It is 10 years since the SCCO last increased the guideline hourly rates. Andrew McAulay looks at the rates, and how you can make the most of them.
Andrew McAulay is a Costs Lawyer and Partner at Clarion. You can contact him at AndrewMcAulay@clarionsolicitors.com or by phone on 0113 336 3334.
Consistency and a true connection between Costs Management and Detailed Assessment is essential for the successful recovery of costs on Detailed Assessment.
If a costs budget is prepared incorrectly, which creates a disconnection between the costs budget and bill of costs, then you can expect a costs law obstacle course and a heavy migraine on detailed assessment.
The case of MXX -v- United Lincolnshire NHS Trust  is a great example, which is summarised below:
Background, Retainer and Hourly Rates
The Claimant instructed her Solicitors in 2012 and the matter was funded by way of a Conditional Fee agreement with the rate for the conducting lawyer (Grade A) agreed at £335 per hour.
In August 2013 the rate for the conducting lawyer increased to £460 per hour (this was an error). In January 2015 the hourly rate was reduced to £350 (effective from May 2014). It was increased to £360 in 2015 and £365 in 2016.
The substantive proceedings related to a high value injury claim, with quantification being resolved in November 2016. The claim was subject to a Costs Management Order dated 2 March 2015.
Detailed Assessment Proceedings were commenced in March 2017 and the bill of costs totalled circa. £1.3 million.
Background to the Costs Management Order
At the CCMC, the District Judge dealt with estimated costs and correctly stated that the incurred costs were for detailed assessment. The hourly rate included in the costs budget for the conducting lawyer was £465 per hour.
In respect of the estimated costs, the Judge indicated a composite rate of £280 per hour, which the parties then used to agree the estimated costs for each phase.
Discrepancies between Budget and Bill
Following the commencement of detailed assessment proceedings, the Defendant compared the costs budget (Costs Management Order) with the bill of costs and noted the following discrepancies:
- Substantial differences in relation to hourly rates.The hourly rate included in the costs budget for the conducting fee earner was £465.00 per hour, but in the bill of costs hourly rates of £335.00 and £350.00 were claimed; and
- The bill of costs included roughly 144 to 147 hours less time for incurred costs than the costs budget.
The Defendant had legitimate concerns and made an Application for an Order pursuant to CPR 44.11, arising out of what the Defendant described as a mis-certification of the Claimant’s costs budget in the substantive proceedings.
It is well worthwhile reading the Judgment and the very articulate submissions advanced by both parties. This will help you to fully understand the decision, which was as follows:
- The Master did not find that the errors regarding the rates for the conducting fee earner (in respect of estimated costs) or the significant time discrepancies in relation to the time included in the costs budget and the bill of costs amounted to improper conduct.
- However, the Master did find that there was improper conduct in relation to the inflated rate/s claimed within the budget (as incurred costs).The Master had previously dealt with a case with some similar issues (Tucker v Griffiths & Hampshire Hospitals NHS Trust 2017) and decided to apply the same sanction in this case as he did in that case, which was to disallow the items claimed in the bill of costs which related to the Costs Management Order.The Defendant had submitted that the Claimant’s bill of costs should be reduced by 75% due to the errors, but the Master said:“Whilst those behind the Defendant in both cases may have considered the sanction in Tucker to be insufficient, it seemed to me to be the only appropriate sanction. There is nothing wrong with the Bill in terms of the indemnity principle. The problem lies with the budget. I consider it to be entirely appropriate to impose a sanction in respect of the work which caused the problem.That work is the non-phase time spent creating and maintaining the budget. It would be wrong in my view retrospectively to disallow some of the budget itself”.
