Points of Dispute and Replies: The Dos and Donts

CPR 47 provides that Points of Dispute and Replies should follow “as closely as possible” the format of Precedent G. CPR 47.9 allows for the paying party to raise disputes to points in the Bill of Costs drafted by the receiving party.

Points of Dispute ‘must be short and to the point’; parties are expected to make their point in a succinct and concise way. In the recent case of Mead v British Airways PLC, the Defendant spent over seven pages setting out one point of dispute. The claimant’s reply was two pages. District Judge Moss accepted the Claimant’s position and the point was dismissed. This is a clear example that a point can be raised and dealt with concisely without the need for disproportionate and lengthy argument. Indeed, in our experience less is often more and judges can be put off and confused by excessive Points of Dispute or Replies. It is not uncommon to see assessing judges commenting to the effect that Points of Dispute were too long and whilst this may not directly affect the outcome, it may well make the judge less well-disposed to a party in the assessment.

Practitioners tempted to set out Points of Dispute or Reply at great length should bear in mind the cautionary tale of Mylward -v- Weldon [1595] EWHC Ch 1, in which the court held that the matters in dispute could have been set out in 16 pages, rather than the 120 page bundle which the claimant’s lawyer had filed. The court ordered that the claimant’s legal representative should be brought to court, and the warden “shall cut a whole in the myddest of the {bundle}, and put {the lawyer’s} head through the hole, so that it hangs about his shoulders; and then shall lead him bare headed and bare faced round about Westminster Hall whilst the Courts are sitting and shew him at the bar of every of the three Courts within the Hall, and shall then take him back again to the Fleet {prison} and keep him prisoner until he shall have paid £10 to Her Majesty for a fine, and 20 nobles to the defendant for his costs in respect of the aforesaid abuse”.

That said, it is imperative for parties to explaining the reasoning as to why they dispute an item in a Bill of Costs. It is not enough to merely state that an item is disputed; the reasons for the dispute must be disclosed. The onus is on the parties to find the correct balance of getting the point across and providing the required information to ensure the point/reply is agreed with by the DJ.

When filing Points and Replies, it is imperative all parties know the relevant dates they are required to adhere to. For context, when a formal Bill of Costs is served by the receiving party, with an N252 will be served. This gives the date for which Points of Dispute are required to be served, which in general is 21 clear days following the date of service. The paying party is permitted to request an extension of time for this, and it is at the discretion of the receiving party to grant or deny the same and there are consequences for failure to comply. Whilst the Rules state that replies to points of dispute must be filed within 21 days of receipt of the points of dispute, there is no sanction for failure to comply. Therefore there is less risk to a receiving party which serves its Replies out of time, however it is possible for the court to impose a sanction (though this is not automatic). CPR 47.13 stipulates that the receiving party may reply to the points of dispute and the receiving party may do so within 21 days. This was supported in Pipe v Electrothermal Engineering Limited where it was confirmed that the receiving party is not limited to 21 days to respond.

The main differences between the paying and receiving party are as follows: should the paying party fail to serve points of dispute within the 21 days, there could be cost implications and the receiving party would be permitted to apply to the court for a Default Costs Certificate, which is an order that the costs claimed by the receiving party be paid in full (effectively a Default Judgment in costs). Whilst it may be possible to apply to set a Default Costs Certificate aside, there is inevitably a risk that the application will not be granted and it is likely that there will be a costs sanction to the receiving party even if it is.

In summary, parties should always follow Precedent G; always ensure points and replies are short and to the point. When undertaking costs proceedings, always be aware of the deadlines and dates to adhere to ensure you are not subjecting your client to unnecessary costs.

Are you J Code ready?

The J-Codes are a set of electronic codes proposed by Jackson LJ, where time is recorded in phase, task and activity. These codes were first published in July 2014 and over 3 years later the MOJ have now included guidance in their 92nd update to the CPR regarding phase, task and activity time recording. The MOJ have decided not to adopt the full J-Code structure proposed by Jackson LJ and have published an alternative and apparently simpler version of the Phase, Task, Activity (PTA) approach. That said, J-Codes can still be adopted or the Phase, Task, Activity (PTA) method can be used, it is down to choice.

