Tag: #clarioncosts

MRO Costs: Determining the Successful Party

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MRO Costs: Determining the Successful Party

In JXX v Archibald [2026] EWHC 630, Senior Costs Judge Rowley gave judgment in an important case concerning the recoverability of Medical Reporting Organisation (“MRO”) fees in personal injury claims. The Defendants challenged the fees claimed by the MROs, while the Claimants sought to recover them as part of their medical disbursements. The dispute therefore focused on the extent to which MRO fees could properly be recovered and the evidence required to justify them. This decision is being appealed to the Court of Appeal, and it is hoped the result will provide definitive guidance for practitioners.

In the meantime, judgment has been given on the consequential issue of costs and, in particular, which party should bear the costs of the MRO-related proceedings (JXX v Archibald [2026] EWHC 2404).

The MRO Dispute

In considering the costs issue, the Judge outlined the key points regarding his previous decision. He had rejected the Defendants’ proposed notion of a “Stringer cap” which limited the fees payable to the MRO to the type of work that would have been undertaken by a solicitor who had instructed the medical expert directly. The Defendants argued that if the MRO produced the information originally envisaged in Stringer v Copley, they would be prepared to pay for such work. However, the Judge considered that the practical effect of the Defendants’ position was that little or nothing would ultimately be recoverable by the MROs. In the earlier judgment Judge Rowley had found that the MRO fees were a disbursement and not limited by comparison with a hypothetical solicitor’s work.

Equally, the Judge had rejected the Claimants’ argument that the fee for producing the medical evidence was a unitary disbursement which did not need to be broken down into any constituent elements but should simply be considered globally as to whether it was reasonable and proportionate. Accordingly, the Claimants were required to provide evidence as to the proportion of the overall fee attributable to the MRO and the methodology used to calculate that figure.

The Successful Party

All parties contended that they had been successful in these proceedings, yet had appealed the decision.

The Judge outlined that the Claimants and MROs had been successful on most of the issues raised between the parties. This was in relation to the Stringer cap issue, administration-type fees and funding costs. The only point that the Judge did not find in favour of the Claimants and MROs was what they described as the 25% cap.

The Judge went on to highlight that the Claimants obtained an order in their favour for payment of sums by the Defendants which they would not otherwise have received, and referred to CPR 44.2 where the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. Therefore, concluding that the Claimants were the successful party.

The position following the 40% reduction in MRO fees

Although the MRO fees were ultimately reduced by approximately 40%, the Judge did not consider this sufficient to make the Claimants the unsuccessful party. While such a reduction could be a significant factor in a conventional detailed assessment and could justify some adjustment to the costs order, it would not ordinarily deprive an otherwise successful party of its costs altogether.

When was the Defendant successful?

The Defendant was successful in relation to the disclosure application and was therefore awarded its costs of that application. The result of the application was to require separation of the MRO fees from the expert’s fees as contended for the Defendant.

In conclusion, the judgment demonstrates that the Court’s assessment of success is a holistic one. Whilst the Defendants were successful in obtaining disclosure and the MRO fees were reduced, the Claimants and MROs were successful overall because they succeeded on most of the key issues and ultimately obtained an order for payment in their favour. Consequently, those individual successes for the Defendants did not alter the overall costs outcome.

Angela Nako is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

Direct Payments and Deputyship Costs: What Deputies Need to Know

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The Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) has provided further guidance following the decision in Re Direct Payments [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2).

The decision is particularly relevant to Deputies who have claimed costs for managing Direct Payments. It confirms that, where those costs have been incurred from 11 October 2024 onwards, retrospective authority from the Court of Protection is required.

This has practical consequences for both bills that are currently being assessed and bills that are yet to be prepared.

At a glance

If you are a Deputy who has dealt with Direct Payments, there are four key questions to consider:

  1. When were the Direct Payment costs incurred?
  2. Has the bill already been assessed?
  3. Has the Court of Protection authorised the management of the Direct Payments?
  4. Does the SCCO have the relevant orders and applications?

The answers will determine what steps need to be taken.

Why does the date 11 October 2024 matter?

The key date arising from the decision is 11 October 2024. Where costs relating to the management of Direct Payments were incurred from this date onwards, the Deputy must obtain the necessary authority from the Court of Protection if those costs are to be claimed.

This means that practitioners should review bills carefully where Direct Payment work forms part of the work undertaken during a general management period.

Where the relevant billing period ended before 11 October 2024, the bill can proceed through assessment in the usual way.

