Tag: Clarion Costs

Costs Consequences of the Claimant’s Late Acceptance of the Defendant’s Part 36 offer

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A recent Court of Appeal decision provided important clarification on how legal costs were calculated when a Part 36 settlement offer was accepted late.

Background

The Claimant in Attersley v UK Insurance Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 217 was injured in a road traffic accident in March 2018. Whilst the claim began under the Road Traffic Accident (RTA) Protocol, it exited the protocol and in February 2021, the Claimant issued Part 7 proceedings, valuing the claim up to £150,000 supported by several expert reports.

The Defendant admitted liability in March 2021 and made a Part 36 offer in the sum of £45,000. The Claimant did not accept this offer within the 21-day relevant period set by the rules. Consequently, the claim was allocated to the multi-track in January 2022, which typically allows lawyers to recover their costs based on what is considered reasonable rather than fixed amounts. The Part 36 offer was accepted in July 2022.

As the Claimant accepted the Part 36 offer outside the 21-day relevant period, and once the claim had been assigned to the multi-track, there was a dispute as to whether the costs could be recovered on a standard basis or were limited to fixed recoverable costs.

Outcome

The Court of Appeal considered the version of the civil procedure rules which applied at the time and held that the key date is when the 21-day period for accepting the Part 36 offer expires, rather than when the offer is eventually accepted, meaning that Claimants who accept an offer after the relevant period will generally be entitled to the amount of costs they would have received had they accepted the offer on the last day of the relevant period. As during that 21-day period the claim remained within the fixed costs regime, the Claimant was entitled to fixed costs which applied at that stage of the proceedings.

The court highlighted that the rules governing settlement offers are designed to encourage early settlement and clarity surrounding financial risk, therefore Defendants should be able to rely on the costs environment that existed when the offer’s relevant period expired. Allowing later events, such as the case being allocated to the multi-track, to change the cost consequences would create unnecessary uncertainty. The court outlined that:

“it is hard to see why a Claimant who [accepted the offer outside the relevant period]…should be in a better position than one who accepts the offer within time.”

Conclusion

The key point of this judgment is that if an offer is made and expires while the case is still within the fixed‑costs regime, the fixed‑costs rules apply to the consequences of accepting that offer, even if the case later evolves or moves outside the fixed‑costs regime.

Although this decision was made in the context of the pre-October 2023 fixed costs rules, it is expected that this is the same approach the Courts will apply under the new fixed‑costs rules introduced in October 2023. That is because those rules are also built around clear stages and predictable cost consequences.

Angela Nako is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

SCCO Updates Filing Guidance for Court of Protection Bills

Leah MorrisLeave a comment

The Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) has earlier this week issued revised guidance on filing supporting papers for Court of Protection bills, coming into effect on 20 April 2026. These updates aim to streamline the assessment process and improve efficiency for both practitioners and Costs Officers.

The SCCO continues to support two methods for submitting supporting documents: digital bundles provided via the Document Upload Centre (DUC) and physical files of papers sent in the post or DX. A summary of the latest guidance is set out below.

1) Digital Bundles via the Document Upload Centre (DUC)

The Document Upload Centre (DUC) allows users to submit supporting papers electronically and is the SCCO’s preferred method, provided submissions follow the required format.

It is important to note:

  • The DUC is only for supporting documents
  • Key documents, including the bill of costs, N258B and court orders, must still be filed via CE-File in the usual way
  • To access the DUC, users must request a link by emailing the SCCO

In terms of formatting, bundles must be in PDF format only. File names should include the SCCO reference number, the Protected Party’s surname, and the billing period or case type (for example, statutory will or property sale). The SCCO also find it helpful if an indication of the bill type is included within the file name, such as general management with the relevant period dates, so it is recommended that this is included.

Where possible, a single bundle should be submitted. If multiple files are necessary, these should be clearly labelled with the relevant date ranges rather than uploading individual documents separately.

Documents must be arranged in chronological order (oldest first), with key documents placed at the beginning of the bundle. These include:

  • The OPG102 and OPG105
  • Client care letter
  • Disbursement evidence
  • Counsel fee invoices

The level of detail within documents remains important. Emails and file notes should clearly show dates and times, with correspondence identifying both sender and recipient. File and attendance notes must also record the fee earner completing the work and the time claimed.

To assist Costs Officers in locating documents quickly, the SCCO recommend:

  • Including a detailed index or bookmarks with clear dates and descriptions so items can be easily identified and cross-referenced against the bill of costs
  • Adding hyperlinks to documents where possible
  • Avoiding duplication of documents or email chains

In terms of timing:

  • For existing cases: upload at the same time as filing the bill (once the SCCO reference number is available)
  • For new cases: upload after receiving confirmation of the SCCO reference number (e.g. SC-2025-COP-001234)

2) Physical Paper Filing

Firms can still submit hard copy bundles by post. While digital filing is encouraged, it is not mandatory.