The decision in this case (and in the case of Tucker) are both cases which were before Master Rowley at the Senior Courts Costs Office. Another Court/Judge could reach a different conclusion and I certainly expect to see this issue again before the Courts for the following reasons:
Lawyers do not time record consistently within their respective departments and firms, which means that discrepancies between budgets and bills will continue to regularly occur and a different Judge/Master may well adopt a more stringent approach;
Costs Budgets are regularly being prepared by non-specialists and prepared very “late in the day”, which leads to errors; and
There is a misconception that the costs budget is a more flexible document than a bill of costs i.e. the statement of truth to a bill of costs carries more weight than a statement of truth to a bill of costs.It is very important that all lawyers (and law firms) approach Costs Management consistently and understand the importance it has on detailed assessment. If that is done, then it leads to a consistent bill of costs, less obstacles on detailed assessment and no migraine – but maybe a headache!
This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding Team. Andrew can be contacted at email@example.com or on 0113 336 3334
NB There are some other interesting points and views in the Judgment which I will cover in a further blog.
The case of Sir Philip Green & Ors v Telegraph Media Group Limited  EWHC 96 (QB)
This matter revolved around the Claimant and two companies seeking an injunction against the Defendant to restrain them from publishing information about the Claimant. The information related to the alleged misconduct of the Claimants which had been subject to non-disclosure agreements.
A number of pre-trial applications were addressed by Warby J, including the issue of costs budgeting . Given the time-sensitive nature of proceedings, the issue of costs budgeting could only be addressed two weeks before trial.
The hourly rates claimed by the Claimant’s City of London-based solicitors ranged from £190 (for a Grade D trainee) to £690 (for a Grade A lawyer – a Partner). Other Partners’ rates claimed by the Claimants were between £510 and £635 per hour. Warby J noted that all these figures were well in excess of the guideline rates, which are £126 for Grade D and £409 for Grade A (emphasis added).
Warby J recognised that, due to the late stage of costs budgeting, the majority of costs were incurred, and as such he was restricted from budgeting incurred costs due to CPR PD 3E 7.4, and was limited to only making comments.
Warby J said he did not consider that hourly rates of more than £550 could be justified, and proportionate reductions should also be made to the lower Partners’ rates.
The Judge added: ‘Of course, fees in excess of the guidelines can be and often are allowed, and in this case the defendants (who themselves claim up to £450 per hour) and I both accept that fees above those rates are justified. But not to the extent of the differences here.’
The outcome of this hearing raises two interesting topics for discussion: the level of hourly rates in general, and, the approach the Court can take in respect of hourly rates in costs management.
Hourly rates in general
As a starting point, and as referenced by Warby J indirectly, it is well accepted that Guideline Hourly Rates are just that, a guideline. They are suitable for carrying out a summary assessment and can be a starting position for detailed assessment. Following this , the Court will take into account both CPR 44.3(5), and the 8 ‘pillars of wisdom’ contained within CPR 44.4(3), when considering whether costs are proportionate and reasonable in amount (when assessing on the standard basis). These factors can be used to support an enhancement, for instance, given the complexity of the matter, or the conduct of parties.
The Court has recently commented further on a case which claimed very high hourly rates, far in excess of the Guideline Hourly Rates. In the matter of Dana Gas PJSC v Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd & Ors  EWHC 332 (Comm), the Court found that hourly rates in excess of £900 were unreasonable, even in a matter which was factually/legally complex, had an international element and was of significant value. The Court considered that hourly rates of half that amount (hence being very similar to the rates referred to as reasonable by Warby J in the case of Sir Philip Green & Ors v Telegraph Media Group Limited  EWHC 96 (QB)), were considered more reasonable to obtain competent representation in such a case.
There is technically no limit on the hourly rates which can be charged by a firm of solicitors, so long as the client agrees to pay them, but the Court is now taking a much tougher stance in respect of how much of that hourly rate can be recovered inter partes. This leaves the firm in an unenviable position: either write off those costs claimed, or, bill the client for the shortfall.
Perhaps this was a factor in Sir Philip deciding to abandon the claim?
