In our latest podcast Andrew McAulay and Matthew Rose discuss some recent developments relating to recoverability of VAT and loan interest, inaccurate bills, Counsels fees in fixed costs cases and failure to make offers.
In our latest podcast Andrew McAulay and Matthew Rose discuss some recent developments relating to recoverability of VAT and loan interest, inaccurate bills, Counsels fees in fixed costs cases and failure to make offers.
Sir Rupert Jackson’s proposal regarding costs capping is now a reality, with the launch of the voluntary capped costs pilot scheme on 14 January in London, Manchester and Leeds Business and Property Courts.
The aim of the pilot scheme
The aim of the scheme is to improve access to the Courts through:
The pilot will provide for a cap on recoverable costs for each stage of the case, and an overall cap on the total, rather than a fixed sum. The maximum a party will be ordered to pay will be £80,000.
The promise of a fixed recoverable costs scheme was first made two years ago by Sir Rupert Jackson in his IPA annual lecture “The Time Has Come”. His view was that “high litigation costs inhibit access to justice. They are a problem not only for individual litigants, but also for public justice generally. If people cannot afford to use the courts, they may go elsewhere with possibly dubious results. If costs prevent access to justice, this undermines the rule of law”. He predicted, or perhaps rather hoped, that the fixed recoverable costs project could be accomplished during the course of that year.
However, the flurry of chatter and speculation regarding the fixed recoverable costs scheme was left behind in 2016 and, as we moved into 2017, it was replaced with Sir Rupert’s proposals regarding costs capping, which he advised would follow the model used in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court.
About the pilot scheme
This newly launched pilot scheme will last for two years. For those cases with a monetary value that are less than £250,000, and where the trial is two days or less, the voluntary pilot scheme is available. It cannot be adopted, however, for any cases where there are allegations of fraud and dishonesty; where extensive disclosure, witness evidence or expert evidence is likely; or where the claim will involve numerous issues and numerous parties.
Agreement of both parties is essential if the pilot’s shortened litigation process is to be pursued. The claim will exit the pilot if there is any dispute by any party in that regard. This shortened process is expected to be less costly, with the initial statements of case being limited in length and accompanied by the documents upon which the party proposes to rely.
Further, witness statements will also be limited in length, with the general rule being reliance on oral evidence of two witnesses. There are restrictions placed on expert evidence, which will only be permitted if the court is satisfied that it’s necessary, and it is likely to be on a single joint basis.
The trial judge will take a hands-on approach, to ensure that the trial estimate is adhered to, and has the power to strictly control cross-examination. When the several imposed time limits for filing the documents are considered collectively, the whole process – from the issue of the claim to the hearing of the trial – should not exceed 11 months.
The costs for each phase of the litigation is restricted to the cap and an assessment of costs is still required. Costs budgeting and detailed assessment are not applicable, with summary assessment being the favoured choice of the rule makers. The normal practice of filing the statement of costs prior to the hearing and the assessment of those costs then taking place at the trial will be avoided. Instead, the parties shall file and exchange schedules of their costs incurred in the proceedings not more than 21 days after the conclusion of the trial.
The schedules shall contain details regarding each applicable stage in the Capped Costs Table. The maximum cap of £80,000 for recoverable costs does not include court fees, VAT, enforcement costs and wasted costs, which are claimed additionally.
For those instances where Part 36 offers have been made the cap is increased to £100,000, and so Part 36 offers continue to play a central role.
With claims now able to be issued and pursued to trial in less than 12 months, and with costs not exceeding £80,000, will more parties engage in litigation? Or, conversely, will this restriction on the amount of costs that can be recovered be off putting? Only time will tell.
Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at email@example.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.
A recent publication of the Senior Courts Cost Office Guide was produced as a result of various changes in the way legal costs are being assessed. However, in respect of Court of Protection costs, not a great deal has changed since its inception. As a result, the 2018 guide brings the perfect opportunity to review the position on Court of Protection costs, getting paid for your work and the rules to follow.
