THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE – WHAT IS IT? IS IT IMPORTANT?

What is the Indemnity Principle?

A long-established principle which effectively means that a successful party cannot recover more in legal costs then they are liable to pay their solicitor under the terms of the contract with their solicitors.

Why does it exist?

To indemnify the winner for the reasonable legal costs incurred on the matter. In practice, the loser contributes to those costs.

If the indemnity principle did not exist, then a losing party could face a costs liability higher than the winner is liable to pay his solicitor. This would mean that a client would make a profit from the costs of the litigation which is not the intention of costs awards. The intention is to reasonably compensate the winner for the legal costs they have incurred.

Please note that there are some exceptions to the indemnity principle, for example, inter-partes claims for costs where the matter was funded by way of a Legal Aid Certificate, and fixed costs claims i.e. where the costs incurred are lower than the costs that can be claimed inter parties.

Key Case Law

Harold v Smith [1860] 5 H & N 381

Costs orders inter-partes are awarded as an indemnity to the receiving party. They are not awarded to impose a punishment on the party who pays them.

Gundry v Sainsbury [1910]

The Court of Appeal confirmed the underlying principle set out in Harold v Smith. The solicitor had acted for no charge and tried (unsuccessfully) to seek costs from the opponent. The court held that the solicitor was not entitled to recover costs as there was no agreement from the client to pay.

J H Milner & Son v Percy Bilton Limited [1966] 1 WLR 1985

Retainer (contract for services by the solicitor) is fundamental to the right to recover costs. No retainer equals no entitlement to recover costs from clients (and therefore no entitlement to costs inter-partes).

Is the Indemnity Principle important?

Taking into account the above cases (which remain good authorities) the indemnity principle is clearly very important and something which every contentious lawyer should have a sound knowledge and understanding of. Failure to do so can lead to serious professional consequences.

The importance of the indemnity principle is best illustrated by the case of Bailey v IBC Vehicles Limited [1998] 3 All ER 570 where the Court said that the signature of a Bill of Costs is that of an officer of the Court and that mis-certification of the Bill is a serious (disciplinary) offence.

In that case Lord Justice Henry said:

“the signature of the Bill of Costs under the rules is effectively a certificate by an officer of the Court that the receiving party’s solicitors are not seeking to recover in relation to any item more than they have agreed to charge under a contentious business agreement. The Court can (and should unless there is evidence to the contrary) assume that his signature to the Bill of Costs shows that the indemnity principle has not been offended”.

When lawyers sign costs budgets, statements of costs for summary assessment and Bills of Costs it is therefore fundamentally important to ensure that there is no breach of the indemnity principle.

I am now going to consider two recent cases regarding the indemnity principle:

Gempride v Jagjit Bamrah & Law Lords of London Limited [2018] EWCA CIV 1367

In this matter, the receiving party’s bill of costs claimed hourly rates higher than those which the client had agreed to pay their solicitor within the retainer. Furthermore, misleading information was provided in Replies to Points of Dispute in respect of the availability of before the event insurance.

The matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal where the Court imposed a penalty for the mis-certification of the Bill of 50% (Part 1 of the Bill of Costs only). Whilst the penalty in the end was not too severe, the real damage for the law firm was to its reputation.

HMRC v Gardiner and Others [2018] EWHC 1716 (QB)

This matter related to an appeal by HMRC in respect of an order for them to pay the Respondents’ costs in tax appeal proceedings. The Respondents were amongst several tax payers challenging penalties imposed by HMRC for incorrect tax returns.

The Respondent’s tax advisors were at the forefront of the work carried out. Counsel was instructed to represent the Respondents and the fees were paid by their tax advisors. HMRC alleged a breach of the indemnity principle (no direct retainer). That argument failed and the key points were as:

  1. There was never an agreement that the Respondents would never pay Counsel’s fees;
  2. Counsel was there to represent the Respondents, not their advisors;
  3. No difference to a trade union funding arrangement; and
  4. The key is a liability to pay (the Respondents were liable to pay the fees that were incurred, but the tax advisors paid them).This is a useful case to rely on where costs have been paid by a third party and a challenge is raised that there has been a breach of the indemnity principle as a result.


    Summary

    As you can see from the authorities, the indemnity principle has been with us for some time. Lord Justice Jackson recommended the abolition of the indemnity principle in his Final Report in 2010. He was of the opinion that the indemnity principle caused more problems than it solved. However, in my view the indemnity principle should always be in place whilst we have a cost shifting environment in England and Wales. Otherwise, it could encourage inflated claims for costs and allow clients to profit on the costs of litigation and therefore increase claims for costs – which would be contrary to the whole purpose of the Jackson Reforms!

