HMCTS are consolidating the work of the courts and tribunals into fewer buildings. It has been announced that from Monday 30 March 2020 there will be a network of priority courts that will remain open during the coronavirus pandemic to make sure the justice system continues to operate effectively.
Fewer than half of all court and tribunal buildings will remain open for physical hearings, with 157 priority court and tribunal buildings remaining open for essential face-to-face hearings. This represents 42% of the 370 crown, magistrates, county and family courts and tribunals across England and Wales.
To help maintain a core justice system that is focused on the most essential cases there will be open courts, staffed courts and suspended courts.
The Judiciary recommend that you check which courts are open before you travel. For information regarding the category of each court please follow this link.
Lord Chancellor Robert Buckland has said that it is vital that we keep our courts running. and that:
“An extraordinary amount of hard work has gone into keeping our justice system functioning. Technology is being used creatively to ensure that many cases can continue. Not everything can be dealt with remotely and so we need to maintain functioning courts.
These temporary adjustments to how we use the court estate will help ensure that we can continue to deal with work appropriately in all jurisdictions whilst safeguarding the well-being of all those who work in and visit the courts”.
Staffed courts will support video and telephone hearings and progress cases without hearings and ensure continued access to justice.
The remaining courts and tribunals will close temporarily and these measures will be kept in place for as long as necessary.
Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of the Costs Management team in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at firstname.lastname@example.org and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.
The Court of Appeal has recently handed down its Judgment in the case of Chapelgate Credit Opportunity Master Fund Limited -v- Money and Others , which was an eagerly awaited decision for litigation funders. The outcome of the case is as follows:
The Arkin Cap should be considered when determining costs, but it is not binding on the Courts.
“……..I do not consider that the Arkin approach represents a binding rule. Judges, as it seems to me, retain a discretion and, depending on the facts, may consider it appropriate to take into account matters other than the extent of the funder’s funding and not to limit the funder’s liability to the amount of that funding”
For those unfamiliar with litigation funding and the Arkin Cap, this arises out of the Court of Appeal decision in Arkin -v- Borchard Lines Limited 2005. In that case, a company which had provided third party funding for an unsuccessful claim was ordered to pay the costs of the winning party, but only to the extent of the funding provided. The Arkin Cap has been a principle which has been regularly applied by the Courts since. The decision in Chapelgate will cause uncertainty for litigation funders, in a world which has significantly evolved since 2005.
The Judgment increases the requirement for litigation funders to properly engage costs lawyers. Funders should be engaging costs lawyers to scrutinise a law firm’s legal budget when they are applying for funding. Costs lawyers should also be retained to monitor costs versus budget (including the opponent’s costs) and to advise on costs management orders.
Costs management orders provide more certainty on detailed assessment (unless the order for costs is made on the indemnity basis). Such measures will ensure that the funder has the maximum control possible on both the costs of the firm they are funding and the opponent’s legal costs; the latter being important in the event that an adverse order for costs is made.
This blog was written by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding Team. Andrew can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at email@example.com
Not only is it prudent and good practice, but it is essential that clients are regularly provided with estimates of their potential legal costs and are appraised in that regard.
The SRA require lawyers to provide their clients with the best possible information regarding the cost of the matter. This should be provided at the outset and reviewed and updated as and when necessary. Estimates of costs up to a particular stage are inadequate to meet the SRA requirements, an estimate of costs up to the conclusion of the claim is required.
The SRA requires lawyers at the outset to analyse whether pursuing the claim is commercially viable. Does the outcome justify the risk of having to pay someone else’s fees? So, an explanation needs to be given to the client of the likely costs of the claim, to include both party’s costs and whether the claim is worth pursuing in view of that. This should be reviewed throughout the lifetime of the claim and updated if appropriate. The reasoning is that the client should be able to make a fully informed decision when deciding to pursue litigation, a partial estimate does not allow this.
This is good practice in any event as it ensures that your client’s expectations are managed and will lead to no surprises. This transparency can lead to less disputes regarding the level of fees and the avoidance of any complaints in law firms which centre around fees.
The type or complexity of the claim will really depend on how sophisticated the estimate will need to be, however scoping the work properly will alleviate any scope creep.
Moreover, preparing an estimate of how much you consider that the claim will cost will assist regarding your approach, a more informed decision can be made regarding this. Providing this information does show confidence in pricing and in any event this more sophisticated pricing is being seen in the marketplace.