Initially, Section 25 of the Mental Health Act 2005 created the weight of the Court of Protection, which protects the property and financial affairs of persons who lack the capacity to manage their own.
There are three methods for recovering your costs; Agreed costs, Fixed costs and Summary Detailed Assessment of costs.
Most Orders will contain a clause entitling the professional Deputy to be paid for the work undertaken. It will provide the option of taking fixed costs or having the costs assessed, subject to the terms of the Order.
As set out in the Guide, Agreed Costs are not generally available and would only be necessary in the circumstances that fixed costs do not cover the work undertaken and it would not be appropriate to undertake a costs assessment. For example, following the death of a Protected Party, they are often required to attempt to agree their costs to bring the matter to a smooth conclusion.
Practice Direction 19B supplementing Part 19 of the COP Rules 2017 sets out fixed costs that may be claimed by Solicitors and office holders in public authorities acting as Deputy for the Protected Party. However, the Court has the discretion to apply the rules to other professionals such as accountants and case managers acting as Deputy. The general rule is that the costs of the proceedings should be paid by the pp1 or their estate unless a Court Order provides for an alternative. Where a Court Order or direction provides for a detailed assessment, the Deputy can choose to take fixed costs in lieu.
Professional Deputies should lodge a request for Detailed Assessment with the SCCO by way of N258b form. Accompanied by:
In cases with costs exceeding £100,000.00, they are to be dealt with by a Master, and the relevant papers in support of the bill must only be lodged when requested.
It should be noted that, unlike litigation costs, a Court of Protection bill MUST NOT be filed electronically.
Once the assessment has taken place, you have 14 days from the date of receipt of the assessed bill to raise an appeal if dissatisfied. If following the review, you remain dissatisfied at the outcome, the SCCO will arrange a date for a oral hearing before a Master. In practice this is usually by telephone or letter.
After completion of the assessment, the Professional Deputy must complete the bill summary on the bill certifying the castings as correct, returning the original bill to the SCCO to enable them to issue the Final Costs Certificate, which is your authority to be paid.
Payments on account
Section 6 of the COP Practice Direction 19B states that Professional Deputies who elect for detailed assessment of the annual management charges can take payments on account for the first, second and third quarters of the year which are both proportionate and reasonable to the size of the estate. The interim bills must not exceed 25% of the estimated charges, so no more than 75% for the annum. The details of the interim bills received must be outlined within the Bill of Costs submitted to the SCCO.
If you require any further information, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org or call me on 0113 336 3350
Cost estimates are necessary for fast track claims when the fixed costs regime is not applicable and for non-budgeted cases
In accordance with CPR 28 PD6.1 (4), a cost estimate is required to be filed and served at the same time as the pre-trial check list. It is stated on the pre-trial checklist (N170) that ‘for legal representatives only: a cost estimate to be filed and served at the same time as the pre-trial check list is filed‘. Therefore, for all fast track claims where there is not a fixed costs regime in place then a costs estimates should be filed. Furthermore, for non-budgeted multitrack claims a costs estimate should be filed. What is particularly interesting is that this captures those claims that are not automatically included in the costs management regime, e.g. claims over £10m.
Case management conferences and indemnity basis costs
In accordance with CPR 26 PD 6.6, the court can impose a costs sanction where a party has failed to file a directions questionnaire or failed to provide further information which the court has ordered. The court will usually order a party to pay on the indemnity basis the costs of any other party who has attended the hearing, summarily assess the amount of those costs, and order them to be paid forthwith or within a stated period.
In accordance with CPR 26 PD 12.5(2), Section VI of Part 45 (fast track trial costs) will not apply to a case dealt with at a disposal hearing whatever the financial value of the claim. So, the costs of a disposal hearing will be in the discretion of the court.