    Do you have any views? – please feel free to share them.

    This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team. Andrew can be contacted at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com or on 0113 336 3334 or 07764 501252.

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COSTS PAID BY A THIRD PARTY – BREACH OF THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE?

The case of HMRC -v- Gardiner and Others [2018] EWHC 1716 (QB) is a case concerning an alleged breach of the indemnity principle.

Background

The Respondents were amongst several tax payers challenging penalties imposed by HMRC for incorrect tax returns. EDF Tax Defence Ltd (“EDF”) were the tax advisors.

The Respondents were successful and HMRC were ordered to pay their costs.

Costs proceedings

EDF were at the forefront of the work carried out in the matter. Counsel was instructed to represent the Respondents and the fees were paid by EDF. HMRC therefore alleged a breach of the indemnity principle on the basis that the Respondents had not paid Counsel’s fees and that there was no direct retainer in place between the Respondents and Counsel.

The argument failed and the key points to note are as follows:

  1. There was never an agreement that the Respondent would not be liable for Counsel’s fees (see paragraph 30 of the Judgment – “The presumption that a client instructing a solicitor or representative to represent them will be liable for costs incurred for such representative may be rebutted by the paying party proving that there was a bargain between the client and the representative that under no circumstances was the client to be liable for costs”).
  2. Counsel represented the Respondents at the hearing, not EDF.
  3. The arrangement was no different to a trade union funding arrangement.
  4. The key for the indemnity principle is a liability to pay and not payment/discharge of the liability (see paragraph 30 of the Judgment – “It is liability to pay rather than who makes payment which is material”).

Had evidence been produced that the Respondents would never have been liable for Counsel’s fees, then the Court would have reached an alternative conclusion. This is therefore a useful case to rely on for parties seeking costs which have been met by a third party, but are facing indemnity principle challenges from a paying party.

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs Litigation Funding Team. Andrew can be contacted at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com
or on 0113 336 3334 or on 07764 501252.

To what extent should the Court consider the Protected Party’s capacity (and wishes) to consent to sexual relations and contraception?

The Protected Party is a young woman with learning disabilities. She previously lived with her family but took part in a number of social and community activities. Concerns were raised, by reason, of her learning difficulties. She was vulnerable to sexual exploitation, pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. There is evidence that she was sexually assaulted, and it was reported that the police expressed concern that the Protected Party should not be unsupervised as she appeared to be a target for sexual exploitation.

The Protected Party has two children, who are in the care of her family. A few years ago, an application was made to the court for an order that the Protected Party be sterilised. This application was aborted and the decision was made to consider a long term method of contraception instead. The other main issue was the concerns regarding the Protected Party’s protection against sexual exploitation.

The expert evidence of a consultant psychiatrist was that the Protected Party lacked mental capacity to consent to sexual relations, to consent to contraceptive treatment and to litigate. It was also recommended that the Protected Party should be supervised at all times when in the presence of sexually active men. She received further education about sexual matters and the Protected Party was to undergo the insertion under general anaesthetic of a copper inter-uterine device (IUD). It was advised that the Protected Party would be sedated, and the IUD would be inserted without her knowledge. This contraception would last for 10 years.

During a lengthy hearing in 2012, Parker J made an order in which, having declared that the Protected Party lacked capacity to litigate and to make decisions with regard to contraceptive treatment, she further declared that it was lawful for the Protected Party (with or without her agreement) to undergo the insertion of a copper coil IUD, to receive a Depo-Provera contraceptive injection, to undergo a full sexual health screen, and to be subject to proportionate restraint if necessary, including sedation. Following the hearing, the Protected Party underwent the operation for the insertion of the IUD. No reasoned judgment was given at the hearing in 2012 and, in the event, no further hearing took place for several years.

In 2016, the Local Authority made an application to restore the proceedings, to revisit the question of the Protected Party’s capacity to engage in sexual relations. The proceedings were to assess and evaluate the clinical risks to the Protected Party’s health presented to her by any further pregnancy; to revisit the Protected Party’s capacity to consent to contraceptive treatment; to re-evaluate the options for Protected Party’s contraceptive treatment in view of the fact that the IUD inserted in 2012 has a life of approximately ten years; to reassess the best interests decision not to inform her of the fact of the insertion of the IUD in the light of any improvement of her understanding; and to authorise her Deprivation of her Liberty at her placement.

