Tag: costs lawyers

Getting it Right – CPR 2.8 and calculating dates for service

Joanne ChaseLeave a comment

Calculation of Time

The recent case of Corfield v Howard [2024] EWHC 2727 (Comm) is a reminder of the importance of calculating time for service and filing of Court documents.

In the above matter, the Defendant applied for declaratory relief as to the meaning of enforcement of a settlement agreement scheduled to a Tomlin order. In accordance with a consent order, skeleton arguments were due to be served and filed one clear day before the hearing. The Court staff noted that no skeleton arguments had been filed and served by the due date. Their time was therefore taken up identifying the breach and writing chasing letters to the parties’ representatives. Both parties subsequently filed their skeleton arguments. HHJ Judge Davis-White KC sated that he did not need to enquire further as to where the fault lay, however, he said that Counsel and instructing solicitors should liaise in good time to ensure that the required skeleton argument can be prepared by Counsel by the required time.

The Judge went on further to state that:

“the delivery of skeleton arguments in accordance with guidance of court order is essential for the efficient running of the courts”. Although the Judge was able to proceed with the hearing on this occasion, the Judge did warn that “the court is likely to impose sanctions in cases as egregious as these”.

Although there were no sanctions in this case, it serves as a timely reminder that compliance with court imposed deadlines is mandatory and, in an appropriate case, the Court may impose sanctions for a failure to comply. Getting it wrong can be costly, and, in the extreme, fatal to the case.

The Rules

CPR Part 6 is at the heart of the rules relating to service of documents, and Practice Direction 6A relates to service within the United Kingdom.

CPR 2.8 sets out how we go about calculating time, and parts 2.8 (2) and (3) specifically explains the clear day rule which often catches practitioners out:

“(2) A period of time expressed as a number of days shall be computed as clear days.

(3) In this rule ‘clear days’ means that in computing the number of days –

(a) the day on which the period begins; and

(b) if the end of the period is defined by reference to an event, the day on which that event occurs are not included.”

CPR 2.8 (4) continues to explain that:

“Where the specified period –

(a) is 5 days or less; and

(b) includes –

(i) a Saturday or Sunday; or

(ii) a Bank Holiday, Christmas Day or Good Friday,

that day does not count”

Examples

Where a CMC is listed for 28 March and the Court orders bundles to be filed no later than 7 days before the CMC, the last date for filing is 20 March.

Alternatively, where a witness statement must be served 5 days before a hearing listed on Tuesday 18 March, the deadline for service is Monday 10 March.

Interestingly, CPR 44 practice direction 9.5 (4) provides different rules for the filing and service of a statement of costs before a fast-track trial and other hearings;

“The statement of costs must be filed at court and copies of it must be served on any party against whom an order for payment of those costs is intended to be sought as soon as possible and in any event –

(a) for a fast track trial, not less than 2 days before the trial; and

(b) for all other hearings, not less than 24 hours before the time fixed for the hearing.

Where a fast track trial is listed for 1.30pm on the first Tuesday after Easter, taking into account the clear day rule and CPR 2.8 (4), the statement of costs must be filed and served no later than the Tuesday before. Wednesday and Thursday provide the 2 clear days, with Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Sunday and Monday not counting. Therefore, in this instance, 7 days before the hearing – suddenly the 2 days turn into 7 days.

However, if it were an interim application hearing listed for 1.30pm on the first Tuesday after Easter, the statement of costs must be filed and served no later than 1.30pm on Maundy Thursday.  What is crucial here is that this rule provides for hours and not clear days. Therefore, filing and serving at 1pm on Maundy Thursday would be perfectly acceptable despite it being within no clear days of the hearing. The clear day rule does not apply when the rules specify the deadline as a number of hours rather than a number of days.

Conclusion

Being aware of this subtle difference could prove to be a very useful tool for any practitioners who are under time constraints for the filing and service of Court documents. A note of advice –  if in doubt then check the rules. The rules regarding filing and service can easily catch you out, particularly bearing in mind that there are also rules surrounding the method of filing and service, i.e. service by email, fax etc., in addition to those relating to timing.

