition and hydration was withdrawn and M died shortly after. Following the decision, Jackson stated “There was no statutory obligation to bring the case to court … A mandatory litigation requirement may deflect clinicians and families from making true best-interests decisions and in some cases lead to inappropriate treatment continuing by default. Indeed, the present case stands as an example, in that M received continued CANH that neither her doctors nor her family thought was in her best interests for almost a year until a court decision was eventually sought.”

However, it is worth noting that the decision in M related specifically to those living on life support, as opposed to all ‘right to die’ cases.

It is becoming clear that there is a shift appearing from the way in which those who are terminally ill are treated by the courts. Previously, an application to the Court of Protection would be required to make a decision on the care received, however, now it appears that the best interests of the terminally ill patient will be put first without the requirement of an application.