Any questions? Please contact Sue at email@example.com or call on 0113 336 3389
The case of Ansell & Evans -v- AT&T (GB) Holdings Ltd (County Court at Oxford 14/12/2017) was an appeal to the County Court in relation to the interpretation and effect of acceptance of a Part 36 offer made in a case to which fixed costs applies.
Further information can be found in Gordon Exall’s blog on this case here
The Claimants had been injured in a car accident and the claim, due to its value, fell within the scope of the RTA protocol (‘the Protocol’). The claims were submitted to the Protocol and the Defendant admitted liability. Subsequently, the Defendant wrote to the Claimants stating that they were concerned that the accident was a low velocity impact and they therefore requested that they have access to the vehicle in order to arrange an inspection “in line with Kearsley -v- Klarfeld…” and that pending such investigations the Defendant “may wish to raise Casey -v- Cartwright”.
Shortly thereafter, the Claimants wrote to the Defendant stating that in light of this request, pursuant to paragraph 7.76 of the Protocol the claim was not suitable for and therefore would no longer continue under the Protocol.
Three months later, the Defendant wrote to the Claimants stating that “LVI is no longer an issue”.
No settlement having been reached, the Claimants issued proceedings under Part 7 and the Defendant thereafter made Part 36 offers, which the Claimant accepted within the relevant period.
The issue between the parties
Following settlement, the Defendant stated that it considered that the Claimants’ conduct in withdrawing the claim from the Portal had been unreasonable, and that the Claimant should be limited to pre-action fixed costs (CPR 45.29B Table 6C).
The Claimants’ position was that:-
The Claimants also alleged that, in the alternative, it had not been unreasonable to withdraw the claim from the Portal in light of the Defendant’s statement that it “had LVI concerns”
At first instance, the Court dismissed the Claimants’ application on the basis that it had been unreasonable to withdraw the claim from the Portal. However, the judge did not give any reasons for dismissing the Claimants’ argument that by operation of CPR 36.20 costs payable by the Defendant were fixed to the sums set out in Table 6B for the stage at which the claim settled and that therefore the Court did not have discretion to make an order in a different amount. The judge at first instance refused permission to appeal.
The Claimants made an application for permission to appeal on the grounds that (1) the judge had failed to give reasons for their judgment, (2) that the judge was wrong in law to reject the Claimants’ argument that by operation of CPR 36.20 costs payable by the Defendant were fixed at those set out in Table 6B, and (3) that the judge was wrong in law to conclude that the Claimants’ had acted unreasonably by withdrawing the claim from the Portal.
At the appeal hearing the Court allowed the appeal on the first ground, but dismissed the second and third grounds.
The First ground was a simple question of fact. As to the third, the court held that the letter sent by the Defendant that it “had LVI concerns” was merely an indication that complex issues might be raised, but was not of itself sufficient to give rise to complexity sufficient to justify withdrawal from the Portal.
However, had the Claimants succeeded on the second ground, the reasonableness or otherwise of the Claimants’ conduct would have been irrelevant. Thus it was upon the second ground that the Claimants’ case hinged and therefore the reasons for dismissal require more detailed analysis.
In respect of the second ground, which was that CPR 36.20 provides that where a Part 36 offer is accepted within the relevant period a claimant is entitled to the costs applicable for the stage at which the claim settlement, the judge held that CPR 36.20(1) incorporates CPR 45.29A(1), which therefore incorporates CPR 45.29A(3) which incorporates CPR 45.24 (consequences of failure to comply or electing not to continue with the relevant pre-action protocol). Simply put, the judge found that where a case settles by CPR 36, the court has discretion to award a different amount to that provided for under CPR 36.20 and Table 6C if the court determines that the claimant acted unreasonably.
CPR 36.20(2) provides that where a Part 36 offer is accepted within the relevant period, the claimant is entitled to the fixed costs in Table 6C of Section IIIA of Part 45 for the stage applicable at the date on which notice of acceptance was served on the offeror.