If your bill is already with the SCCO

If a bill has been filed but has not yet undergone provisional assessment, the next steps depend on the period covered by the bill.

  1. If the bill only covers costs before 11 October 2024

There is no change to the usual assessment process in respect of those costs.

  1. If the bill includes costs from 11 October 2024 onwards

The SCCO should be notified by email at SCCO@justice.gov.uk.

The notification should provide:

  • the SCCO reference number;
  • the protected party’s name;
  • the relevant general management period(s); and
  • the date on which the bill or bills were filed.

It should also explain that the bill contains Direct Payment costs and confirm that an application has been made to the Court of Protection seeking the necessary authority.

What happens then?

  • The SCCO will pause the assessment while the Court of Protection application is dealt with.
  • Once the Court of Protection order granting authority is available, the assessment can continue.
  • Importantly, the SCCO has confirmed that the bill will retain its position in the assessment queue.

What if the Court of Protection has already made its decision?

Once an order has been made, the next step is to provide the SCCO with the relevant documentation.

The documents should be filed through CE File on the existing case using:

  • Filing – Letter from Legal Representative/Deputy

Where authority has been granted

The following should be filed:

  • A covering letter + the Court of Protection order + a copy of the application

This gives the SCCO the information it needs to continue with the assessment.

Where authority has been refused

The position is different and practitioners should file:

  • The court order + a replacement bill excluding the Direct Payment costs

This enables the SCCO to proceed with the assessment without the costs for which authority has not been granted.

What should you do differently when preparing a new bill?

The SCCO guidance also provides an opportunity to make sure that new bills contain the relevant information from the outset. Where a Deputy has received Direct Payment funding, the background section of the bill should clearly identify the type of funding involved, whether NHS funding or Care Act funding. The bill should also set out details of any order that authorises the Deputy to manage those Direct Payments.

What if a Final Costs Certificate has already been issued?

A different approach may apply where a Final Costs Certificate (FCC) has already been issued.

In those circumstances, practitioners should refer to Question 20 of Re Direct Payments [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2).

This is an important distinction, as the position for a bill that has already reached final certification is different from one that is still awaiting provisional assessment.

What about reassessment?

The SCCO has confirmed that requests for reassessment will be considered on their individual circumstances.

However, where the issue concerns Direct Payment costs incurred from 11 October 2024 onwards, practitioners should be aware that it is unlikely the dispute can be resolved until the appropriate Court of Protection authority has been provided.

Obtaining the necessary authority should therefore be considered before pursuing a reassessment where Direct Payment costs are in dispute.

A practical checklist for Deputies

Before submitting or progressing a bill, it is worth checking the following:

Before filing

  • ☐ Have any Direct Payments been received?
  • ☐ What type of funding was received?
  • ☐ Were any costs relating to their management incurred from 11 October 2024 onwards?
  • ☐ Is there an order authorising the management of those Direct Payments?
  • ☐ Have the relevant Court of Protection applications and orders been included with the supporting papers?

If the bill is already awaiting assessment

  • ☐ Has the SCCO been notified that the bill contains Direct Payment costs?
  • ☐ Has an application for retrospective authority been made?
  • ☐ Has the Court of Protection order been provided to the SCCO once received?

If authority is refused

  • ☐ Has the court order been filed?
  • ☐ Has a replacement bill been prepared excluding the relevant Direct Payment costs?

Need advice about a Direct Payment costs claim?

If you are a Deputy or legal professional dealing with a bill that includes costs relating to Direct Payments, it is important to consider the date on which the costs were incurred, the authority available and the stage the bill has reached in the SCCO process. It’s important to consider this guidance alongside the decision in Lumb to understand the implications fully. Please work with your costs provider to ensure that you include the relevant information in relation to Direct Payments sought within the narrative of the bill.

Security for Costs Retained After Judgment and Disclosure Ordered Against Litigation Funders

Ellena HunterLeave a comment

Security for Costs Retained After Judgment and Disclosure Ordered Against Litigation Funders

The decision in Yodel Delivery Network Ltd v Corlett & Ors [2026] EWHC 1741 (Ch) concerned a series of post-judgment costs applications following the dismissal of a substantial counterclaim and the award of indemnity costs in favour of the Claimant. The judgment addresses a number of important costs issues, including whether security for costs paid into court can be released to satisfy an interim costs order, the circumstances in which additional security may be ordered for detailed assessment proceedings, the availability of non-party costs orders against those directing litigation, and disclosure of litigation funders. The court ultimately refused to order the release of £1.525 million held as security for costs, granted further security for the costs of detailed assessment, made a non-party costs order against the First Defendant and ordered disclosure of the identity and funding arrangements of those who had financed the litigation.