It is well established that the Court must walk a tightrope when addressing hourly rates while setting a budget. The Court can have regard to the constituent elements of the budget, including hourly rates (CPR PD 3E 7.3), but the Court must not over step the mark and proceed to fix or approve hourly rates (CPR PD 3E 7.10). Warby J’s comments appear to strike the right balance between the two. Unfortunately, shortly after the hearing, the Claimants abandoned the claim, and we will therefore not see at detailed assessment stage how much weight is given to comments made at costs management stage.
The interplay between hourly rates, costs budgeting and detailed assessment is an interesting one, and a topic which will, no doubt, continue to develop as more and more budgeted cases proceed to detailed assessment.
This blog was prepared by Kris Kilsby who is an Associate Costs Lawyer at Clarion and part of the Costs Litigation Funding Team. Kris can be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org or on 0113 227 3628.
In the recent case of JXA -v- Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  EWHC 1747 (QB) the Court provided clarification in relation to how solicitors’ hourly rates are to be assessed.
By way of brief background, the underlying claim related to a case of infant cerebral trauma. Th case ultimately settled on the basis of 90% liability attaching to the Defendant. Damages were not resolved but it was resolved that they would run into many millions of pounds, potentially £20 million.
The Claimant served a bill of costs in which the Claimant claimed hourly rates of £380 – £420 for Grade A fee earners, £270 for Grade C fee earners, and £150 – £190 for Grade D fee earners.
The initial assessment was carried out by Master Nagalingam of the Senior Courts Costs Office, who allowed rates of £350, £200 and £150 respectively.
On appeal, it was alleged that the Master had incorrectly applied the test in in Wraith -v- Sheffield Foremesters Ltd, Truscott -v- Truscott  EWCA Civ 2285 which provides that in assessing hourly rates the court must consider:-
- Whether the choice to instruct the firm of solicitors engaged was reasonable; and
- Whether the charges of that solicitor were reasonable, taking into account the broad averages of charges of firms practicing in that area.
If the answer to the first limb of the test is “no” then the court will determine what firm or class of firm it would have been reasonable to instruct, and then apply the second stage of the test on the basis of that notional firm.
The Claimant alleged that the Master had failed to directly address the first stage of the test in Wraith. In fact, the Master had implied a finding that he considered the appropriate comparator for the purpose of the first stage of the test to have been a solicitor practicing in Outer London.
In judgment, the appellate court held that the Master had not addressed the first limb of the test in Truscott. However, the court went on to find that despite this, the Master had correctly considered the charges of comparable solicitors undertaking comparable work and that therefore the hourly rates allowed were within the ambit of the Master’s wide discretion on costs. Accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal.
Following the decision in Surrey -v- Barnet & Chase Farm House Hospitals NHS Trust  EWCA Civ 451, “the choice does not have to be the best one, but merely a reasonable one”. This means that the mere fact that there is or was an alternative solicitor who could have conducted the matter at a lower hourly rate does not in itself indicate that the decision was unreasonable for the purpose of the test in Wraith.
Nevertheless, it is relatively easy for a paying party to conduct a search of solicitors practicing in the same area in the locality of the receiving party on the Law Society website. Of course, it is usually the case that even if other solicitors can be identified, neither party will be able to prove what their charging rates. However, on a standard basis assessment any doubt will be resolved in favour of the paying party (CPR 44.3). Furthermore, where there are a large number of firms it may be possible to argue that such competition will or should have the effect of forcing hourly rates down. What is more, it should be usual practice for paying parties to enquire what investigations were undertaken by the receiving party into the availability of alternative solicitors and any quotes or information regarding hourly rates were received. If the receiving party fails to provide such information, the paying party can argue that either it indicates that no investigations were undertaken (and that therefore the choice was unreasonable), or that the solicitors instructed charged rates in excess of those charged by other firms. In either case, doubt should be resolved in favour of the paying party.