There is no provision within CPR 36.20 which is relevant to these facts. In particular, there is no provision which states that CPR 45 generally shall apply where a Part 36 offer is accepted within the relevant period or which provides for any discretion for the court to award any other amount.
CPR 36.20(1), states “This rule applies where (a) a claim no longer continues under the RTA or EL/PL Protocol pursuant to rule 45.29A(1)”.
So far as it is relevant CPR 45.29A(1) provides that “subject to paragraph (3), this section applies (a) to a claim started under (i) the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (‘the RTA Protocol’)… where such a claim no longer continue under the relevant Protocol or the Stage 3 Procedure in Practice Direction 8B”
CPR 45.29A(3) provides that “nothing in this section shall prevent the Court making an order under rule 45.24.”
The judge found that because CPR 45.29A(1) states that it is “subject to” CPR 45.29A(3), where the court considered that withdrawal from the portal was unreasonable under CPR 45.24, by virtue of CPR 45.29A(3) the claim had not “continued under the RTA Protocol” for the purpose of CPR 36.20(1). Accordingly, the Court was not bound to allow only those costs within Table 6C.
It is possible to argue that the judge on appeal erred in their finding as set out above.
In this case, it was a simple matter of fact that the claim had not continued under the Protocol under CPR 45.29A(1). CPR 45.29A(3) states that “nothing in this section” shall prevent the court from making an order under CPR 45.24. However, it does not state that a finding under CPR 45.24 that the claim had left the portal unreasonably would mean that section CPR 45.29A(1) did not apply. Furthermore as is clear, CPR 36.20 is not “in this section” (i.e. within CPR 45.29A) and therefore CPR 45.29A(3) is specifically dis-applied.
Claimants should careful to ensure that they do not withdraw a claim from the portal unless the defendant has actually raised a complex issue. Parties should be sure to clarify with their opponent whether there are any issues of conduct prior to the issue of proceedings and in any event before any offer of settlement is made or accepted. It is a common tactic for defendants in particular to only raise issues such as this after settlement has been agreed, as was indeed the position in this case. Written correspondence on the point prior to the acceptance of an offer should at the least give rise to an argument in estoppel should they later try to raise conduct.
The introduction of fixed costs was expected to create certainty in the amount which parties would recover at the conclusion of a claim. However the rules as drafted leave numerous lacunas and gaps which parties can exploit, which in turn has lead to satellite litigation. This is not what the drafters of the rules intended and is often not in the interest of the parties, as it leads to additional further cost which, in many cases and given the already low amount of costs recoverable, can be disproportionate.
In order to avoid this risk it is important that practitioners ensure that terms of settlement make proper provision for costs to avoid the risk of further litigation. This is a complex topic, and this is intended as a quick reference guide to help you to avoid the pitfalls so that you do not fall into the ‘fixed costs trap’.
Pursuant to the Protocols, a claim will leave the portal if it is revalued in an amount higher than the protocol limit (currently £25,000). However, CPR 45.29A states that fixed costs apply where the claim was started in the protocol. Of critical importance is to note that the mere fact that the claim was revalued at more than the protocol limit does not mean that standard basis costs apply. Practitioners should be wary of this when settling such claims and should either:
Whilst it may seem extreme to refuse settlement until allocation, this is at present the only way to ensure (so much as it is ever possible to ensure) that fixed costs will not apply. It should be borne in mind that such an approach is a calculated risk, as it is possible that a court would find that such conduct is ‘unreasonable’ should the matter proceed. That said, it should be possible to argue that without agreement fixed costs would apply and that the claimant is therefore better off and as such the conduct was not unreasonable.
Where fixed costs do apply and the claim is settled by part 36, there is no right to detailed assessment. If a dispute arises over fixed costs then one of the parties must apply.
It is generally preferable to seek to agree the amount of fixed costs which apply. Failure to do so can lead to disputes (and costly applications) over the correct level of fixed costs and ‘reasonable’ disbursements. It is currently unclear whether the costs of such applications are recoverable. Including a provision in a settlement agreement should be straightforward, as the costs are fixed. If an opponent refuses to do so it may be that they intend to raise technical arguments about the costs which are recoverable.