Background

The Claimant successfully defended a counterclaim brought by the Third Defendant and additional claim by the Fourth Party (“counterclaim”) and was awarded costs on the indemnity basis, subject to detailed assessment. An interim payment on account of costs totalling approximately £2.75 million was also ordered.

Prior to trial, £1.525 million had been paid into court as security for the Claimant’s costs. Following judgment, the Third Defendant and Fourth Party applied under CPR 37.3 for that money to be paid out to the Claimant in partial satisfaction of the outstanding interim costs liability. The Claimant opposed the application and, in turn, sought:

  • Additional security for the anticipated costs of detailed assessment proceedings;
  • A non-party costs order against the First Defendant pursuant to section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981;
  • Disclosure of the identity of those who had funded the litigation; and
  • An extension of time for commencing detailed assessment proceedings.

Can Security for Costs be Used to Satisfy an Interim Costs Order?

The Third Defendant and Fourth Party argued that the purpose of security for costs had effectively crystallised once the Claimant obtained a costs order in its favour. They submitted that there was no reason why the money held by the court should not be released to satisfy part of the outstanding costs liability immediately.

The Claimant argued that the purpose of security for costs is to protect a successful party from the risk of non-payment of all costs liabilities arising from the proceedings. Releasing the security would leave the Claimant exposed to a substantial risk that further costs awarded following detailed assessment would be irrecoverable.

The Court accepted the Claimant’s position.

The Judge emphasised that security for costs paid into court is security held by the court to protect against enforcement risk. While funds paid into court are frequently released after judgment by agreement, that does not alter the essential nature of the security.

The Judge held that the Claimant was entitled to retain security until all liabilities in respect of which the security had been ordered had been satisfied. Granting the application would have discharged the interim costs debt whilst simultaneously depriving the Claimant of security for potentially more than £1.3 million of additional costs that could become payable following detailed assessment.

In deciding how to exercise its discretion the court looked at the circumstances, including the Third Defendant’s financial position. That evidence demonstrated why security for costs had originally been ordered and reinforced the continuing need for it. The application for payment out was therefore refused.

Additional Security for Detailed Assessment Proceedings

The Claimant also sought additional security for the anticipated costs of the detailed assessment itself and argued that it was likely to incur approximately £250,000 in assessment costs.

The court accepted that it had jurisdiction to order security for the costs of detailed assessment proceedings but whilst accepting that some additional security was justified, the court rejected the Claimant’s submission that those costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis merely because the underlying claim had resulted in an indemnity costs order. The Judge held that costs of detailed assessment proceedings are separate proceedings and any indemnity assessment would depend upon the conduct of those proceedings themselves.

The Court ordered additional security of £48,000. Failure to provide the security would result in the Third Defendant and Fourth Party being debarred from participating in the detailed assessment proceedings.

Non-Party Costs Order Against the First Defendant

The Claimant also sought an order under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 that the First Defendant be personally liable for the costs of the counterclaim.

Although the First Defendant opposed the application in part, he did not dispute in principle that such an order could be made.

One argument advanced was that it was too late for the Claimant to seek a non-party costs order because earlier costs orders had already been made. The Court rejected that submission. The Judge confirmed that there is no prescribed time limit for section 51 applications and noted that such applications are frequently made after costs orders have been obtained, particularly where questions subsequently arise over enforceability.

The Judge therefore made the First Defendant jointly and severally liable for the costs of the injunction application and the counterclaim proceedings.

However, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to make the First Defendant liable for costs previously awarded by the Court of Appeal because any such application would need to be determined by the Court of Appeal itself.

Disclosure of Litigation Funders

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the decision concerns the Claimant’s application for disclosure relating to those who had funded the counterclaim.

Evidence before the court established that the litigation had been financed by numerous investors. The Claimant sought extensive information concerning the identity of the funders, the amount of funding provided, the terms upon which funding had been made available and the extent of each funder’s involvement in the litigation.

The court accepted that such disclosure was appropriate and ancillary to potential future section 51 applications.

The Judge held that the Claimant was entitled to understand who had funded the litigation and assess whether non-party costs applications should be pursued. The Judge rejected arguments that disclosure should wait until after service of the bill of costs, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding the Third Defendant’s financial position.