Solicitors should carefully consider the level of their hourly rates at the outset, and be prepared to justify them. One case which will assist is Higgs -v- Camden & Islington Health Authority  EWHC 15 (QB) in which the Court set out a matrix for the calculation of hourly rates enhanced above guideline rates. Some form of “risk assessment” conducted at the outset, applying the test in Higgs, may well assist in justifying the hourly rates claimed on a detailed assessment of costs.
Matthew Rose is a Solicitor in the Costs and Litigation Funding department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at email@example.com, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 2460622
This continues to spark debate. The rules states that the hourly rate cannot be set (CPR 3 PD 3E, para 7.10), but further explain that the constituent elements of the budget should be considered when assessing the amount to approved (CPR 3 PD 3E, para 7.3). So, with the hourly rate falling under the umbrella of a ‘constituent element’ the hourly rate can be taken into account, but importantly, not fixed. There will usually be a number of factors that contribute to a reduction of the budget and on occasions the level of the hourly rate may be one of those contributing factors.
Parties are often working blind in respect of the logic that the case management Judge applied. If the court did take the hourly rate into account when reducing the amount of estimated costs sought, and no evidence exists to support the Judge’s thought process, what happens when the costs are finally assessed?
At the moment there is conflicting case law in this regard.
In RNB v London Borough of Newham  EWHC B15 (Costs) Deputy Master Campbell said “If (as it is the case) the hourly rate is a mandatory component in Precedent H which is not and cannot be subjected to the rigours of detailed assessment at the CCMC, it makes no sense if it is automatically left untouched when the rates for the incurred work are scrutinised at the ‘conventional’ assessment.”
“Such an approach would offend against the guidance given in Harrison at paragraph 44. Indeed, as [counsel for the defendant] points out, it is only on that occasion that a paying party has an opportunity to challenge the rate.”
This was therefore a “good reason” to depart from the costs allowed in the claimant’s last approved budget.”
However in Nash v Ministry of Defence  EWHC B4 (Costs) – Master Nagalingam found that “a reduction in hourly rates of the incurred costs is not a good reason to depart from the budget in respect of the budgeted (future) costs”.
And finally, in Jallow v Ministry of Defence  EWHC B7 (Costs) Master Rowley found “that there is no good reason to depart from the budget by virtue of the reduction to the hourly rates in this case”.
How can the legal profession employ the rules as currently drafted? Is it possible to gain clarity and a clearer view of the blind logic/working approach adopted by the Judges? If, during the course of the CMC, the Judge does comment on the hourly rate, ask him/her to record a note on the case management order that the hourly rate was considered when approving the budget and that it played a role in the reduction to the rates.
Any questions? Please contact me at firstname.lastname@example.org or call me on 0113 336 3389.
Bespoke budgets in multi-party litigation, proportionality, updating the incurred costs included in the budget prior to the CCMC, including the costs of interim hearings in the budget, disapplying the 2% cap for costs management and the resourcing of fee earners were all points that were dealt with at the most recent CCMC in the latest phone hacking cases (Various Claimants including (1) John Leslie (2) Chantelle Houghton v MGN Limited  EWHC 1244 (Ch)).
MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION – The court’s approach to this multi-party litigation avoided the need for multiple costs management hearings for similar claims. The court applied a structure that was similar to a GLO and directions were made regarding managing the costs of the claim. Common and individual costs were split, and Costs Management was dealt with by the application of template budgets for individual costs and common costs. There were 3 categories of claims for the individual costs and the court could order that there be bespoke individual budgets in place of the template budgets. In this decision the court agreed that bespoke budgets were applicable to two of the Claimants, Leslie and Houghton.
THE BUDGET AND PROPORTIONALITY – Chief Master Marsh applied the proportionality test to the Claimants’ budgets commenting that “I would emphasise that the court is not required to have regard to the constituent elements of each budget phase (it may do so) and the court’s task is to decide whether the total for each phase falls within a range of reasonable and proportionate costs…. And the court is not looking to establish what the budget figure should be objectively ascertained, but rather a figure that falls within the applicable range applying the reasonableness and proportionality tests alongside each other.”