Claimants should note that defendants are aware of these argument and therefore may try to catch out the unwary.
This is a very quick summary of the issues surrounding settlement in cases to which fixed costs apply, however with the imminent introduction of fixed costs in cases of noise induced hearing loss slated for 2019 at the latest and he likely introduction of fixed costs in all cases in around 2020, these issues will only become more relevant. On current information, the proposed rules for NIHL claims do not fix any of the existing issues with fixed costs and therefore we can expect these problems to persist for some time.
Matthew Rose is a Solicitor in the Costs and Litigation Funding department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at firstname.lastname@example.org, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 2460622.
The case of MacInnes v Hans Thomas Gross  contains some very useful information for any law firm or litigant considering the issue of indemnity basis costs awards. Pages 2 and 3 are the relevant pages to consider in the judgment.
In the case, the First Defendant applied for an indemnity basis costs award against the Claimant, but this was rejected by The Honourable Mr Justice Coulson, and in doing so he considered a number of authorities in relation to such awards. Those very useful authorities are at paragraph 3 of the judgment and are as follows:
The review of key authorities in the judgment is very useful and provides an excellent starting point for anyone tasked with considering whether to apply for an indemnity basis costs award.
Do remember that an indemnity basis costs award should always be sought in the appropriate cases, due to the fact that proportionality is not a consideration/factor when costs are assessed on the indemnity basis. There is also case law that supports the position that a receiving party is not restricted/held to its costs budget where costs are assessed on the indemnity basis (Slick Seating Systems  and Kellie v Wheatley ). CPR 3.18 also supports this.
The new test of proportionality has had a real impact (negatively for receiving parties) on some reported cases (see, for example, The new test of proportionality – 66% reduction) and therefore an indemnity basis award would provide protection for a receiving party from the new test of proportionality. Furthermore, there is a strong argument that an indemnity basis costs award escapes fixed costs (Broadhurst v Tan ) and therefore applications for indemnity basis costs awards may well be on the increase given the likely extension of fixed costs for civil and commercial litigation in the not too distant future.
This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding Team. Andrew can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at email@example.com.
Following on from my newsletter below, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee meeting notes have been published today. Last month I explained how Jackson LJ had suggested how ‘capped fixed costs’ would work. The meeting notes have now confirmed how the pilot scheme will work, explaining that costs for preaction would be capped at £10,000, for particulars of claim at £7,000 and for defence and counterclaims at £7,000.
Many thanks to John Hyde of the Law Society Gazette who has reported that “Parties can claim up to £6,000 for a reply and defence to the counterclaims, £6,000 for the case management conference, £6,000 for disclosure and £8,000 for witness statements. Expert reports are capped at £10,000, with the trial and judgment costs limited to £20,000.
The working group dedicated to the pilot scheme proposes an overall cap of £80,000 rather than setting an actual fixed amount at this stage.
The proposal, backed in principle by the committee, is to run the pilot in certain specialist civil courts: the London Mercantile Court and three courts in each of the Manchester District Registry and Leeds District Registry. Any cases where the trial will go beyond two days, or where the value is more than £250,000, are excluded“.
Clarion May 2017 Newsletter: Fixed Recoverable Costs. A taster of how the pilot scheme may work.
The judiciary have released an outline regarding how the fixed recoverable costs regime may work. Jackson LJ attended a costs seminar in Birmingham back in March 2017, which focused on mercantile and business litigation. At that seminar both Jackson LJ and HHJ Waksman outlined their proposals for the fixed costs pilot scheme, those proposals being subject to the approval of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee. The details of their proposals were as follows:
The pilot scheme will run in the London Mercantile court, and Manchester and Leeds specialist courts.
The Defendant has an absolute right to object to this, and if so then the proceedings would be removed from the fixed cost list.