Joanne Chase is a Legal Director in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

MA & AA, Re (Re Section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) [2023] EWCOP 65

Leah MorrisLeave a comment

Background

The case of MA & AA, Re (Re Section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) [2023] EWCOP 65 concerned an 84 year old woman who was diagnosed with dementia (MA) and an 89 year old man who has been diagnosed with dementia, epilepsy, heart disease and cerebrovascular hypertension (AA). MA and AA are husband and wife and had been married for 63 years. Following their diagnoses, the parties were moved into the same care home. In due course, this care home could no longer meet the needs of MA, and therefore she was moved to a different placement.

A plan was then made to reintroduce contact between MA and AA via telephone, video call and then in person. After only two in person contact sessions, the local authority issued a COP9 application to end all contact, by any means, between MA and AA on the grounds of distress and the risks posed by MA to AA at the end of contact sessions. This application was strongly opposed by MA, and the judge was asked to decide on future care and residence, whether were to be any further attempts at contact and whether a removal of contact represented a breach of rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Considerations of the Judge

The Judge considered various issues surrounding the case including care and residence, contact, declaration, the positions of the parties and the law, including capacity and best interests. The Judge also reviewed the case of HH v Hywel Dda University Health Board & Ors [2023] EWCOP 18 which set out how the Court should proceed in a situation involving two Protected Parties where the best interests decisions are interconnected.

The options available on behalf of MA were;

  • MA remaining at placement 2 and AA remaining at placement 1; or
  • MA remaining at placement 2 and AA residing at placement 3.

Decision

The Judge stated that ‘it is universally accepted that the starting point in this matter is that wherever possible, a husband and wife should have contact with each other’ but the evidence shows, sadly, AA no longer recognises MA. Given this analysis, he decides he had ‘not found any evidence that the respondents have acted in a way which is disproportionate and incompatible with a convention right.’ Therefore, it was concluded that due to MA’s erratic behaviour during face-to-face contact and AA’s lack of interest in video meetings, it was determined to be in both AA and MA’s best interests that they each remain at their current placements and for them to not have any form of contact at this stage.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at costs.support@clarionsolicitors.com

Pre-judgment interest allowed at 2% above the Bank of England base rate

Ellena HunterLeave a comment

Asturion Foundation v Alibrahim [2024] EWH 757 (Ch) concerned a very long-running action (9 years) during which the Defendant had incurred about £6.6 million in costs. The Claimant sought recovery of the title of an English property that had been transferred to the Defendant, by a board member of the Claimant.

Mr Justice Johnson found that the transfer of title was made within the purposes of the Foundation and the transferor had acted within the scope of internal competencies. It was agreed by the Claimant that the Defendant was the successful party and was therefore entitled to her costs.

The Defendant had failed on some points and therefore, the Claimant sought a percentage deduction to the Defendant’s recoverable costs to account for those unsuccessful issues. The Defendant conceded that a percentage deduction should be made but did not agree with the extent proposed by the Claimant. Ultimately, Mr Justice Johnson made a deduction of 15% from the Defendant’s otherwise recoverable costs.

The parties addressed Mr Justice Johnson on the issue of interest on costs. It was the Defendant’s position that interest should be paid on the costs expended by her since the dates of payments of the relevant invoices rendered by her solicitors. The Defendant emphasized that due to the litigation spanning a period of 9 years, she had been ‘out of pocket’ for a considerable period and she should therefore, be entitled to a payment reflecting the time value of money. This was calculated by the Defendant’s costs draftsman using a rate of 2% above the Bank of England base rate which was argued to represent a reasonable approximation of the Defendant’s likely costs of borrowing.

The Claimant argued that there should be suspension of payment of judgment debt interest until it had a fair opportunity to decide what sums it accepts should be payable, as a detailed bill of costs had not yet been received.

The Judge saw merits in both parties’ arguments.

In terms of pre-judgment interest, it was noted that this was within the Court’s discretion. The Judge determined that as the Defendant had been ‘out of pocket’ for a significant period of time, it would be unfair for her not to be compensated accordingly. Therefore, the Judge ordered that pre-judgment interest be paid at 2% above base rate from time to time. Interest was not, however, awarded during a 2.5-year period in which the proceedings were in a ‘state of suspense’ pending determination of the Defendant’s strike out application that was eventually unsuccessful.