The electronic bill of costs is mandatory for all Part 7 multi-track claims from 6 April 2018 and therefore Phase, Task and Activity codes (PTA codes) are crucial.  J Codes/ PTA codes however are not mandatory, although it is expected that any additional costs associated with the drafting of the electronic bill of costs due to PTA code time recording not being adopted, may not be recoverable on an inter-partes basis.

This only applies to work undertaken from 6 April 2018.
Recording time in line with phase, task and activity will at last enable budgets to be monitored with ease.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at CivilCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Proportionality and budget comparisons

Budgets were once again considered in the case of Red and White Services Ltd v Phil Anslow Ltd & Anor [2018] EWHC 1699 (Ch). This was a competitions claim about a bus company and its parking bays. In summary, the Claimant had the use of more parking bays than the Defendant, the Claimant sued the Defendant for trespass and the Defendant in turn brought, by way of a counterclaim, a competitions Act law claim against the Claimant and pursed a Part 20 Competitions Act claim against the Third Party.

All parties were ordered to prepare budgets with the Claimant’s and Third Party’s budgets being in similar amounts, each in the region of £1.5 million; and the Defendant’s budget coming in at just less than £300,000.00.

The Defendant not surprisingly submitted the Claimant’s and the Third Party’s budgets were seriously disproportionate, given that the damages in this claim were likely to be in the region of £80,000 to £120,000.

Mr Justice Birss commented that “It is essentially, although these are my words not counsel’s, an attempt to create figures for costs which are unrealistically low for the purpose of budgeting and to act as an unfavourable contrast to the figures from the claimant and the third party”

He considered proportionality and commented…

“I do not regard the budget costs figures in this case as proportionate or reasonable, particularly given the relatively limited nature of the disputes between the parties. The individual dispute which is worth the most is the overpayment/overvaluation claim. That will involve some quantity surveying evidence, although experience of such disputes leads me to suspect that this will not necessarily be extensive: the various valuation items in issue will probably fall into a handful of types or categories, so that once an expert has addressed the leading items in each category, there will be little left for the expert to do. The defects are a relatively modest element of this claim, so that even if they required both M and E and architectural experts, the involvement of such experts ought to be relatively limited.

He further commented that ..

“It is a matter for the defendant to have chosen to join both of those independent companies and therefore the fact that the two budgets together, each of £1.5 million, mean that the defendant could be bearing a cost risk of £3 million, does not seem to me to be a matter of great significance on the facts of this case. The individual budgets are the figures I need to consider, not the net risk to the defendant of aggregating the two.”

The judge, after applying the proportionality test and refusing to make comparisons with the Defendant’s budget, approved budgets for the Claimant and Third Party each in a sum not exceeding £800,000.00.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at CivilCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

What role does the hourly rate play in the budget?

This continues to spark debate. The rules states that the hourly rate cannot be set (CPR 3 PD 3E, para 7.10), but further explain that the constituent elements of the budget should be considered when assessing the amount to approved (CPR 3 PD 3E, para 7.3). So, with the hourly rate falling under the umbrella of a ‘constituent element’ the hourly rate can be taken into account, but importantly, not fixed. There will usually be a number of factors that contribute to a reduction of the budget and on occasions the level of the hourly rate may be one of those contributing factors.

Parties are often working blind in respect of the logic that the case management Judge applied. If the court did take the hourly rate into account when reducing the amount of estimated costs sought, and no evidence exists to support the Judge’s thought process, what happens when the costs are finally assessed?

At the moment there is conflicting case law in this regard.

In RNB v London Borough of Newham [2017] EWHC B15 (Costs) Deputy Master Campbell said “If (as it is the case) the hourly rate is a mandatory component in Precedent H which is not and cannot be subjected to the rigours of detailed assessment at the CCMC, it makes no sense if it is automatically left untouched when the rates for the incurred work are scrutinised at the ‘conventional’ assessment.”

“Such an approach would offend against the guidance given in Harrison at paragraph 44. Indeed, as [counsel for the defendant] points out, it is only on that occasion that a paying party has an opportunity to challenge the rate.”

This was therefore a “good reason” to depart from the costs allowed in the claimant’s last approved budget.”