The pilot is currently a ‘work in progress’, however it is envisaged that these proposals will be making their way to the Civil Procedure Rules Committee in June 2017, so these could be public by July 2017. It is currently predicted that:
The above proposals were made in March 2017, however since then there have been further proposals, as follows:
Sue Fox who is a Senior Associate and Head of Costs Budgeting at Clarion, can be contacted on 0113 336 3389 or on firstname.lastname@example.org
At this years’ APIL conference it was said that “Costs budgets are now working better”………
Thanks to Gordon Exall and Rachel Rothwell for tweeting interesting and salient comments and quotes made at this years’ APIL conference. Those tweets included – “Harrison is coming any day”, “Merrix may largely be upheld with clarification of incurred costs”, “costs budgets are now working better”……… To read a few of those comments please click here.
Thanks again to Rachel and Gordon for their continued devotion to provide updates
on costs law.
Sue Fox is the Head of Costs Budgeting in the Costs and Litigation Funding department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at email@example.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.
In the case of BNM v MGN Limited  EWHC B13 (costs) the Senior Costs Judge applied the new test of proportionality to post Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) additional liabilities. The claim was for defamation and therefore the additional liabilities (despite being incurred post 1 April 2013) were recoverable inter partes (additional liabilities for defamation and mesothelioma cases remain recoverable inter partes post LASPO).
In BNM the Senior Costs Judge based his decision on the fact that pursuant to CPR 44.3(7) the old test of proportionality was not preserved for additional liabilities incurred post 1 April 2013. The key paragraphs from BNM on this point are as follows:
28 – It seems to me that the intention was that the rules as to the recoverability of additional liabilities would be preserved in relation to those additional liabilities which remain recoverable after 1 April 2013. However, the old test of proportionality was not preserved in relation to those additional liabilities. Had that been intended it could have been achieved quite easily by a further exception in CPR 44.3(7).
31 – A consequence of the reduction of the base costs to a proportionate figure will be that the success fee, a percentage of those base costs, also reduces. It would be absurd and unworkable to apply the new test of proportionality to the base costs, but the old test of proportionality to the success fee.
32 – Ring fencing and excluding additional liabilities from the new test of proportionality would be a significant hindrance on the court’s ability to comply with its obligation under CPR 44.3(2)(a) to allow only those costs which are proportionate.
In the case of King v Basildon & Thurrock University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust  EWHC B32 (Costs) Master Rowley reached a difference conclusion, albeit the additional liabilities in this care were incurred pre 1 April 2013 i.e. pre LASPO. Master Rowley’s decision was primarily based on the definition of costs in the CPR post 1 April 2013. The useful paragraphs of Master Rowley’s judgment to consider are as follows:
23 – The key phrase in the new proportionality test in 44.3 (5) states that “costs incurred are proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to ….”. The word “costs” as now defined refers to profit costs and disbursements but does not include additional liabilities. Given that the proportionality test in 44.3 (5) only applies to work carried out since that definition of costs has come into being, the obvious interpretation is that it only relates to the base costs of a CFA. It is not clear to me why additional liabilities should necessarily be caught by a test which is based on a definition recast specifically to exclude such liabilities.
24 – In my view, treating the word “costs” as only referring to base costs fits in with the provisions of Part 3 in relation to costs budgeting which were also brought into the CPR in April 2013. For example, in rule 3.15 the court “may manage costs to be incurred by any party in any proceedings” and in doing so will make a costs management order. Such an order will record the extent to which budgets are agreed between the parties and, to the extent they are not agreed, will record the court’s approval after making appropriate revisions. “The court will thereafter control the parties’ budgets in respect of recoverable costs”. Precedent H, which sets out the costs to be managed, expressly excludes any additional liabilities that may still be recoverable between the parties. Consequently, the only interpretation of the recoverable costs which the costs management order is controlling, is that they are the base costs of a CFA as set out in the Precedent H. The court is required to set a budget which is specifically described as allowing reasonable and proportionate costs notwithstanding that it excludes additional liabilities.