Disclosure was therefore ordered within 14 days. However, recognising that the Third Defendant was attempting to raise funds to satisfy the outstanding costs liability, the court directed that the Claimant should not contact the identified funders until 1-month after the hearing date.

Conclusion

This decision provides useful guidance on the treatment of security for costs following judgment. It confirms that a successful party will not necessarily be required to release security merely because an interim costs order has been made. Where there remains a real risk that future costs liabilities may go unpaid, the court may permit the security to remain in place until detailed assessment has concluded, and all liabilities have been discharged.

The judgment also highlights the court’s willingness to order security for the costs of detailed assessment proceedings, make non-party costs orders against those responsible for litigation and require disclosure from those who have funded unsuccessful claims.

Ellena Hunter-Green is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercial@clarionsolicitors.com.

Professional Executors Cannot Charge Without Clear Authority: Lessons from Royal Holloway v QLaw Legal Services Ltd [2026] EWHC 2090 (SCCO)

Daniel MurrayLeave a comment

The decision in Royal Holloway and Bedford New College v QLaw Legal Services Limited [2026] EWHC 2090 (SCCO) provides an important reminder that professional executors cannot assume entitlement to remuneration simply because a testator was told that charges would be made. The Senior Courts Costs Office reaffirmed the strict requirements governing executor remuneration and highlighted the limited circumstances in which solicitors acting as executors can recover professional fees.

Background

The case concerned the estate of Margaret Anne Selby, whose residuary beneficiary was Royal Holloway and Bedford New College. Her will appointed two executors:

  • Patricia Malcher, a friend of the deceased; and
  • the directors of QLaw Legal Services Limited, trading as Quantick Daley Solicitors.

Following Ms Selby’s death, Mr Neil Quantick, the sole director of QLaw, acted as joint executor and administered the estate. Between January and July 2024, QLaw rendered bills totalling £53,187.60 for professional executor services. The residuary beneficiary subsequently applied under section 71(3) of the Solicitors Act 1974 for an assessment of those bills in September 2025.

A preliminary issue was ordered to determine whether QLaw had any entitlement to charge the estate at all. The firm had prepared Ms Selby’s will prior to her death.

The Legal Issue

The will contained no charging clause authorising the executors to charge professional fees.

QLaw therefore sought to rely on section 29(2) of the Trustee Act 2000, which permits a professional trustee or personal representative to receive reasonable remuneration if every other trustee agrees in writing to that remuneration. As personal representatives are treated similarly to trustees under the Act, the provision can apply to executors.

The central question was therefore whether:

  1. discussions with the deceased before execution of the will; or
  2. subsequent correspondence with the co-executor,

amounted to sufficient authority for QLaw to charge professional executor fees.

QLaw’s Argument

QLaw relied on evidence that, during the will drafting process, the deceased had been informed in correspondence, that professional executors would charge for their services and that the deceased had indicated she was content with that arrangement.

It also relied on later correspondence in which the lay co-executor acknowledged receiving details of QLaw’s costs information. QLaw argued that these communications demonstrated the necessary authorisation to charge.

The Decision

Costs Judge Leonard rejected the Defendant’s arguments.

The court held that discussions during the will drafting process could not create an entitlement to remuneration where the will itself contained no charging clause. The executors derived their authority from the will, not from pre will correspondence or discussions with the deceased. Had the deceased intended professional executors to charge, that intention should have been reflected expressly in the will.

The judge further held that the co-executor’s de facto acquiescence to the Defendant’s rendering charges to Ms Selby’s estate for such services could not constitute agreement sufficient to satisfy section 29(2) of the Trustee Act 2000. Her request for an estimate was no more than evidence of that de facto acquiescence. Accordingly, QLaw had no right to charge the estate for Mr Quantick’s services as a professional executor.

Reliance on Shepherd & Co Solicitors v Brealey

A significant aspect of the judgment was its reliance on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Shepherd & Co Solicitors v Brealey [2024] EWCA Civ 303. That case similarly involved solicitor executors seeking remuneration in the absence of a charging clause. The Court of Appeal emphasised that section 29 requires written agreement from all executors and that the policy behind the legislation is to preserve transparency and prevent trustees from profiting without clear authority.

Costs Judge Leonard considered the factual similarities striking and applied the same principles to reject QLaw’s claim.