However in  Nash v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC B4 (Costs) –  Master Nagalingam found that “a reduction in hourly rates of the incurred costs is not a good reason to depart from the budget in respect of the budgeted (future) costs”.

And finally, in Jallow v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC B7 (Costs) Master Rowley found “that there is no good reason to depart from the budget by virtue of the reduction to the hourly rates in this case”.

How can the legal profession employ the rules as currently drafted? Is it possible to gain clarity and a clearer view of the blind logic/working approach adopted by the Judges? If, during the course of the CMC, the Judge does comment on the hourly rate, ask him/her to record a note on the case management order that the hourly rate was considered when approving the budget and that it played a role in the reduction to the rates.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at CivilCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Various Claimants v MGN – Some much needed clarity!

Bespoke budgets in multi-party litigation, proportionality, updating the incurred costs included in the budget prior to the CCMC, including the costs of interim hearings in the budget, disapplying the 2% cap for costs management and the resourcing of fee earners were all points that were dealt with at the most recent CCMC in the latest phone hacking cases (Various Claimants including (1) John Leslie (2) Chantelle Houghton v MGN Limited [2018] EWHC 1244 (Ch)).

MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION – The court’s approach to this multi-party litigation avoided the need for multiple costs management hearings for similar claims. The court applied a structure that was similar to a GLO and directions were made regarding managing the costs of the claim. Common and individual costs were split, and Costs Management was dealt with by the application of template budgets for individual costs and common costs. There were 3 categories of claims for the individual costs and the court could order that there be bespoke individual budgets in place of the template budgets. In this decision the court agreed that bespoke budgets were applicable to two of the Claimants, Leslie and Houghton.

THE BUDGET AND PROPORTIONALITY – Chief Master Marsh applied the proportionality test to the Claimants’ budgets commenting that “I would emphasise that the court is not required to have regard to the constituent elements of each budget phase (it may do so) and the court’s task is to decide whether the total for each phase falls within a range of reasonable and proportionate costs…. And the court is not looking to establish what the budget figure should be objectively ascertained, but rather a figure that falls within the applicable range applying the reasonableness and proportionality tests alongside each other.”

“The court must apply both the reasonableness and proportionality tests, but the former may yield to the latter. And, in practice, although PD3E, paragraph 7.3, requires the court to consider each budget phase separately, and therefore to consider the proportionality of each phase total, the task has to be undertaken with an initial overall review of proportionality by reference to the factors in CPR44.3(5)…

The costs in the budget phases must not only be reasonable but must also bear a reasonable relationship with the proportionality factors I have indicated. The proportionality factors that are relevant are to be taken together and given notional weight as a whole. In these cases, the sums in issue are not large for High Court claims when taken in isolation. But when the proportionality factors are put together, the financial value of the claims proves to be relatively unimportant because of the wider factors. The budgets substantially exceed the sums in issue but is not a reason to conclude that the overall budgeted sums and the totals per phase are disproportionate.

It seems to me that the wider factors I have summarised, in particular the public importance and test case factors, will have the effect that if the costs are reasonable they are proportionate. That conclusion chimes with the approach the parties have adopted and avoids the court wielding a concept of uncertain application.”

UPDATING INCURRED COSTS – There was a considerable time period between the date that budgets were required to be filed and when the CCMC was listed. Mr Leslie updated his budget prior to the CCMC to include incurred costs up to 1 May 2018, however the other parties did not. The Master recognised the problems of one party updating the incurred costs and the other parties not, explaining that this approach resulted in Mr Leslie having “ousted the court’s jurisdiction to consider a significant amount of expenditure” and consequently found that “the relevant date for the purposes of incurred costs as being 17 January 2018.”

This can be avoided by agreeing a date that the incurred costs are included up to and in turn obtaining the court’s permission to update the incurred costs.

HOURLY RATES – Chief Master Marsh refused to be drawn into the debate regarding hourly rates and instead considered the allocation of work in the budget between different grades of fee earner and the total figure claimed for each phase was of greater importance.

INTERIM HEARINGS – An amount for specific disclosure had been included in the disclosure phase, the Master found that the inclusion of interim hearings in the budget were wrong in principal as they may be subject to an inter partes costs order, the costs were moved into the contingency phase.

