Understanding the consequences of serving a defective bill of costs

In Hyder -v-Aidat-Sarran [2024] EWHC 3686 (SCCO), Deputy Costs Judge Roy KC dealt with two applications: from the Claimant for relief from sanctions for late service of the bill of costs; and from the Defendants who applied under CPR 44.11 to strike out the Claimant’s claim for costs due to serious and repeated failures to comply with rules, practice directions and Court orders and/or unreasonable or improper conduct during the detailed assessment proceedings.

Background Information

The applications were made against a background of procedural failures by the Claimant. A defective bill of costs, which had been prepared in the wrong format, had been served late. The Defendants served Points of Dispute in response to the defective bill, which highlighted numerous other failings, including a failure to certify and claims for costs to which the Claimant was not entitled. In the absence of Replies to Points of Dispute, the Defendants applied for an Unless Order.

As there was no serious dispute that the Claimant’s bill was defective, and on the strength of assurances given by the Claimant that an amended bill of costs had been prepared which would be served at the same time as the request for detailed assessment was filed, an Unless Order was made by consent. The Unless Order required the Claimant to file a request for detailed assessment hearing by 13 August 2024. In default of which the Claimant’s costs would be disallowed, and the Claimant would be required to pay the Defendants’ costs of the detailed assessment proceedings.

In the event, the Claimant filed the bill of costs together with a request for detailed assessment 1 day late by email, notwithstanding that the use of CE-File is compulsory in the Senior Court Costs Office. Although by this time the bill was in the correct format, none of the previously identified defects had been rectified and the filed bill introduced further defects in addition to those previously identified.

The Claimant was therefore required to apply for relief from sanctions. The Defendants opposed the application on grounds that the bill was so severely defective the Claimant could not properly be said to have belatedly complied with the Unless Order and they also applied for an order to strike out the claim for costs under CPR Rule 44.11, in any event.

The Judge dealt with each application in turn.

  1. The Claimant’s application for a relief from sanctions

The Judge referred to the Denton Principles, which is a three stage test used to guide the Court when deciding applications for a relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9.

Stage 1 was considered in relation to whether the service of a defective bill a day late was non-compliance with the order and whether that was a serious or significant breach.

The Judge stated that he was ‘ultimately against’ the Defendants submissions that the bill was so defective it should not be described as complying with the order because the bill was served within the meaning of the order in that the Unless Order did not specify a requirement to serve a fully compliant bill. Relief from sanctions was therefore granted.

  1. The Defendants’ application under CPR 44.11 to strike out the Claimant’s claim for costs

CPR 44.11(1) sets out the Court’s powers to address misconduct, which may apply where:

(a) a party or their legal representative fails to comply with a rule; or

(b) a party’s or legal representative’s conduct is unreasonable or improper.

If either limb of CPR Rule 44.11 are met, then the Court may apply one of the sanctions in CPR 44.11(2), which are:

  • disallow all or part of the costs which are being assessed; or
  • or order the party at fault or that party’s legal representative to pay costs which they have caused another party to incur.

The Judge found that both limbs of CPR 44.11(a) and (b) were made out. He found that in addition to the defects identified in the original bill, the Claimant had served an electronic bill which failed to comply with most of the requirements of electronic bills in Practice Direction 47.

The Judge agreed there were multiple significant failures within the bill, with some more serious than others. He also found it ”beyond belief” that the defects were not rectified in the electronic bill, despite being identified in the Points of Dispute. The Claimant also failed to serve evidence to explain or address the failings and failed to apologise for (or even acknowledge any of the failings) before the hearing. This was described as “serious and troubling lack of insight and contrition on behalf of the Claimant’s solicitors.”

It was also held that it was not appropriate for the Claimant’s solicitor to blame their costs draftsman for the errors on the basis that the costs draftsman is the solicitor’s agent, and the solicitor is vicariously liable for the draftsman’s failings (Gempride v Bamrah [2018] EWCA Civ 1367). The solicitor also had direct supervisory responsibilities which they did not fulfil in relation to reviewing and checking the bills of costs.

The Judge therefore found that “there have been multiple compound breaches. They have been serious. They have been persistent. They are unexplained, and they are inexcusable for the most part.

It was then left to the Judge to decide upon the severity of the sanction to impose. Although a complete strike out of the claim for costs was possible, the Judge decided against that on grounds that the Court of Appeal had found that sanction to be draconian, even in cases of serious misconduct. Instead, the Judge recognised that a severe sanction was warranted and Ordered that the Claimant’s assessed costs would be subject to a 75% reduction.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Civil and Commercial Costs Team at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

What scope is there for the recovery of litigation related costs as financial Deputy?

There is an unavoidable overlap between deputyship costs and litigation costs where a Deputy is appointed to manage P’s property and financial affairs whilst a claim remains ongoing concerning P. This has historically been and will continue to be somewhat of a grey area. The main distinction is working out whether the time spent is to be recovered under the Deputy’s bill of costs for general management or under the litigation claim.

Costs Judge James recently offered some valuable insight on this issue, and confirmed that the SCCO take the approach that “where the Deputy is being asked to provide information and/or schedules and/or documentation to support an interim payment application in ongoing litigation, these are not general management charges. They have been brought about by the actions of the defendant to the claim and the costs should rightfully be laid at the defendant’s door and not billed to P’s estate”. The same goes for where the Deputy is asked to prepare a witness statement for use in the litigation claim, with the key takeaway being that this time (with the work ultimately being generated by the defendant) should be claimed and recovered under the litigation rather than coming at a cost to P’s estate. It is not a black and white answer as to whether you can or cannot recover this time, but a question of where the work is best placed for recovery and payment.

It is inevitable in a Court of Protection deputyship matter where there is an ongoing claim that there will be some level of maintained contact throughout the management year regarding the general progression of the claim given the financial Deputy’s obligations and responsibilities. We continue to recommend that this periodical contact be included in general management bills for assessment. However, please note that where there is a significant level of contact between the fee earners and the litigator, the SCCO may take the stance that it would be more appropriate for the time incurred to be pursued in the litigation bill of costs and recovered from the defendant.

It is recommended that Deputies also consider the cases of In re Gibsons Settlement Trusts [1981] and Hadley v Pryzbylo [2024] in considering where work is best placed to be claimed and recovered. In re Gibsons Settlement Trusts [1981] applied a three strands of reasoning test, which was affirmed in the later case of Hadley v Pryzbylo [2024]. Another interesting observation made in Hadley v Pryzbylo which highlights further the lack of certainty in approach in this regard was that “as a matter of common sense, it would be unusual to rule that any generic category of cost was irrecoverable in principle; by the same token, it would be wrong to assume that, even if the generic category is recoverable, every item that made up that category was automatically recoverable”. This further demonstrates that costs in this area do not follow a one size fits all or black and white approach.

The case of ACC and Others [2020] also touches on litigation costs incurred by Deputies and what work can be done under the general management authority for steps taken in contemplation of litigation. My colleague Leah has recently prepared a helpful summary of the main points from this judgment, which you can read here: https://clarionlegalcosts.com/2024/10/15/acc-others-a-useful-recap/

If you have any specific queries as Deputy in relation to the recovery of your work in ‘litigation support’ work, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us to discuss this.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at costs.support@clarionsolicitors.com.