In the event of scope creep, a detailed estimate can assist and justify those further costs that are associated with the additional work. It is wise to keep your client informed if any of the out of scope work is not recoverable from the otherside, failure to do so may put you at risk regarding those additional costs.
In addition to identifying out of scope work, it is sensible to monitor your estimate and advise the client if the estimate is subject to change. If a detailed estimate has been provided at the outset it will be much easier to explain why the estimate requires increasing.
The draconian sanctions and restrictions surrounding budgets do not apply to estimates, the estimates are used as a yardstick to measure reasonableness. It is not intended to be straight jacket, that said, they do need to be prepared with care because if the client can show reliance and the matter proceeds to solicitor and own client assessment then your costs are at risk of a reduction as a result of that reliance.
Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at firstname.lastname@example.org and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622
The precedent H guidance notes have never aligned with the precedent S guidance notes (Phases and Tasks Reference and Lookup table in Precedent S (bill of costs)) until the update to the precedent H guidance notes which was made last month, this update has addressed some of those discrepancies.
Please find below the amendments that have been made to the guidance notes:
Pre-action: The precedent H guidance notes states that settlement discussions, advising on settlement and Part 36 offers before proceedings were issued are to be included in the Preaction phase. However, in the Precedent S guidance these discussions are included in the ADR/Settlement phase (task “Other Settlement Matters”) . The precedent H guidance notes must be followed therefore any preaction settlement discussions should be included in the preaction phase.
Issue/statements of case: The precedent H guidance notes have been amended to include “amendments to statements of case” in this phase, the previous guidance stated that these should be excluded from this phase. This amendment has resulted in alignment with the Precedent S guidance.
CMC: The precedent H guidance notes have been amended to include any further CMCs that have been built into the proposed directions order whereas previously the notes stated that any additional CMCs were not to be included in this phase. The position remains regarding any estimated CMCs that have not been proposed in the directions order, these are to be included as a contingent cost. Any disclosure work, i.e. list of disclosure issues, EDQ should be included in the disclosure phase.
Budget – The costs in relation to this phase includes inconsistencies which present numerous difficulties. The Precedent H Guidance Notes includes “correspondence with opponent to agree directions and budgets, where possible”, and “preparation for, and attendance at, the CMC”. The same applies in relation to the PTR phase, which includes “preparation of updated costs budgets and reviewing opponent’s budget”, “correspondence with opponent to agree directions and costs budgets, if possible” and “preparation for and attendance at the PTR”. While the precedent H guidance note specifically excludes preparation of the costs budget for the first CMC, it doesn’t specifically exclude preparation of Precedent R. The Precedent S description of this task is “work on budgeting between the parties following initial completion of the first budget, including the monitoring of costs incurred against the budget and any applications for variation of the budget” – it doesn’t mention the drafting of Precedent R and seems to relate to work post CMC.
Furthermore, in para 7.2 of PD3E the 2% cap relates to all recoverable costs of the budgeting and costs management process other than the recoverable costs of initially completing the Precedent H. If some costs budgeting items are included in the CMC and PTR phases (i.e. following the Precedent H Guidance Note), practically how is the 2% figure on the front page of Precedent H calculated? Should it include the budgeting items which appear in the CMC and PTR phases of Precedent H, or is it exclusive of them? And, what exactly is meant by “budget process” in relation to this 2% cap?
Unfortunately there is no guidance regarding the budget process or “associated material” that is referred to in the guidance notes – does this include composite summaries, breakdowns of costs?
One solution for this phase is to time record in line with the precedent S guidance notes and then when it comes to preparing the budget assess what aspects of the % cap belongs in the CCMC stage. If the time is recorded as CCMC it is a more onerous task to ascertain what element of the CCMC phase is relevant to the % cap.
Trial: The guidance note has been amended to now include counsel’s brief fee in the trial preparation phase rather than the trial phase.
Settlement phase: The precedent H guidance note previously excluded mediation from this phase, this has now been amended to include mediation.
Definition of budgeted and incurred costs – CPR 3.15 and PD 3E para 7.4 Incurred costs are now all costs incurred up to and including the date of the first costs management order, unless otherwise ordered. Budgeted costs are all costs to be incurred after the date of the first costs management order.
Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at email@example.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.
I posted a blog at the end of June about the case of MXX v United Lincolnshire NHS Trust (2018) (please follow this link to read the blog https://clarionlegalcosts.com/2019/06/25/ensure-consistency-between-your-costs-budget-and-bill-of-costs/).