COSTS MANAGEMENT COSTS – The costs associated with costs management are subject to a 2% cap. Chief Master Marsh was asked to consider lifting the cap, he agreed on the basis that the complexities surrounding the multi-party litigation warranted exceptional circumstances in this case.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at CivilCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Proportionality – a flurry of cases

Proportionality is a hot topic in the legal costs world at the moment and in the last 4 months there has been a flurry of cases from the Senior Courts Costs Office and the High Court. The cases are as follows:

Marcura & DA-Desk FZ-LLC -v- Nisomar Ventures Limited & Claus Hyldager.

Various Claimants -v- MGN Ltd [2018]

Arjomandkhah -v- Nasrouallahi [2018]

Powell & others -v- The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2018]

The outcomes in each of these cases are of course case specific. Every case is different, and therefore in practice, this is what makes the application of the new test of proportionality difficult to predict.

It is now fundamentally important for all litigators and costs lawyers to have a sound knowledge of CPR 44.3 (5):

Costs incurred are proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to –

(a) the sums in issue in the proceedings;

(b) the value of any non-monetary relief in issue in the proceedings;

(c) the complexity of the litigation;

(d) any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party; and

(e) any wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as reputation or public importance.

Lawyers should be able to link case facts/details to the above factors and articulate those facts to a Judge at a CCMC, summary assessment or to a Costs Judge on detailed assessment (or provisional assessment).

A really important point is that value shouldn’t be given superior status, as shown in the cases of Various Claimants -v- MGN Ltd [2018] and Marcura & DA-Desk FZ-LLC -v- Nisomar Ventures Limited & Claus Hyldager (costs can be higher than damages). However, in practice, Judge’s are often tactically led by Defendants to place a greater weight on value. It is therefore important for Claimants to be alive to this and ensure the Judge gives equal consideration to each factor in CPR 44.5 (3) and to encourage the Judge to adopt a ‘holistic’ approach (May & May -v- Wavell Group & Dr Bizzari [2018]) when applying the new test of proportionality.

The ’May’ case is the only case to date to give some real judicial guidance in relation to the test and how it should be applied. The decision in that case was appealed, but last week permission to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal. Many legal experts expected the ‘May’ Appeal to provide the Court of Appeal with the chance to issue some clarity and guidance on the test – they will now have to wait a bit longer.

The area of proportionality is starting to develop and we will see many more decisions in 2018, with some appearing harsh and some lenient. The application of the test involves a large degree of judicial discretion and therefore practitioners should not expect a great deal of consistency. If certainty is what practitioners want then fixed costs is the remedy, which is of course not an attractive alternative!

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team. He can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com

 

Make sure your costs budgets, statements of costs and bills of costs are prepared correctly!

The Court of Appeal recently handed down Judgment (Gempride -v- Jagrit Bamrah and Lawlords of London Limited [2018]) in a case which involved alleged misconduct in detailed assessment proceedings.

The underlying claim related to a claim by Ms Bamrah against Gempride for personal injuries. The claim settled by way of CPR 36 on 18 March 2013 for £50,000.00. Ms Bamrah initially dealt with the claim through her own law firm (Falcon Legal) before the claim was transferred to David Stinson & Co.

The case dates back to 2014 where Master Leonard in the Senior Courts Costs Office struck out Part 1 of the Claimant’s bill of costs (insofar as the costs exceeded the fixed hourly rate recoverable by litigants-in-person) due to mis-certification, on the basis that:

  1. the bill contained incorrect hourly rates; and
  2. mis-leading information in relation to Before-the-Event (BTE) insurance was provided in the Replies to Points of Dispute.

The Claimant successfully appealed that decision before His Honour Judge Mitchell in the Central London County Court. One of the most notable reasons for the reversal of the decision was that the judge found that the Claimant was not responsible for the acts and omissions of the costs consultants that were instructed (Lawlords of London Limited).