Following the preparation of a report on future care support by the CHT, it was agreed that the IUD should remain in situ until the end of its natural life. A statement from the social worker set out four options:

(1) option A(i) – the IUD remains in place, the Protected Party is not informed of its existence, and care and supervision remains at its current level;

(2) option A (ii) – the IUD remains in place, the Protected Party is not informed of its existence, but the level of care and supervision is reduced;

(3) option B – the IUD is removed without informing the Protected Party and the risk of sexual exploitation is managed “through social means” with the current level of care and supervision;

(4) option C – the IUD remains in place and the Protected Party is informed of this.

Having analysed the benefits and disadvantages of these options, the social worker decided option 2 was in the Protected Party’s best interests.

At the hearing in 2017, the three principal issues between the parties were as follows:

(1) Does the Protected Party have capacity to consent to sexual relations?

(2) If she does, what steps should be authorised to facilitate the relationship between the Protected Party and her boyfriend, or between her and any other person with whom she wished to have a sexual relationship?

(3) Is the proposed relaxation in supervision in her best interests? In addition, however, it was thought appropriate for the court to review wider issues concerning her treatment, including the question of whether it should continue to be covert or whether the Protected Party should be informed about it.

In addition, however, it was thought appropriate for the court to review wider issues concerning her treatment, including the question of whether it should continue to be covert or whether the Protected Party should be informed about it. As there remain a number of details within the draft order which the parties have been unable to agree, it was necessary for the judge to make an order outlining the best interests of the Protected Party in relation to her capacity – general principles, capacity other than sexual relations, her capacity to consent to sexual relations, contraception, covert treatment and her sexual relationships and supervision.

In this case, there are a number of arguments against retaining the IUD. It is a clear infringement of the Protected Party’s human rights and freedom. Furthermore, this infringement has been brought about without her knowledge and without providing her with any opportunity to express her wishes and feelings. In her oral evidence, the Care Agency manager said that she thought that the Protected Party would not want to keep the IUD if asked. Secondly, although the Protected has not been expressly asked about her wishes and feelings concerning contraception, she has consistently said that she does not want to have a baby at this stage. It was necessary to consider the psychological harm that the Protected Party may encounter if; the IUD was removed and she became pregnant again or if the IUD was removed without sedation. In this instance, it was decided that it is in the Protected Party’s best interests for the IUD to remain in place until the end of its normal ten-year span. At that point, further careful consideration will have to be given as to what contraceptive treatment.

It was directed for the level of sexual supervision of the Protected Party and her boyfriend should be relaxed slightly and reviewed at a further hearing once this has been considered in more depth. Finally, the provisions of the order relating to the IUD plainly involve a Deprivation of Liberty. A clause was included within the order that such a deprivation is lawful.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

INDEMNITY COSTS FOLLOWING DISCONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

CPR 38.3 provides that a Claimant may discontinue a claim by filing and serving a Notice of Discontinuance on the other parties. Under CPR 38.6(1) it states the following:

“Unless the court orders otherwise, a Claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a Defendant against whom the Claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which the Notice of Discontinuance was served…”.

Under CPR 44.9(1), such an order is a deemed order for costs and the basis of assessment is the standard basis.

The case of Two Right Feet Limited (in liquidation) -v- National Westminster Bank PLC and others is a case where the Claimant discontinued proceedings against the Defendants and the Defendants made an application for costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis due to the following issues:

  1. failure to engage pre-action;
  2. improper and unjustified allegations;
  3. an exaggerated claim;
  4. a case which was speculative (both in facts and law);
  5. a claim which was brought without proper investigation;
  6. concerns as to the approach to disclosure; and
  7. delayed discontinuance, other delays and more minor points.

Background

On 3 March 2015, the Claimant commenced proceedings against the Defendants.  In the claim form, the Claimant alleged that the Defendants were liable for deceit and conspiracy.  The claim was first notified to the First and Second Defendants on 9 June 2015 and the claim form was served on 3 July 2015. The amounts claimed amounted to £20 million. The claims were strenuously denied by the Defendants.  On 7 October 2016 there was a case management conference where directions were set and the case was transferred into the Mercantile Court.  Disclosure followed in January 2017, but on 22 February 2017 the Claimant discontinued its claim. 

Indemnity Basis Costs Order

The Judgment provides very useful information for any party considering an application for an indemnity basis costs order as it cites the leading authorities (paragraph 36 is very useful to read in this regard).

The Judge concluded that an order for indemnity costs was appropriate and determined that the way in which the case had been advanced by the Claimant (and conducted) carried the case out of the norm, which is of course an important consideration for any court when deciding whether to award indemnity costs.