In the Judgment of Master Rowley, there are some interesting points which I felt were appropriate to cite and share through this separate blog. Those points are as follows:
Master Rowley found that the inflated incurred costs amounted to improper conduct and said the following at paragraphs 57 and 58:
“57. The need to comply with the indemnity principle must be on page 1 of any introduction to the law of costs. It is fundamental throughout the issues regarding what sums can be claimed from one party by another. It is, or should be, engrained in everyone dealing with solicitor’s costs. Whether it is a detailed bill of costs that is being produced, a summary assessment schedule or even simply a breakdown in a letter being provided to the opponent, it is imperative that the costs set out as being payable by the opponent do not exceed the sums payable by the client to their solicitor. The case of Harold v Smith (1850) 5 H. & N. 381 is more than 150 years old but it remains correct that the sum claimed should not be a punishment to an opponent nor a bonus to the client (or solicitor) which is the effect of claiming more costs from the opponent than are payable by the client.
- I do not accept that the statement of truth for Precedent H is intended to be a composite statement or one akin to signing an estimate. If that was so, in my Judgement, the Statement would simply say that the document was a fair and accurate estimate of the costs which it would be reasonable and proportionate for the client to incur in litigation. But that is not what it says. It specifically refers to incurred and estimated costs separately and it seems to me that a solicitor signing a Statement of Truth has to consider whether the incurred costs figure is fair and accurate separately from whether the figures for estimated costs are fair and accurate. There is absolutely no reason why the incurred costs figure should not be accurate. There are many reasons to understand that the estimated costs figure is no more than educated guesswork. The change in the hourly rates for future work identified by Irwin Mitchell is one of those reasons.”
The importance of the indemnity principle (which I have blogged on previously and you can find here https://clarionlegalcosts.com/2019/02/12/the-indemnity-principle-what-is-it-is-it-important/) is clearly set out above at paragraph 57 of the Judgment.
At paragraph 58, it is clear that the signature of a Precedent H should not be taken lightly, it is a statement of truth and is not akin to signing an estimate, the signature on the Precedent H is not intended to be a composite statement. Paragraph 58 also indicates that the courts do not expect the incurred costs to be calculated incorrectly because of the inclusion of any incorrect hourly rate/s. However, the courts would be open to the use of composite rates for estimated costs given that hourly rates could clearly change (both upwards and downwards) over time. If you consider this applies to any budget that you are preparing, then make this clear in the assumptions to your budget, this will provide you with protection on detailed assessment and ensure transparency with the court and your opponent.
In the Judgment, Master Rowley did not find that the significant difference between the costs claimed in the bill and those in the costs budget (144-147 hours) amounted to improper conduct. Master Rowley said the following:
“61. Similarly, I do not think that the claimant’s approach to the amount of hours claimed in the budget and subsequently in the bill founds any significant criticism. My understanding of the limit of 1% of the total budget for the preparation of the precedent H was originally allowed for on the basis that clients would have been billed for the incurred costs by that point and so relatively little work would be needed to consider the incurred costs. If that is correct, it takes no account of matters dealt with under contingency arrangements such as a CFA when no bill will have been rendered by the time the Precedent H is prepared.
- It seems to me to be unrealistic to expect a party to vet the time recorded on a line by line basis in the manner suggested by the Defendant here. The bill of costs has taken nearly 100 hours to prepare and that involves a considerable greater sum than would be allowed by 1% of the budget. Whilst I accept Mr Bacon’s comment that the extent of the remuneration is not the touchstone for the effort that should be involved, it does seem to me to be a pointer as to the expectation of the time to be spent in preparing a budget. Most of the time will be spent in the estimation of future costs and much less will be spent in relation to incurred costs. Including items which are unlikely to be recoverable between the parties’ assessment runs a risk of the budgeting judge concluding that those costs are high and commenting about this in the CMO.
- I do not think that it can be said to be unreasonable for a solicitor to include in the budget, the time that the various fee earners have recorded on their system as being sums which the client is potentially liable to pay.
- Similarly, having considered that time to be vulnerable to challenge on a between the parties’ assessment, it can only be reasonable for the drafter of the bill of costs to exclude such time. Where, as here, the time is extensive, the incurred costs actually claimed between the parties will be significantly reduced. But that does not necessarily mean that something improper has occurred when the budget was prepared, in my view.”
Personally, whilst I cannot say that the discrepancy in time was improper, I struggle to accept the Master’s decision that there can be such a large discrepancy on detailed assessment (because the bill drafter excludes time when drafting the bill of costs). It is important that incurred costs are broadly correct in terms of time incurred and absolutely correct in terms of hourly rates. If not, it creates an incorrect starting point on detailed assessment and questions the signature of the costs budget. Furthermore, 1% can be a generous amount when preparing a high value costs budget (A £10 million budget would potentially allow a charge of £100,000 to prepare the costs budget).