Practical Implications for Private Client Practitioners

This decision serves as a warning to solicitors and professional executors:

  1. Include a Charging Clause

If a professional executor is intended to charge for acting, the safest course remains to include a clear and properly drafted charging clause within the will itself. Reliance on conversations, attendance notes or client understanding is unlikely to suffice. This of course can only apply where the executor’s firm has been involved in the will drafting process.

  1. Written Agreement Means Written Agreement

Where section 29(2) is relied upon, practitioners should obtain clear written consent from every co-executor. Informal communications, silence, acquiescence or acceptance of invoices may not satisfy the statutory requirement.

  1. Transparency Is Critical

The judgment reinforces the policy objective identified in Brealey: beneficiaries and co-executors must be able to identify clearly the basis upon which professional remuneration is claimed.

  1. Costs Assessment Risks Remain Significant

Where there is uncertainty regarding entitlement to charge, the issue may arise before any assessment of reasonableness. A professional executor may find that the question is not whether the fees are reasonable, but whether any fees are recoverable at all.

Conclusion

The case is another strong affirmation of the long standing principle that executors are generally not entitled to remuneration unless there is clear authority permitting it. The court adopted a strict approach to section 29 of the Trustee Act 2000 and confirmed that neither a testator’s informal understanding nor a co-executor’s passive acceptance of fees can replace the need for express authority.

For private client practitioners, the message is simple: if professional executors are expected to charge, make sure the entitlement is clearly documented in the will or supported by unequivocal written agreement from all co-executors. Failure to do so may leave even substantial fees irrecoverable

 

Parties claimed costs multiple times more than the claim was worth

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

Background

In O’Sullivan v Trading 212 UK Ltd [2026] EWCC 32 (03 June 2026), the Claimant brought a claim arising from the Defendant’s closure of his trading account. The Court was highly critical of the parties’ approach to litigation, noting the apparent absence of ADR and the disproportionate escalation of a modest claim into a half‑million-pound costs dispute.

Costs awarded

Applying the usual rule, CPR 44.2(2), the Court held that the Defendant was the successful party and the Claimant should pay the Defendant’s costs.

However, the Court identified specific issues which justified departures from the default position.

  1. The Defendant’s late disclosure

Although the late disclosure did not affect the outcome, it prolonged the trial, triggered additional applications and increased costs for both parties.

The Court deprived the Defendant of its own costs for the disclosure phase and ordered the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s costs caused by the late disclosure.

The Claimant claimed £54,115, whereas a total of £27,000 plus VAT was allowed.

  1. The Defendant’s Strike-Out application

This application was pursued based on the Claimant’s alleged conduct towards witnesses. Although the application was adjourned on the basis of undertakings, the Court found it was reasonable to bring some form of application.

The Defendant claimed £59,513.67, which the Court found disproportionate. A total of £15,000 was allowed.

The Court adopted a broad‑brush approach to summary assessment, emphasising that costs should be assessed by reference to overall proportionality rather than a line-by-line analysis.

The Court declined to engage in wider conduct-based arguments advanced by both parties, considering such analysis disproportionate.

Departing from the Costs Budgets

Despite CPR 3.18, the Court found good reason to depart from the approved costs budgets, resulting in downward revisions.

The Court looked at proportionality, the value of the claim and the relatively small number of documents. The Court also observed that the case had likely been misallocated and should not have proceeded on a multi-track basis of this scale. The court also raised concern about the hourly rates, finding significant reductions necessary.

Conclusion

The table below demonstrates the disparity between costs incurred and costs allowed, highlighting the severity of the disproportion:

Party Costs incurred Costs allowed
Claimant £246,426 £32,400

(For the Defendant’s late disclosure)
Defendant £452,456.26 £128,750

 

 

Following set-off, the Claimant was ordered to pay £96,350.

This case serves as a clear reminder that the Court will closely scrutinise proportionality in litigation and may impose significant downward adjustments, even where costs budgets have been approved.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

CRPC Annual Open Meeting (8 May 2026): Key Costs Takeaways

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The Civil Procedure Rule Committee’s Annual Open Meeting on 8 May 2026 provided useful insight into the Committee’s current thinking on civil costs. Whilst no immediate rule changes were announced, a number of important costs issues were discussed, highlighting the CRPC’s approach to future reform.

Key Costs Issues Discussed

  1. Mazur

The Committee was asked whether it intended to amend the CPR following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur, particularly regarding the definition of ‘legal representative’. The Committee indicated that it wishes to observe how the industry responds to the decision before proceeding with any intervention.