The case also highlights the importance of the receiving party (Defendants in this case) making an application. Notice of Discontinuance creates a deemed order for costs on the standard basis. Should a receiving party feel that they are entitled to indemnity basis costs then they should seek agreement with the paying party (Claimant in this case) or make an application to Court. A receiving party should not leave the matter for detailed assessment – the detailed assessment hearing is a forum to determine the quantum of costs, not to determine the basis of assessment.

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team.  He can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com

 

The format of the precedent H budget and precedent R are working well, claims Mr Justice Birss

At February’s Civil Procedure Rules Committee meeting Mr Justice Birss reported that “work was ongoing to make certain that the new bill costs, Precedent H and Precedent H Guidance are consistent and accurate and that N260 the summary costs statement follows the same format. The content of Precedent H itself would not be changing. The Chair added that in his experience having settled down, Precedent H and R are working very well“. Therefore no changes are expected to the precedent H budget or the precedent R budget discussion report, the remaining changes relate to the bill of costs and statements of costs.

The wholesale changes to costs that we have encountered over the last 5 years were made as a result of Sir Rupert Jackson’s report whereby he likened the current bill of costs to a “Victorian style account book” making it “relatively easy for a receiving party to disguise or even hide what has gone on”. His purpose was to create transparency and unison with time recording systems and costs related documents, hence the need for the new electronic bill of costs, which is the final piece of Jackson’s jigsaw.

If the legal profession were to embrace time recording as Jackson intended, i.e. recording time in phase, task and activity, then astonishingly some 5 years after the publication of his legendary reforms, Sir Rupert Jackson may achieve his aim. However, Sir Rupert narrowly missed having his vision fully formalised and embedded into the rules during his working lifetime, his retirement has pipped him to the post.  He can now sit back and watch from afar, how his intended co-ordinated approach to costs will work in reality!

Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at sue.fox@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

 

Non-Party Costs Orders

The case of Housemaker Services & Anor -v- Cole and Anor [2017] is a useful case for any litigant or law firm considering whether to make an application for a non-party costs order.

Facts

  1. The claim was brought under CPR Part 8 for a limitation direction under Section 1028 of the Companies Act 2006. The underlying claim related to three disputed invoices rendered by the First Claimant to the Defendants. The First Claimant had subsequently been struck off the register and dissolved.
  2. The Court dismissed the claim because the First Claimant could not demonstrate that the dissolution of the company had caused the claim not to be brought, and therefore the Court declined to give a limitation direction.
  3. The Court ordered the First Claimant to pay the Defendants’ costs on the standard basis. The Defendants applied for Mr Wayne Williams, the sole director of the Claimant, to be joined as Second Claimant to the proceedings, for the purposes of making an application for a non-party costs order against him.
  4. The Court made the order joining Mr Williams (Second Claimant) and then gave further directions for the application against him to be dealt with on paper. The Judgment essentially deals with those submissions and the Courts determination of the application for a non-party costs order against Mr Williams.

Submissions of Interest/Note

  1. Mr Williams gave instructions to pursue the proceedings and appeared to have funded them. The First Claimant had no assets and it was highly unlikely that they would be able to satisfy an order for costs.
  2. In respect of a non-party costs order, a warning at the earliest opportunity should be given. The first warning of the application was made at a very late stage.
  3. There was no suggestion that proceedings were brought in bad faith, for an ulterior motive or improperly. 

    Useful Information/Comments from the Judgment

     

  • Paragraph 10 – “A decision to make a non-party costs order is exceptional, but this only means that it is outside of the ordinary run of cases. In a case where a non-party funds and controls or benefits from proceedings, it is ordinarily just to make him pay the costs, if his side is unsuccessful, because the non-party was gaining access to justice for himself, and thus can be regarded as the real party to the litigation”. (this was a general comment about non-party costs orders).

 

  • Paragraph 11 – “However, the director of a limited company is in a special position. It is not an abuse of the process for a limited company with no assets to bring a claim in good faith. It is always open to a defendant to such a claim to apply for security for costs. The mere fact that a director who controls the company’s litigation also funds the claim is not enough in the ordinary case to justify a non-party costs order against him if the company’s case fails”. 

     

  • Paragraph 12“A company is indeed owned by its members. But this does not mean that the shareholder is the “real” party to the claim. In law, the assets of the company (including any claim) belong to the company, and not to the members. Where the proceedings are brought in good faith and for the benefit of the company (rather than for some collateral purpose), the company is indeed the real claimant. If it were otherwise, the principle of the separate liability of the company from its members would be eroded”. 

     

  • Paragraph 13“Moreover, it is not an unusual thing, let alone wrong, that a director who is a shareholder of a company and who funds the company’s claim will ultimately benefit from it if it is successful. It is simply a consequence of the policies adopted by our company law, allowing businessmen to take some risks in seeking profit without incurring unlimited liability”. 