25 – In my judgment, being consistent with the costs management arrangements and avoiding bizarre outcomes in bills which involve both proportionality tests, point towards the rules being interpreted as continuing to require the court to assess the base costs and additional liabilities separately.
26 – Furthermore, the purpose of the Jackson reforms in initiating a sea change could have resulted in Parliament disallowing the recoverability of success fee and ATE premiums from 1 April 2013. But it did not do so and has allowed for the run-off of recoverable success fees and premiums in the main and the continued recoverability of success fees or premiums in particular instances. It seems to me that the fact that additional liabilities are still allowed for by the provisions of CPR rule 48.1 simply means that they remain in existence. It does not mean that they have to be assessed in the aggregate with the base fees using a test which has no recognition of additional liabilities. This is particularly so when aggregation will render those additional liabilities effectively irrecoverable in practice”.
The approach of Master Rowley has recently been followed by Master Brown in the case of Murrells, Estate of v Cambridge University NHS Foundation Trust  EWHC B2 (Costs).
The following are useful extracts from the Judgment:
33(7) – …It seems likely that they will have entered into such arrangements in the reasonable expectation that the additional liabilities would continue to be recoverable as they were pre-LASPO. To apply the new test to additional liabilities in the way contended for would, however, require many litigants to submit to a substantial, if not complete, disallowance of their additional liabilities as against the other party or parties to the litigation, while at the same time the liability to pay an insurer or the lawyers the additional liability would be preserved. If that were right, it would inevitably lead to many litigants, including – it might be observed – victims of mesothelioma, having to give up deserving claims or defences. I agree with Master Rowley: in these circumstances, the defendant’s contention cannot be reconciled with transitional provisions and the clear will of Parliament. The intention must have been to provide, at the very least, an orderly retreat from the old funding scheme.
34 – In the circumstances, I respectfully disagree with the decision of Master Gordon-Saker in BNM as to the application of the new proportionality test to additional liabilities and therefore also as to the need to aggregate base costs with additional liabilities.
The case of BNM is currently on its way to the Court of Appeal, with a hearing date expected for October 2017. Hopefully, this will bring some clarity to the position, but until then expect lots of costs litigation over the point. Hopefully, the Court of Appeal will not simply address the additional liabilities in BNM, but also address the position of pre-LASPO additional liabilities in the context of the King case.
Personally, I think the position adopted by the Senior Costs Judge represents a drafting error in relation to CPR 44.3(7). The intention of LASPO in my view was very clear:
Surely, it was never the intention for additional liabilities at 1 and 3 above to be recoverable only for them to be crippled by the new test of proportionality (resulting in a non-recovery)? Surely, it was never the intention to specifically ‘carve out’ defamation and mesothelioma claims only for the additional liabilities to then be squashed on detailed assessment due to the new test of proportionality? This is particularly relevant in defamation cases where costs can easily dwarf damages.
What all this does show is the problems that can be caused when even minor changes are made to the CPR. I say this in the context of a significant extension of fixed costs on the horizon. There are fixed costs disputes every day at the moment in relation to portal cases and fast track injury cases where the numbers in dispute are very small. Where the numbers in dispute are large i.e. in multi-track fixed costs cases then this will undoubtedly cause satellite litigation, for example arguments about location, what stage the case settled and disbursements.
LJ Jackson thinks that fixed costs will bring certainly, but if Defendants (paying parties) are prepared to exploit a ‘gap in the rules’ as highlighted in the BNM case then expect Costs War 2 post implementation of fixed fees! The Courts are going to be busier than ever, which would be contrary to what LJ Jackson and the governments wants.
LJ Jackson maybe about to score an ‘own goal’ with his planned extension of fixed fees……
This Blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay, who is a Partner and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding Team at Clarion. He can be contacted on firstname.lastname@example.org or on 0113 336 3334.