The Judge did agree that the Claimant should be afforded further time to consider the bill (when received) and to determine what it accepts as reasonable and proportionate. Therefore, Mr Justice Johnson suspended the accrual of judgment debt interest for a period of 3 months but allowed pre-judgment interest to continue.

Ellena Hunter is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

A substantial reduction of costs on the indemnity basis in a summary assessment

ujjainimistryLeave a comment

Mrs Justice Knowles summarily assessed the costs of a dismissed committal application, made by the wife in Alvina Collardeau v Michael Fuchs & Anor [2024] EWHC 642 (Fam). The costs of the First and Second Respondents were assessed on the indemnity basis, but they were substantially reduced for the reasons set out below.

Indemnity Basis:

Mrs Justice Knowles saw ‘no justification for departing ’’ from the principle that indemnity costs are usually imposed in contempt proceedings, and she, therefore, assessed the costs on this basis. The Judge noted that the applicant’s case was ‘weak and evidentially flawed’’ as well as being ‘improperly motivated and disproportionate’.

CPR 44.4(1)(b) outlines the factors to be considered in deciding the amount of costs to be awarded when assessing on the indemnity basis. Costs will be allowed if they are not unreasonably incurred, or they are not unreasonable in amount; any doubt will be resolved in favour of the receiving party. The Court do not need to have regard to proportionality when assessing costs on the indemnity basis. This means that the receiving party is likely to obtain a higher percentage of their costs claim on assessment than if costs were assessed on the standard basis.

Despite Mrs Justice Knowles ordering that the costs be assessed on the indemnity basis, she did determine that the costs incurred by both respondents were ‘manifestly excessive and unreasonable’. The total spent between both respondents was £510,876.90. The Second Respondent submitted that he was entitled to have regard to the wife’s profligate approach to litigation costs when instructing his own legal team. The Judge deemed this as a ‘wholly unreasonable approach, which encourages exorbitance, if not profiteering’.’ This Respondent’s total costs exceeded £330,000.

The First Respondent’s costs were reduced by 33% as it was not justifiable to have 2 of each grade of fee earner preparing the case, charging a significant rate. Counsel’s fees were also reduced by 50%.

The Second Respondent’s fees were reduced by 44%. But this was still considered unreasonably high and excessive. There were 3 Grade A fee earners on this matter, which was deemed unnecessary. The costs associated with any obtained expert evidence was deducted in full as the court did not grant authorisation for expert evidence to be adduced.

Mrs Justice Knowles considered all features of the case and in order to reach a just decision, costs were assessed on an indemnity basis, but the costs were heavily reduced as they were considered to be wholly unreasonable.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at CivilandCommercialCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Litigant in Person required to file and serve a costs budget

Bethany CollingsLeave a comment

In a recent Judgment, Cotham School v Bristol City Council & Ors [2024] EWHC 824 (Ch) it was held that a Litigant in Person (“LIP”) was required to file a costs budget as they instructed Direct Access Counsel. HHJ Paul Matthew handed down a judgment following an application for a costs capping order under CPR rule 3.19.

HHJ Paul Matthew stated:

“It seems to me that, if there is any risk, let alone a substantial risk, that disproportionate costs would be incurred in this case, the better instrument for preventing that undesirable event is effective costs management orders, rather than the ‘blunt instrument’ of a costs capping order. In the circumstances, I propose to order pursuant to rule 3.15(1) and (3)(a) that, although this is a Part 8 claim, and although the second defendant is a litigant in person (albeit employing counsel on a direct access basis), all parties must file and exchange costs budgets not later than 21 days before the first case management conference. Having so ordered, the preconditions for a cost capping order under rule 3.19 are not satisfied, and I decline to make such an order.”

Under CPR 3.12(1), LIPs are exempt from complying with costs budgeting. However, the Court retains discretion to order a person to file and serve a costs budget, even if they are not obliged to do so pursuant to CPR rule 3.12(1A).

HHJ Paul Matthew referred to the case of Campbell v Campbell [2016] where Chief Master Marsh confirmed:

“Furthermore, the court may decide to make a costs management order in relation to a litigant in person’s budget. Indeed, in a case in which a litigant in person is likely to be seeking a substantial costs order, whether because there will be fees of counsel under the Direct Access scheme or otherwise, it may well be desirable to do so.” 