The decision of the Master also troubles me for the following reasons:
- It is possible to prepare a budget as a bill of costs i.e. prepare a bill of costs which can be converted into a costs budget for the CCMC. Whilst this incurs greater cost, it effectively means that the costs are front-loaded so that the costs for drafting the bill at the conclusion of the matter are much lower.
- Lawyers have historically struggled with recording their time (and continue to struggle) in a way that reduces the time required to draft a bill of costs, not to mention time recording by using the phase, task and activity codes. It therefore surprises me that the Master seemed to accept an approach of calculating incurred costs by simply ‘lifting’ time from a time recording ledger. To my mind, time needs to be vetted correctly and incurred costs should not change significantly between those stated in the costs budget and those stated in the bill of costs.
- Where a costs management order has been made and the matter proceeds to a JSM or mediation, it can be possible for the parties to agree costs at the JSM or mediation based on the costs management order (Claimant providing some very basic updated figures). If the budget was not based on the accuracy expected within a bill of costs, then any breach of the indemnity principle would not be identified and there is a real risk that costs irrecoverable inter partes would potentially be recovered from the paying party.
- Furthermore, the Master’s approach is in real contradiction to the requirements of a document that contains a statement of truth, of which the budget is one of those documents.
It is therefore imperative that the incurred costs figure is not only calculated correctly in terms of the hourly rate but is calculated correctly (with no significant errors) in relation to inter partes incurred costs. When litigating, each party should be able to proceed on the basis that the incurred costs included in the budget are correct and can be relied upon. Whilst the Claimant substantially reduced the incurred costs in the MXX case (which was to the benefit of the Defendant), it does raise a real question over the costs management process if a party can change their incurred costs figure, which in this instance was by nearly 150 hours.
The aim of this blog was to share some of the wider points which arise from the Judgment of Master Rowley. I would be interested to hear any other people’s views and opinions which can be shared through this blog.
Please note that the case was the subject of an Appeal and I will blog separately (and shortly) in relation to the outcome of the Appeal. The outcome does not impact the points raised in this blog.
This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs Litigation Funding Team. He can be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org or on 0113 336 3334.
This series of blog articles will address the increasing viability of third party funding as an alternative to traditional litigation funding methods. It will look at how the law has developed historically and how the Court now approaches third party funding and the potential liability of third party funders.
The third part of this series will explore the liability of third party funders in the matter of Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 and 3)  1 WLR 3055.
This matter related to an unsuccessful action in respect of anti-competitive practices which resulted in the collapse of the Claimant’s company, and which severely affected his finances. The Claimant entered into an agreement with a professional litigation funding company (MPC) to provide funding for the expert evidence and litigation support services for the expert. MPC did not agree to pay any of the Defendants’ costs or to provide finances for an ATE premium due to the significant amount of the premiums available.
The claim was unsuccessful at Trial and the Claimant was ordered to pay the Defendants’ costs. The Defendants’ then sought a non-party cost order against MPC for the entirety of the Defendants’ entitlement to costs. However, this was refused at first instance.
The Defendants subsequently appealed the decision.
The Court of Appeal considered the balance that needed to be struck between the access to justice provided by third party funding and the general rule that costs should follow the event. It was considered that a funder who purchased a stake in an action should then be protected from all liability of the opposing party’s costs in the event the claim fails.
The Court of Appeal commended the following approach:
‘a professional funder, who finances part of a Claimant’s costs of litigation, should be potentially liable for the costs of the opposing party to the extent of the funding provided’
This has become known as the Arkin cap. This approach has provided clarity and transparency to funders as they can now quantify their liability should the matter fail.
Whilst the cap has been readily adopted by the funding industry, it has also not been without criticism. The main criticism being that the cap creates an uneven playing field in favour of the third party funder as they will only ever be liable for the amount of their investment, whilst the opposing party would be liable for all of the costs of the funded party.
In the next part of the series…
The next blog in this series will take a look at the recent decision which has built upon the ‘Arkin cap’ in the matter of Davey v Money  EWHC 997 (Ch).
This blog was prepared by Kris Kilsby who is an Associate Costs Lawyer at Clarion and part of the Costs Litigation Funding Team. Kris can be contacted at email@example.com or on 0113 227 3628.