  1. Costs Budgeting (Precedent H)

The meeting addressed uncertainty surrounding CPR 3.15(5)(a), specifically on whether the £1,000 or 1% cap applies only to the first draft of a Precedent H or also covers subsequent revisions prior to the first CCMC.

Master Sullivan confirmed that the intention is for the cap to cover the preparation of the budget, which is presented at the costs management hearing. She acknowledged that the wording could be clarified and suggested that the CPRC should consider whether any amendments are required.

Those in practice will know that there are occasions when multiple versions of the initial budget are required before the matter proceeds to a CCMC, which causes tension with the current wording of the CPR and fee caps which can only be lifted in exceptional circumstances.

  1. Bill Certification

Following Mazur, the Committee was asked whether the certification of a bill of costs should be extended to other authorised legal professionals such as CILEX practitioners, Costs Lawyers and barristers with the relevant rights.

The CPRC indicated that when the overall consequences of Mazur become clear, it will consider whether any rule changes are required. Therefore, the current process is preserved.

  1. Fixed Recoverable Costs (FRC)

Several concerns were raised about the operation of the extended FRC regime:

  • Clinical Negligence FRC – No update was provided on extending FRC to lower-value clinical negligence claims. The Committee confirmed that this remains a matter for the Department of Health and Social Care, indicating that there will be no imminent procedural changes.
  • Fast Track – v – Intermediate Track Costs – Concerns were raised about the potential for higher recoverable costs on the Fast than Intermediate Track due to differences in staging and case types. Mr Justice Trower clarified that the structure of the two tracks is based on proportionality rather than linearity, meaning that the figures correspond to how each track is intended to operate rather than forming a single ascending scale. The two tracks constitute separate frameworks designed to provide predictable fixed costs within their respective scope and that their differing outcomes arise from their distinct structures, rather than from inadvertence.
  • Intermediate Track Band 1 – Specific concerns were expressed about the low costs recovery for liability-admitted personal injury claims in Intermediate Track Band 1. Mr Justice Trower indicated any reform will depend on the government’s consideration of the Fixed Recoverable Costs stocktake and forthcoming post-implementation review.
  • Interim Application Costs under FRC – It was suggested that the current fixed costs for interim applications no longer reflect the reality of practice, as many now require extensive preparation, contested hearings and advocacy. As a result, the fixed recoverable amounts often fall short of the work involved. The Committee advised that these concerns would be considered as part of the broader post-implementation review.
  • Further FRC Issues – Questions were raised in relation to late acceptance of Part 36 offers under FRC, as well as the specific issues outlined in Attersley v UK Insurance Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 217, and inconsistent judicial allocation of cases to Complexity Bands. It was advised that these issues will be considered/responded to out-of-committee.

Although no immediate reforms were announced, the meeting demonstrated that the CPRC is monitoring the recent costs reforms made. The Committee’s current approach seems to be to allow recent developments to settle prior to considering further procedural amendments, with many of the issues raised expected to be considered by the

Angela Nako is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

Post-Judgment Security for Costs? The SCCO Clarifies the Position

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In the case of Magomedov & Ors v Rabinovich & Ors [2026] EWHC 962 (SCCO), Costs Judge Brown considered an “unusual application” concerning whether the SCCO had jurisdiction to order security for costs in detailed assessment proceedings.

Background Facts

Following the substantive claim, the Applicants (Defendants in the original claim) served Notice of Commencement of Detailed Assessment and a Bill of Costs totalling £4.2million, pursuant to four costs orders made in their favour. No request for detailed assessment was made, and Points of Dispute had not been served. Also, interim payments totalling £1.8 million had already been received.

The Applicants applied for an Order under CPR 25 for the Respondents (the Claimants in the original claim) to provide security for the costs of detailed assessment proceedings. The Respondents opposed the application on the basis that the SCCO lacked jurisdiction to consider the application because its powers were limited to those set out in CPR 47, which provides for the court to grant an interim costs certificate ordering the paying party to pay such sum as the SCCO considers appropriate.

The Applicants sought the sum of £336,000 which was some 70% of the costs it said would be incurred of £480,000.  A bill of costs had been prepared at a cost of £220,000. It was said that some £259,000 would be incurred in the assessment, assuming a three-week hearing.

The Court referred to the relevant provisions of CPR 25, specifically 25.1 which enables the court to grant an order for the security of costs as one of the interim remedies outlined in that subsection. Subsections 25.26(1) and 25.27 were also relied upon in support of the application.