The Defendant (Gempride) appealed and was successful before the Court of Appeal. In respect of the instruction of Lawlords of London Limited, and the very important point about a Solicitor not being responsible for the acts of omissions of an agent, Lord Justice Hickinbottom said:

“At a time when new business practices mean that solicitors are more frequently subcontracting work out to the unauthorised, it seems to me to be an important matter of principle that solicitors on the record – and other authorised litigators and ‘legal representatives’ for the purposes of the CPR – understand that they remain ultimately responsible for the acts and omissions of those to whom they delegate parts of the conduct of litigation, particularly where those to whom such work is delegated are not authorised… it is only in that way that the supervisory jurisdiction of the court can be effectively maintained…”

“The reverse side of that coin is that, because the solicitor has responsibility for the conduct of those to whom he subcontracts work for which he as a solicitor has been retained, then he is able to charge for that work at an appropriate rate as profit costs (together with any success fee uplift under a CFA) and not simply as a disbursement.”

In respect of the bill of costs the Court of Appeal felt that there should be a penalty for the mis-certification, but that Master Leonard’s penalty was too severe; they disallowed 50% of Part 1 of the bill of costs. The Court did emphasise that the Claimant’s conduct in attempting to claim hourly rates which exceeded those in the retainer was not, in its judgment, dishonest. However, it found that on the best interpretation the Claimant had believed that as she was essentially acting for herself (albeit under the umbrella of Falcon Legal) and was entitled to modify the retainer “at will”, that this was fundamentally wrong, and that such conduct was “unreasonable or improper” to a level that could justify a sanction.

This is a very important decision for Solicitors who instruct costs lawyers and other costs professionals. It is fundamentally important that costs budgets, statements of costs and bills of costs are prepared correctly and the hourly rates claimed do not breach the indemnity principle – the Solicitor has the overall responsibility to make sure the costs document is correct as they certify it. It is also important to make sure that information in Points of Dispute and Replies to Points of Dispute is accurate. Failure to do so can result in costs penalties, but more importantly, allegations of misconduct and associated legal reporting which would be damaging for any law firms’ or legal costs firms’ reputation.

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay, who is a Partner and the Head of the Costs & Litigation Funding team at Clarion. Andrew can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.McAulay@clarionsolicitors.com.

 

When a CFA describes the claim rather than the work it covers

The recent Court of Appeal decision of Malone v Birmingham Community NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1376 reinforced the importance of a clearly drafted funding document.

The case involved a prisoner at HMP Birmingham who pursued a claim for failure to diagnose testicular cancer between August 2010 and January 2011. The prison was operated by the Ministry of Justice, and health care services were provided by Birmingham Community NHS Trust, and Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust.

The Claimant initially instructed Ross Aldridge Solicitors, who had difficulty in identifying the correct Defendant, and in March 2012 the Claimant transferred instructions to New Law Solicitors. They, too, encountered uncertainty when trying to identify the correct negligent Defendant.

The Claimant entered into a CFA with New Law Solicitors on 16 January 2013, which stated that the agreement covered “All work conducted on your behalf following your instructions provided on [sic] regarding your claim against Home Office for damages for personal injury suffered in 2010.”

On 04 October 2013, after proceedings were issued but yet to be served, Birmingham Community NHS Trust admitted responsibility for the Claimant’s treatment, and on 20 March 2014 damages were agreed in the sum of £10,000 plus costs.

A detailed assessment of costs commenced, and the Defendant challenged the enforceability of the CFA on the basis that it was limited to a claim against the Home Office/Ministry of Justice only. DJ Phillips, regional costs judge for Walker, found on 27 April 2015 that the CFA excluded a claim against the Defendant and therefore costs were not recoverable under the agreement as the Claimant had no contractual liability to pay his Solicitor for the work done in suing the Defendant.

The Claimant applied for permission to appeal, which was initially dismissed by HHJ Curman QC in a judgment dated 25 September 2015, but was later granted by Brigg LJ by way of order dated 28 July 2017.

On appeal, Patten LJ and Hamblen LJ considered whether the critical wording of the CFA (highlighted in bold above) merely identified the claim to which it related, or whether it limited the scope of the CFA to a claim against the Home Office only. It was necessary to consider the principles established in paragraphs 11-13 of Wood v Capita Insurance Services [2017] UKSC 24 to ascertain whether a textual analysis of the agreement was required or whether greater emphasis should be given to the factual matrix (contextualism).