Conversely, HHJ Paul Matthew referred to the case of CJ and LK Perk Partnership v Royal Bank of Scotland [2020] EWHC 2563 (Comm), where it was held that LIPs with direct access Counsel should not file and serve costs budgets.

In this case, although the LIP had instructed Counsel under the direct access scheme and did not instruct solicitors, HHJ Paul Matthew concluded that due to the potential significant claim for costs if successful, all parties, including the second Defendant (the LIP), should file and serve a costs budget, regardless of the nature of Part 8 proceedings.  

Bethany Collings is a Paralegal in Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Funding Team and can be contacted on 07774 951949 or at bethany.collings@clarionsolicitors.com

Important Considerations Regarding the Termination of a CFA by a Client

Joanne ChaseLeave a comment

The case of Sellers v Simpkins [2023] EWHC 3296 (SCCO) has brought to light important considerations regarding the termination of a Conditional Fee Agreement (CFA) by a client. The judgment, delivered by Senior Costs Judge (SCJ) Gordon-Saker, provides valuable lessons for clients and lawyers alike.

The Case

In this case, Steven Simpkins, formerly practicing as Simpkins & Co in Hampshire, acted for the claimant after she was seriously injured in a road accident. The CFA was signed in May 2015, and no success fee was payable under the agreement, which was a CFA Lite. In March 2021, the claimant terminated the retainer and instructed another firm. The claim was settled in August 2021.

The Judgment

The SCJ ruled that a solicitor whose CFA was terminated by the client can charge costs in excess of the amount recovered from the defendant in the underlying proceedings. The SCJ held that “the overall cap does not apply where the solicitor elects to claim their charges before the conclusion of the claim.”

Summary

For Clients Terminating a CFA

Clients should be aware that if they terminate a CFA, they may be required to pay the previous solicitor’s costs under the CFA. This could potentially be in excess of the amount recovered from the defendant in the underlying proceedings.

For Lawyers Whose Clients Have Terminated a CFA

Lawyers whose clients have terminated a CFA should be aware that they can elect to claim their charges before the conclusion of the claim. This could potentially allow them to recover costs in excess of the amount recovered from the defendant in the underlying proceedings.

For Lawyers Advising a Client Who Has Terminated a CFA

Lawyers advising a client who has terminated a CFA should be aware of the potential for their client to be liable for costs in excess of the amount recovered from the defendant. They should ensure that their client is fully informed of this potential liability before proceeding.

Conclusion

The judgment in Sellers v Simpkins [2023] EWHC 3296 (SCCO) provides important guidance for clients and lawyers regarding the termination of a CFA. It highlights the potential for significant costs liabilities and underscores the importance of clear communication and understanding between clients and their lawyers.

The Bar Council’s Guidance on the use of Generative AI

Joanne ChaseLeave a comment

The Bar Council has recently issued guidance for barristers on the use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI), including ChatGPT and other large language model systems (LLMs). The guidance concludes that there is nothing inherently improper about using reliable AI tools to augment legal services, but they must be properly understood by the individual practitioner and used responsibly.

The guidance is not legal advice and is not ‘guidance’ for the purposes of the BSB Handbook I6.4. However,  it highlights the key risks with LLMs and explores the considerations for barristers, and by extension all lawyers, when using generative AI:

  • Due to possible hallucinations and biases, it is important for lawyers to verify the output of LLM software and maintain proper procedures for checking generative outputs.
  • LLMs should not be a substitute for the exercise of professional judgment, quality legal analysis and the expertise that clients, courts and society expect from their legal representatives.
  • Lawyers should not to share with an LLM system any legally privileged or confidential information.
  • Lawyers should critically assess whether content generated by LLMs might violate intellectual property rights or breach trademarks.
  • It is important to keep abreast of relevant Civil Procedure Rules, which in the future may implement rules/practice directions on the use of LLMs, for example, requiring parties to disclose when they have used generative AI in the preparation of materials, as has been adopted by the Court of the King’s Bench in Manitoba.

This Bar Council guidance will be kept under review and updated periodically, however practitioners will need to be vigilant and adapt as the legal and regulatory landscape changes.

Court fee consultation – have your say!