The Application

The Application was dismissed. Costs Judge Brown held that, although the court hearing the substantive claim may order security for the costs of detailed assessment as part of the overall costs of the proceedings, once the substantive proceedings had concluded, the SCCO did not possess the wider jurisdiction available to the court hearing the substantive claim and was instead limited to the narrower powers under CPR Part 47.

While CPR 25.12 allows the court dealing with the substantive claim to order security for costs “after judgment”, this did not extend to subsequent detailed assessment proceedings. CPR 47 was described as a ‘self-contained code’ governing detailed assessment and did not incorporate the provisions of CPR 25.

The Court also emphasised that CPR 47 contains mechanisms that are designed to protect the receiving party and that the only interim remedy available in detailed assessment proceedings was an interim costs certificate under CPR 47.16.

The judge identified several structural reasons for declining jurisdiction, including the absence of a clear enforcement mechanism, the difficulty in identifying the “defendant” for CPR 25 purposes once the parties had become receiving and paying parties, and the risk of creating disproportionate satellite litigation.

In any event, even if jurisdiction had existed, the judge stated that the application would have been refused as a matter of discretion, particularly because the Applicants had failed to raise the issue before the court determining the substantive claim. The appropriate course for parties seeking security for the costs of detailed assessment is therefore to apply to the court dealing with the substantive proceedings, which has sufficient power to include such costs within a security for costs order.

Conclusion

The Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) has held for the first time that it lacks jurisdiction to order security for costs under CPR 25, which in turn highlights the fact that CPR Part 47 operates as a ‘self-contained code’.

The judgment clarifies the limit of the SCCO’s jurisdiction, confirming that powers that derive from the CPR cannot be imported into general discretion.

The key takeaway for practitioners is if an application for security for costs is required, it should be made to the court hearing the underlying claim. Once the proceedings enter the costs jurisdiction in CPR 47, the available tools to remedy matters become narrower.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

$35 Million in Costs for a Two-Week Hearing: Is Arbitration Still More Cost Effective Than Litigation?

Image Daniel MurrayLeave a comment

Introduction The High Court’s decision in Genel Energy Miran Bina Bawi Limited v The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq [2026] EWHC 1003 (Comm) reinforces two familiar themes in English arbitration law: the finality of arbitral awards and the limited scope for court intervention under the Arbitration Act 1996. The case arose from a challenge under […]

SCCO Updates Filing Guidance for Court of Protection Bills

Leah MorrisLeave a comment

The Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) has earlier this week issued revised guidance on filing supporting papers for Court of Protection bills, coming into effect on 20 April 2026. These updates aim to streamline the assessment process and improve efficiency for both practitioners and Costs Officers.

The SCCO continues to support two methods for submitting supporting documents: digital bundles provided via the Document Upload Centre (DUC) and physical files of papers sent in the post or DX. A summary of the latest guidance is set out below.

1) Digital Bundles via the Document Upload Centre (DUC)

The Document Upload Centre (DUC) allows users to submit supporting papers electronically and is the SCCO’s preferred method, provided submissions follow the required format.

It is important to note:

  • The DUC is only for supporting documents
  • Key documents, including the bill of costs, N258B and court orders, must still be filed via CE-File in the usual way
  • To access the DUC, users must request a link by emailing the SCCO

In terms of formatting, bundles must be in PDF format only. File names should include the SCCO reference number, the Protected Party’s surname, and the billing period or case type (for example, statutory will or property sale). The SCCO also find it helpful if an indication of the bill type is included within the file name, such as general management with the relevant period dates, so it is recommended that this is included.

Where possible, a single bundle should be submitted. If multiple files are necessary, these should be clearly labelled with the relevant date ranges rather than uploading individual documents separately.

Documents must be arranged in chronological order (oldest first), with key documents placed at the beginning of the bundle. These include:

  • The OPG102 and OPG105
  • Client care letter
  • Disbursement evidence
  • Counsel fee invoices

The level of detail within documents remains important. Emails and file notes should clearly show dates and times, with correspondence identifying both sender and recipient. File and attendance notes must also record the fee earner completing the work and the time claimed.

To assist Costs Officers in locating documents quickly, the SCCO recommend:

  • Including a detailed index or bookmarks with clear dates and descriptions so items can be easily identified and cross-referenced against the bill of costs
  • Adding hyperlinks to documents where possible
  • Avoiding duplication of documents or email chains

In terms of timing:

  • For existing cases: upload at the same time as filing the bill (once the SCCO reference number is available)
  • For new cases: upload after receiving confirmation of the SCCO reference number (e.g. SC-2025-COP-001234)

2) Physical Paper Filing

Firms can still submit hard copy bundles by post. While digital filing is encouraged, it is not mandatory.