[A textual analysis is typically used for agreements that have been negotiated and prepared with the assistance of skilled professionals. Alternatively, consideration of a factual matrix can also lead to the correct interpretation of an agreement, particularly if a contract had been made without skilled input].

Hamblen LJ stated that the “insertions made to the CFA demonstrate it as poor quality drafting and little attention to detail. The critical wording consists of only one sentence and yet it contains three manifest mistakes: (i) the omission of the date of the instructions and (ii) the omission of the definite article before “Home Office” and (iii) the description of the claim being against “Home Office”. The Home Office had not been responsible for operating prisons for some years”. The poor drafting led to a greater emphasis being placed on the factual matrix of the agreement rather than a close textual analysis.

Hamblen LJ considered the most natural reading of the critical wording as being a CFA that covered “all work conducted” on the Claimant’s behalf following “instructions provided” in respect of his claim “against Home Office” and he concluded that the wording was descriptive of the instructions received rather than of the work to be done. Further, he suggested that if the CFA had meant to provide only a limited coverage, greater care and precision would have been expected, but that in any event it would have been in neither party’s interest to seek to impose a strict definitional limit on the agreement so early in the claim.

Therefore, taking into account both textualism and contextualism, it was found that the CFA was not limited to a claim against the Home Office/Ministry of Justice only and the Claimants appeal was allowed.

Whilst in this case the judgment goes in favour of the receiving party, it highlights the importance of giving careful consideration to exactly what a retainer provides for, both at the outset and during the life of a claim, to ensure there are no pitfalls on assessment. It is crucial that time is invested into the creation of a retainer at the outset of a matter, and that it is regularly reviewed throughout the life of a case.

If you have any questions or queries in relation this blog please contact Joanne Chase (joanne.chase@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 336 3327) or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 2460622.

INDEMNITY COSTS FOLLOWING DISCONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

CPR 38.3 provides that a Claimant may discontinue a claim by filing and serving a Notice of Discontinuance on the other parties. Under CPR 38.6(1) it states the following:

“Unless the court orders otherwise, a Claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a Defendant against whom the Claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which the Notice of Discontinuance was served…”.

Under CPR 44.9(1), such an order is a deemed order for costs and the basis of assessment is the standard basis.

The case of Two Right Feet Limited (in liquidation) -v- National Westminster Bank PLC and others is a case where the Claimant discontinued proceedings against the Defendants and the Defendants made an application for costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis due to the following issues:

  1. failure to engage pre-action;
  2. improper and unjustified allegations;
  3. an exaggerated claim;
  4. a case which was speculative (both in facts and law);
  5. a claim which was brought without proper investigation;
  6. concerns as to the approach to disclosure; and
  7. delayed discontinuance, other delays and more minor points.

Background

On 3 March 2015, the Claimant commenced proceedings against the Defendants.  In the claim form, the Claimant alleged that the Defendants were liable for deceit and conspiracy.  The claim was first notified to the First and Second Defendants on 9 June 2015 and the claim form was served on 3 July 2015. The amounts claimed amounted to £20 million. The claims were strenuously denied by the Defendants.  On 7 October 2016 there was a case management conference where directions were set and the case was transferred into the Mercantile Court.  Disclosure followed in January 2017, but on 22 February 2017 the Claimant discontinued its claim. 

Indemnity Basis Costs Order

The Judgment provides very useful information for any party considering an application for an indemnity basis costs order as it cites the leading authorities (paragraph 36 is very useful to read in this regard).

The Judge concluded that an order for indemnity costs was appropriate and determined that the way in which the case had been advanced by the Claimant (and conducted) carried the case out of the norm, which is of course an important consideration for any court when deciding whether to award indemnity costs.

The case also highlights the importance of the receiving party (Defendants in this case) making an application. Notice of Discontinuance creates a deemed order for costs on the standard basis. Should a receiving party feel that they are entitled to indemnity basis costs then they should seek agreement with the paying party (Claimant in this case) or make an application to Court. A receiving party should not leave the matter for detailed assessment – the detailed assessment hearing is a forum to determine the quantum of costs, not to determine the basis of assessment.

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team.  He can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com