“The court must apply both the reasonableness and proportionality tests, but the former may yield to the latter. And, in practice, although PD3E, paragraph 7.3, requires the court to consider each budget phase separately, and therefore to consider the proportionality of each phase total, the task has to be undertaken with an initial overall review of proportionality by reference to the factors in CPR44.3(5)…
The costs in the budget phases must not only be reasonable but must also bear a reasonable relationship with the proportionality factors I have indicated. The proportionality factors that are relevant are to be taken together and given notional weight as a whole. In these cases, the sums in issue are not large for High Court claims when taken in isolation. But when the proportionality factors are put together, the financial value of the claims proves to be relatively unimportant because of the wider factors. The budgets substantially exceed the sums in issue but is not a reason to conclude that the overall budgeted sums and the totals per phase are disproportionate.
It seems to me that the wider factors I have summarised, in particular the public importance and test case factors, will have the effect that if the costs are reasonable they are proportionate. That conclusion chimes with the approach the parties have adopted and avoids the court wielding a concept of uncertain application.”
UPDATING INCURRED COSTS – There was a considerable time period between the date that budgets were required to be filed and when the CCMC was listed. Mr Leslie updated his budget prior to the CCMC to include incurred costs up to 1 May 2018, however the other parties did not. The Master recognised the problems of one party updating the incurred costs and the other parties not, explaining that this approach resulted in Mr Leslie having “ousted the court’s jurisdiction to consider a significant amount of expenditure” and consequently found that “the relevant date for the purposes of incurred costs as being 17 January 2018.”
This can be avoided by agreeing a date that the incurred costs are included up to and in turn obtaining the court’s permission to update the incurred costs.
HOURLY RATES – Chief Master Marsh refused to be drawn into the debate regarding hourly rates and instead considered the allocation of work in the budget between different grades of fee earner and the total figure claimed for each phase was of greater importance.
INTERIM HEARINGS – An amount for specific disclosure had been included in the disclosure phase, the Master found that the inclusion of interim hearings in the budget were wrong in principal as they may be subject to an inter partes costs order, the costs were moved into the contingency phase.
COSTS MANAGEMENT COSTS – The costs associated with costs management are subject to a 2% cap. Chief Master Marsh was asked to consider lifting the cap, he agreed on the basis that the complexities surrounding the multi-party litigation warranted exceptional circumstances in this case.
Any questions? Please contact me at email@example.com or call me on 0113 336 3389.
There has recently been a flurry of case law in respect of the effect of costs management on hourly rates at detailed assessment.
With regard to costs management, there are two rules of central importance, both contained within Practice Direction 3E:-
Para 7.3 provides that “The court’s approval will relate only to the total figures for budgeted costs of each phase of the proceedings, although in the course of its review the court may have regard to the constituent elements of each total figure. When reviewing budgeted costs, the court will not undertake a detailed assessment in advance, but rather will consider whether the budgeted costs fall within the range of reasonable and proportionate costs.”
CPR PD 3E (7.10), which states that “It is not the role of the Court in the costs management hearing to fix or approve the hourly rates claimed… the underlying detail… is provided for reference purposes only”.
As to Detailed assessment, the relevant rule is Part 44.3(1), which provides that:-
Regardless of the basis upon which costs are assessed “…the court will not in either case allow costs which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount”.
The starting point is the judgment in Harrison -v- University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust  EWCA Civ 792, which held that where there is an approved budget, the court is empowered to sanction a departure from the budget if it considers that there is good reason to do so. What the judgment did not say is that the figure allowed for a particular phase in a costs management order will be allowed unless there is good reason to depart from it. The distinction is subtle, but important.