     

  • Paragraph 14 – “A person choosing to deal voluntarily with (or to sue) a limited liability company does so against the legal background. Any potential unfairness caused to a party who is (involuntarily) sued by such a company is remedied by the security for costs jurisdiction”. 

     

  • Paragraph 15“Accordingly, in order to make it just to order a director to pay the costs of unsuccessful company litigation, it is necessary to show something more. This might be, for example, that the claim is not made in good faith, or for the benefit of the company or it might be that the claim has been improperly conducted by the director”. 


    Conclusion
     

    The Court decided that this was not a case where non-party costs order should be made. The Court did not find that the behaviour of Mr Williams in controlling, funding and ultimately hoping to benefit from the claim went beyond the ordinary case of the director and shareholder of a company pursuing a legal claim (paragraph 22). 

    This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding team. He can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com.

Pre 1.4.13 CFA – Advocacy or Litigation services provided OR not?

The recent case of Choudhury -v- Markerstudy could have serious repercussions for receiving parties in Detailed Assessments.  Here is a brief summary of the case:

  • Rohan Choudhury (a child) suffered an accident on 12 March 2013. Rohan was a minor and was therefore represented by her Mother, Mrs Choudhury.
  • An Infant Approval hearing took place in January 2015, where the Court approved a settlement figure of £1,050.00.
  • The Claimant was represented by Irwin Mitchell solicitors, who at the time of instruction, were acting under a Collective Conditional Fee Agreement (CCFA) with Aviva.
  • Following the accident Aviva wrote to the Claimant, and thereafter, Irwin Mitchell wrote to the Claimant explaining the terms in which they would be retained. Those letters were sent before 1 April 2013, but no other work was carried out.
  • Mrs Choudhury instructed Irwin Mitchell by signing a document on 1 April 2013 and returning it. The document that she signed was the pre 1 April 2013 CCFA.
  • The Defendant argued that the retainer was invalid because it was signed and entered into on 1 April 2013, but was based on a regime which on 1 April 2013, was no longer available to litigants (and therefore invalid).
  • The Claimant stated that this was incorrect because ‘Advocacy or litigation Services were provided to the Claimant under the agreement in connection with that matter before the commencement day’ (Section 44.6, 6b of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 – ‘LASPO’).
  • The Court ruled that ‘Advocacy or litigation services’ had not been provided and therefore the retainer was invalid. As a consequence, no costs were payable by the Defendant to the Claimant as there was no indemnity between the Claimant and the Claimants Solicitors.

The District Judge clearly adopted a strict interpretation of LASPO and what amounts to ‘Advocacy and litigation services’. The paying party did not dispute that if litigation services had been provided then the retainer would have been valid.

This Judgment will no doubt cause concern to receiving parties.  Whilst the Judgment is only at County Court level, it will encourage paying parties to raise such arguments. There will still be plenty of cases left in the system where the additional liabilities were entered into very close to 1 April 2013.  In fact, it was widely reported in many legal publications (at the time) that law firms had signed up clients to Conditional Fee Agreements, and in particular ATE insurance, very close to the deadline of 1 April 2013.

Many believe that a black and white approach should be adopted in relation to the inception i.e. if the additional liability was incepted pre 1 April 2013 then it is valid and the associated additional liability recoverable, however, if it is entered into post 1 April 2013 then the additional liability is not recoverable.  The issue over ‘Advocacy or litigation services’ will create some interesting arguments!

In my opinion, what law firms should have done is sent a “holding” Letter of Claim to the Opponent (or likely Opponent) prior to 1 April 2013.  Surely, this would have provided protection from the ‘Advocacy or litigation services’ point?

The key practical point from the Judgment is that the work which was done before 1 April 2013 was effectively ‘client care’ work. In reality, the case will only have an impact on clients who were signed up to CFA’s and/or ATE insurance premiums close to 1 April 2013.  For example, if a client was on a private fee paying retainer from say January 2013, but switched to a CFA retainer in late March 2013, then ‘Advocacy or litigation services’ would have most likely been provided by the time the CFA was entered. This scenario would therefore be safe from the argument.

It is widely reported that fixed costs for all fast track work and low level multi-track work will be introduced in October 2018. Those who draft the rules as to implementation need to do so carefully as otherwise arguments and satellite litigation will take place.

This blog was prepared by Andrew McAulay who is a Partner at Clarion and the Head of the Costs and Litigation Funding. He can be contacted on 0113 336 3334 or at andrew.mcaulay@clarionsolicitors.com.