Ella WilkinsonLeave a comment

The Ministry of Justice have recently published an open consultation regarding the proposed implementing of increases to various court and tribunal fees, citing factors such as the rise in the consumer price index and the running costs of HMCTS. The intended increases are 10% across a range of court and tribunal fees in several jurisdictions, to support the continued delivery of services and to reduce the level of subsidisation required from taxpayers.

Within the proposals, there is an intention to also establish a routine approach to reviewing and amending fees every two years, to take into account any changes in the running costs of HMCTS, as well as the wider financial position in respect of the economy and pricing.

The consultation began on 10 November 2023 and will end on 22 December 2023, so we would invite you to review the proposals and submit your views ahead of this deadline, as Court of Protection fees are included within the changes being considered. The Court of Protection specific proposals are set out in the below table:

ItemCurrent FeeProposed New Fee
Court of Protection application£371.00£408.00
Court of Protection appeal£234.00£257.00
Court of Protection hearing£494.00£543.00
Court of Protection filing for detailed assessment£87.00£96.00
Appeal against a Court of Protection costs assessment£70.00£77.00
Request to set aside a Court of Protection costs certificate£65.00£72.00

You can review the full consultation report via the link below for further information, and this also includes information as to how you can get in touch to submit your views (see pages 17-19 in particular).

Click to access tribunal-fees-consultation-web-accessible.pdf

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact Ella.wilkinson@clarionsolicitors.com for further information, who is an Associate within the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion.

Costs of attending pre-inquest review can be recoverable

Bethany CollingsLeave a comment

The judgment of Costs Judge James Briley & Ors v Leicester Partnership NHS Trust & Ors [2023] EWHC 1470 (SCCO) provides further insight into the recoverability of costs associated with a Coroner’s Inquest as part of the costs of a subsequent civil claim. Although it is usually accepted that such costs are recoverable in principle, it is not uncommon for paying parties to attempt to limit the extent of claims for costs. One area which is often targeted are costs in respect of pre-inquest review hearings, which can be deemed to be ‘housekeeping tasks’.

The claim related to a young woman who died whilst under the Defendant’s care. The deceased had a substantial history of mental health issues as well as Asperger’s Syndrome and a diagnosis of emotional unstable personality disorder. The deceased also had a history of self-harm and suicide attempts and had been admitted to various mental health units throughout her lifetime. The deceased passed away on 28 December 2016, having been found on her bedroom floor having ligatured with her clothing. The cause of death was an un-survivable hypoxic brain injury.

Following the deceased’s death there was a serious incident investigation which identified a number of concerns. Thereafter there was a further investigation and a future inquest. The deceased’s representatives subsequently brought claims against the Defendant for damages. The civil claims concluded before the inquest took place, however there were two pre-inquest reviews which addressed issues of expert evidence, disclosure, and witness evidence before the damages claim was settled in the sum of £65,000.

In the subsequent detailed assessment of costs, one of the issues between the parties was the extent to which the costs associated with the inquest were recoverable from the Defendant. In particular, the Defendant took issue with the costs of attending the pre-inquest review hearings, which amounted to a total of £14,770.67, including Counsel’s fees, Solicitors costs and disbursements.

The Defendant objected to all costs associated with the pre-inquest reviews largely on grounds that they denied that the costs incurred were of use in the civil claim. This was based on the submission that full admissions of liability had been made and the Defendant had apologised at the time of the deceased’s death. They also suggested that a pre-inquest review was largely ‘housekeeping’ and they relied on the decision in Amanda Helen Lynch (Representative of the Estate of Colette Lynch) and Others v (1) Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police (2) Warwickshire County Council and (3) Warwickshire NHS Trust [14 November 2014], which is an example of a Costs Judge disallowing the costs of a pre-inquest review.

In rejecting the Defendant’s arguments, the Costs Judge confirmed the importance of finding out what caused the death in the first place was a significant factor. It was also held that the fact that the deceased’s representatives had gone on to secure a meaningful apology and a commitment to learn lessons from the death were as important as the financial value of the damages recovered.

As regards the Defendant’s suggestion that the costs were of no use in the civil claim, the Costs Judge found that the participation in the pre-inquest reviews shed light on the treatment received by the deceased, which assisted in considering the non-negligence aspects of the civil claim. In addition, it was found that representation at the pre-inquest reviews helped prevent the Coroner from being influenced by the Defendant’s representatives which may have prevented key documents and facts coming to light. The costs of attending the pre-inquest reviews were therefore allowed in principle.