If submitting papers physically, they should be sent to:

Senior Courts Costs Office
Thomas More Building
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
DX: 44454 Strand

Many of the same principles apply to paper bundles as to electronic ones. Files should be clearly labelled with the SCCO reference number, the Protected Party’s name and the billing period or case type, and documents should be organised in chronological order.

Key documents should be placed at the front of the bundle (or the first bundle if multiple are submitted), including:

  • The OPG102 and OPG105
  • Client care letter
  • Disbursement evidence
  • Counsel fee invoices
  • A copy of the e-filing acceptance notice, including return details
  • Where multiple boxes or bundles are required:
  • Label them sequentially (e.g. Box 1 of 2)
  • Arrange documents chronologically across all boxes and bundles
  • In terms of timing:
  • Papers should be sent as soon as possible after CE-File acceptance
  • They must be submitted within 28 days

Mandatory Filing Notification

Each time a bill is submitted via CE-File, you must clearly state how you intend to file supporting documents. This should be included in the “filing comments” by confirming either ‘paper’ or ‘DUC’. Failure to include this information may result in the filing being rejected.

Final Thoughts

These updates from the SCCO reflect a continued move toward digital efficiency while still accommodating traditional filing methods.

For practitioners, the key takeaway is simple: clarity, organisation, and compliance with formatting rules are essential. Adopting the DUC where possible, and doing so correctly, will help avoid delays and ensure a smoother assessment process, particularly given the continued delays and significant turnaround time for receipt of assessed bills, which remains in excess of a year at present.

For further guidance or to request DUC access, contact the SCCO directly at scco@justice.gov.uk.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at costs.support@clarionsolicitors.com.

When High-Value Claims Still Require Budgeting: Garry White & Ors v Uber London Limited & Ors

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

The Claim

In the case of Garry White & Ors v Uber London Limited & Ors, approximately 13,000 London black cab drivers issued group proceedings against companies within the Uber group, claiming losses of around £199 million. A further claim, valued at approximately £141 million, was brought by the assignee of two private hire operators, Kabbee and Iride.

Although the total value of the litigation is around £340 million, each driver’s individual claim is relatively modest (circa £15,000), making group litigation a proportionate approach.

The claims arise from allegations that Uber unlawfully obtained a private hire vehicle operator licence by misrepresenting its operating model. It is said that this enabled Uber to compete directly with licensed black cab drivers while undercutting regulated fares, causing substantial financial loss between 2012 and March 2018.

The Preliminary Limitation Issue

Uber denies liability and argues that the claims were issued outside the six-year limitation period.

The Claimants rely on Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, arguing that time did not begin to run until they could reasonably have discovered the relevant facts, which they say occurred in June 2018 following a licensing appeal hearing.

The court has ordered that limitation be determined at a standalone five-day preliminary trial. A representative sample of 20 Claimants (10 chosen by each side) will be used to assess when sufficient knowledge arose. If the Defendants succeed, the litigation may conclude at that stage.

The Costs Budgeting Decision

A significant procedural issue to be determined was whether costs budgeting should apply.

Although claims valued at £10 million or more are ordinarily excluded from the costs management regime, the court retains discretion. The Defendants sought to disapply budgeting, relying on the overall high value of the claim, the existence of litigation funding and ATE insurance, and the alleged additional burden budgeting would impose.

The Claimants argued that, despite the aggregate value, the case is fundamentally a mass claim by individuals of limited means. They required clarity regarding potential adverse costs exposure and future funding requirements.

The Court agreed with the Claimants. While acknowledging that very high-value claims are generally unsuitable for costs management, this case was considered materially different. The modest individual claims and group structure justified greater costs oversight and transparency.

Why This Matters

This decision reinforces that the £10 million threshold is not decisive. Courts will look beyond the headline value of proceedings and consider the nature of the parties and the practical impact of costs exposure.

In large-scale group actions involving individuals with limited financial resources, costs budgeting may be viewed as an important tool to promote fairness, proportionality and effective case management and there are steps you can take ahead of the first CMC if you consider a CMO to be useful in your case.

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors and can be contacted on 07741 988 925 or at Katie.Spencer@clarionsolicitors.com.