Following a month later, the judgment in RNB -v- London Borough of Newham  EWHC B15 (Costs) gave guidance on how the Court would approach hourly rates in the context of a costs management order. In RNB it was held that if hourly rates were reduced on assessment, that reduction would apply to all of the costs claimed, whether they were incurred pre- or post- the costs management order.
In Bains -v- Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, 18th August 2017, The County Court at Birmingham (Unreported), District Judge Lumb expressly disagreed with the position in RNB and found that “to reduce hourly rates for budgeted costs to the same levels as those allowed for the incurred costs… would be to second guess the thought process of Costs Managing Judge and would impute a risk of double jeopardy...”
In the absence of a report or transcript, we do not know what reasoning underpinned the judge’s finding in Bains. What is clear is that a central assumption to the finding in Bains was that the judge at costs management may have accounted for a reduction to hourly rates when making the costs management order. It could be said that such an assumption would be tantamount to a finding that the judge at costs management had breached CPR PD 3E (7.10), by in effect setting the hourly rates when making the costs management order. It might well be argued that such an assumption was unreasonable.
Furthermore, the judgment in Bains explicitly states that there is a risk of double jeopardy; in other words, that the judge on assessment may have considered a reduction to hourly rates when making the costs management order. At least on a standard basis assessment, CPR 44.3(2)(b), any doubt as to whether the court on costs management had done so should be resolved in favour of the paying party. Thus in the absence of an explicit finding that the judge on costs management had factored in a reduction to the hourly rates, the court on assessment should assume that they did not.
A little later, in Nash -v- Ministry of Defence  EW Misc B4 (CC), Master Nagalingam of the Senior Courts Costs Office held that a reduction to hourly rates in respect of the incurred costs would not be a ‘good reason’ to depart from the budget for future costs. This has led to some litigants arguing that where there is a Costs Management Order, so long as the party is within budget for the given phase, a reduction to hourly rates will not ‘carry through’ to the future costs in the budget. It is important to recognise that, in Nash, the receiving party’s budget had been agreed.
The central question here is whether or not a reduction to hourly rates is a ‘departure’ from the costs management order. As stated above, hourly rates are not to be fixed or set by the court on costs management. Therefore, if the hourly rates do not form a part of the costs management order, a reduction to hourly rates for ‘future’ costs cannot be said to be a departure from it. By analogy, an additional liability (such as an ATE premium, which is recoverable in Clinical Negligence matters) does not form a part of the budget, and therefore a reduction to such a premium does not constitute a departure.
It is also important to note that CPR PD 3E 7.3 provides that the purpose of costs management is for the court to identify a range of costs which it considers to be reasonable and proportionate for the conduct of the claim. However, the fact that a costs management order has been made does not justify a party incurring costs which are individually unreasonable so long as they fall within budget. In the context of hourly rates, therefore, if it is found that an hourly rate of say £450 per hour is unreasonable, then that hourly rate is unreasonable regardless of whether the work was done before or after the costs management order was made.
Some commentators have argued that the judgments in Bains and Nash are an attempt by the Courts to implement the intention of Jackson LJ to remove the need for detailed assessment. Returning to Harrison, Davis LJ commented that the case had “descended into a kind of arms race in collecting views or comments… with an aim of… extracting some kind of clue as to what [had been] intended…” when the rules were drafted. Importantly he went on to comment “this is beside the point… what we have to do is construe the wording of [the CPR]”. It is quite clear that, in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it is not the function of the Court to decide what the intention behind the rules was, but only to interpret what the Rules mean and how they apply to the facts.
The difficulty faced by litigators and judges at present is that the rules are unclear, and there is little guidance as to how they should be implemented. This results in a lack of clarity and certainty when proceeding to assessment of costs. In my opinion, there are two potential routes by which the rules might be improved:-
- The detailed approach
The Precedent H is amended to remove reference to hourly rates and time. There could then be no question of the assessing judge taking hourly rates into account. As the court cannot set the hourly rates in any event, this should have no practical impact upon the making of costs management orders; the judge on costs management will have a feel for the case and will be fully qualified to consider the work which needs to be done in each phase and make a judgment as to the amount of costs which it would be reasonable and proportionate to incur in doing it.