Bethany Collings is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding team and can be contacted at bethany.collings@clarionsolicitors.com or on 0777 951949.

Access to Justice Prevails : Court of Appeal rules that Translator Fees for Trial are recoverable in Fixed Costs Cases

Daniel MurrayLeave a comment

In a significant ruling for litigators who deal with cases captured by the current fixed costs regimes, the Court of Appeal in Santiago v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2023] EWCA Civ 838 has ruled that the fees of a translator or interpreter were recoverable in a case which settled on the morning of Trial.

Background

The dispute regarding the recoverability of the fees was one which arose following a successful personal injury claim brought by Mr Santiago, a Brazilian national who spoke Portuguese. His claim had been brought under Section IIIA of CPR 45 (those falling outside of the Pre-Action Protocol). At first instance, Deputy District Judge Sneddon, felt constrained by the Court’s previous decision in Cham (A Child) v Aldred [2019] EWCA Civ 1780, [2020] 1 WLR 1276, and disallowed the fees, whilst acknowledging that her instinct told her otherwise. Permission to appeal was subsequently granted.

The Court in Cham, a case in which the central issue was the recoverability of Counsel fees for advice, had determined that in cases progressing under Section IIIA of CPR Part 45, those advice fees were not recoverable as a disbursement under CPR45.29I(h), which permits recovery of a disbursement which is “reasonably incurred due to a particular feature of the dispute.” Lord Justice Coulson, sitting in that matter, had went on to summarise that whether the Claimant was a child, or an individual who could not speak English, then those features were a characteristic of the Claimant, not the dispute, and therefore any provision for recovery of such fees were accounted for in the sums allowed for fixed profit costs, and no additional sums should be allowed as a disbursement.

The Decision

Lord Justice Stuart-Smith determined that the comments by Lord Justice Coulson in Cham’ were strictly obiter, with the case determining the position in relation to Counsel fees for advice, and not fees of translators and interpreters. Therefore, the decision was not binding upon him.

He went on to determine that “by CPR 1.2(b), the Court “must” seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it interprets any rule. The first issue, therefore, is one of principal………it seems to me to be clear beyond argument to the contrary that an interpreter is essential if a person or witness who does not speak adequate English is to participate fully in proceedings or give their best evidence.”

LJ Stuart Smith went on to confirm that despite arguments on behalf of the paying party to the contrary, the fees of translators were not encompassed within Table 6B of CPR 45, which contains the specific provisions for recoverable Solicitor’s fees for cases under Section IIIA, and that “the fact that the provision of independent interpreting services will not be provided by a party’s solicitors or counsel as part of the provision of their legal services provides strong support for the submission that they must be recovered”.

The need for advice in cases involving minors or protected parties was distinguished from the need for an interpreter, on the basis that cases involving minors can still proceed to a settlement without the advice, and can still be endorsed by the individuals when they reach the age of majority, whereas  “interpretation of sub-paragraph (h) that precluded the recovery of reasonably incurred interpreter’s fees in a case such as the present would not be in accordance with the overriding objective because it would tend to hinder access to justice by preventing a vulnerable party or witness from participating fully in proceedings and giving their best evidence.”

Commentary

Whilst this ruling is one which will no longer be relevant to cases with a date of incident on or after 1 October 2023, and the new CPR 45.59 expressly permitting recovery of these fees, it will no doubt be most welcomed by litigators dealing with the runoff of cases still captured by the current regime.

It will also be interesting to see if the strong views on access to justice lead to a review of the recovery of translator fees in cases which proceed under the various Pre-Action Protocols, and in which these types of disbursements are currently not recoverable. No variations to this approach are encompassed within the new rules either.

Disbursement disputes on new fixed costs regime is one of the topics which will be discussed at our seminar on 6 September. The seminar will focus key issues in relation to the new rules, including practical guidance on the new banding and allocation rules. Click here for more information and to register to attend.

For further information on this decision, please contact Daniel Murray, who is an Associate in Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Funding Department and can be contacted at daniel.murray@clarionsolicitors.com.