- The summary approach
The court is empowered to set rates at costs management, and also to make a judgment in relation to incurred costs. Under this system, the judge would summarily consider the costs already incurred in the litigation and include within the costs management order what each party will be allowed at the conclusion in respect of the costs already incurred. The court will set a limit for future costs, and the successful party is entitled at the conclusion of the litigation to the amount allowed by the court in respect of incurred costs, plus all amounts incurred after the costs management order so long as they are less than the budget.
The first approach would continue to provide for a detailed assessment at the conclusion of the proceedings, the second approach would not. Of course, the problem with the second approach is that it could give rise to unfairness as parties would not be able to deal with their opponents’ costs in detail.
What is clear is that under the current rules, there is significant doubt over how they should be interpreted, and we will have to wait and see whether this doubt will be rectified by the rules or by binding judgments in the courts.
Matthew Rose is a Solicitor in the Costs and Litigation Funding department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at firstname.lastname@example.org, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 2460622.
Throughout the legal profession there is a ‘myth’ that a Receiving Party should expect to recover in the region of 70% of their costs on detailed assessment. Many lawyers advise their clients of this. In some instances this may be a reasonable estimate, but in my experience the figure is often arrived at without any consideration of the costs contained within the bill of costs.
The bill of costs is the absolute starting point in relation to the likely outcome on detailed assessment. If the hourly rates claimed in a bill of costs are in accordance with the SCCO Guideline Hourly Rates, the costs claimed are clearly proportionate and the time claimed is generally reasonable then one would expect any reductions on detailed assessment to be minimal. The recovery should therefore be way in excess of 70%.
However if, for example, the following issues relate to a bill of costs then one could expect the recovery to be much less than 70%:
1. the hourly rates are significantly above the SCCO Guideline Hourly Rates
2. the claim for costs is globally disproportionate
3. there is lots of duplication and solicitor/own client communications claimed
4. There has been a lack of delegation.
We recently prepared Points of Dispute (acting for the Paying Party) on a matter and following Provisional Assessment the bill of costs was reduced by 50%. This was mainly due to proportionality and VAT being incorrectly claimed.
When considering a claim for costs, lawyers should pay attention to the costs contained within the bill of costs when estimating the likely level of recovery. The 70% ‘myth’ should not be the starting point. Advising a client that 70% is the ‘norm’ could actually mean the client is paying more or receiving less than they should be. My advice is therefore to proceed with caution and shy away from relying on the 70% ‘costs myth’. This is now more important than ever in light of the new test for proportionality and the impact that this can have on summary or detailed assessment (Who Needs Fixed Costs and Proportionality continues to get tougher).
This blog was written by Andrew McAulay, who is a Partner at Clarion. He is the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team and can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 and email@example.com
In short, the answer is maybe, but it depends on the complexity of the matter rather than the geographical area of the solicitor’s firm. It is important to note that London 1 rates (‘City rates’) do not work in the same way as the rest of the hourly rates allowed by the Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO). Not only is a city post code (EC1 – 4) required but the work undertaken must be of exceptional substance. It is important to take into consideration the decisions made within the Matter of King –v- Telegraph (2005). Please see Paragraph 92 of the link below whereby Master Hurst stated:
“City rates for City solicitors are recoverable where the City solicitor is undertaking City work, which is normally heavy commercial or corporate work…A City firm which undertakes work, which could be competently handled by a number of Central London solicitors, is acting unreasonably and disproportionately if it seeks to charge City rates.”
Interestingly, the SCCO informed that most of the Costs Officers have never come across a case where ‘city rates’ have been allowed on a Court of Protection bill…
If you require any further advice or assistance in relation to your Court of Protection costs, please do not hesitate to contact the Clarion Costs Team on COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com or 0113 246 0622.