If submitting papers physically, they should be sent to:

Senior Courts Costs Office
Thomas More Building
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
DX: 44454 Strand

Many of the same principles apply to paper bundles as to electronic ones. Files should be clearly labelled with the SCCO reference number, the Protected Party’s name and the billing period or case type, and documents should be organised in chronological order.

Key documents should be placed at the front of the bundle (or the first bundle if multiple are submitted), including:

  • The OPG102 and OPG105
  • Client care letter
  • Disbursement evidence
  • Counsel fee invoices
  • A copy of the e-filing acceptance notice, including return details
  • Where multiple boxes or bundles are required:
  • Label them sequentially (e.g. Box 1 of 2)
  • Arrange documents chronologically across all boxes and bundles
  • In terms of timing:
  • Papers should be sent as soon as possible after CE-File acceptance
  • They must be submitted within 28 days

Mandatory Filing Notification

Each time a bill is submitted via CE-File, you must clearly state how you intend to file supporting documents. This should be included in the “filing comments” by confirming either ‘paper’ or ‘DUC’. Failure to include this information may result in the filing being rejected.

Final Thoughts

These updates from the SCCO reflect a continued move toward digital efficiency while still accommodating traditional filing methods.

For practitioners, the key takeaway is simple: clarity, organisation, and compliance with formatting rules are essential. Adopting the DUC where possible, and doing so correctly, will help avoid delays and ensure a smoother assessment process, particularly given the continued delays and significant turnaround time for receipt of assessed bills, which remains in excess of a year at present.

For further guidance or to request DUC access, contact the SCCO directly at scco@justice.gov.uk.

You can find out more about our services here or you can contact the Costs and Litigation Funding team at costs.support@clarionsolicitors.com.

From Millions to Nil: The Stark Warning in Winros v Global Energy

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In a judgment handed down on 19 December 2025 in the case of The Winros Partnership v Global Energy Horizons Corporation [2025] EWHC 3362 (Ch) (19 December 2025), Mr Justice Marcus Smith upheld a decision of the Senior Costs Judge Gordon-Saker in an assessment under the Solicitors Act 1974 to assess bills totalling circa £6 million at nil. The decision focusses on the circumstances in which a solicitor can terminate a CFA and preserve the right to claim fees from a client.

 

Background

The dispute arose from a long-running dispute between The Winros Partnership (formerly Rosenblatt Solicitors) and their former client, Global Energy Horizons Corporation. Winros had acted for Global Energy under a series of CFAs, which typically provided that the solicitor was only paid only in the event case succeeded.

However, the relationship deteriorated before any success was achieved under the last CFA. Winros terminated the retainer by accepting Global Energy’s repudiatory breach rather than relying on an express termination clause in the CFA.

After the retainer was terminated, Winros delivered a bill for circa £6 million, arguing it should be paid for the work they had done up to the point of termination. Winros also issued a claim in the Chancery Division for damages in relation to the termination of the CFA. Global Energy subsequently asked the court to assess the bill under Section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974and the claim in the Chancery division was stayed pending the outcome of the assessment.

What the High Court Decided

On appeal from the Senior Costs Judge’s decision in the Senior Courts Costs Office, Mr Justice Marcus Smith upheld the assessment that Winros was not entitled to any payment and that the bill was to be assessed at nil.

Winros chose to terminate the CFA by accepting Global Energy’s repudiatory breach rather than invoking the contractual mechanism in clause 14 (which would have entitled it to fees for work done). Choosing a common law termination meant the contractual protections for payment on termination did not apply.

Furthermore, Winros argued they should have been paid on a quantum meruit basis, which is a restitutionary claim for the value of work done. However, the Court agreed with the lower court that as the CFA had already clearly set out the consequences of early termination, there was no “total failure of basis” that would justify unjust enrichment. Simply put, the contract already articulated what was to happen, leaving no gap for restitution to fill.

The Judge also commented (albeit obiter) that the detailed assessment procedure under the Solicitors Act 1974 was a regulatory process for reviewing bills, not a forum to decide standalone restitutionary claims. Those should be pursued in separate proceedings if genuinely arguable. Therefore, a detailed assessment proceeding was not the appropriate course of action.

The decision highlights the fact that courts will strictly uphold the terms of a carefully drafted CFA, particularly clear provisions on termination and payment that allocate risk with certainty—even if that results in a solicitor going unpaid. It highlights the critical importance of how a solicitor terminates a retainer, as terminating under contract versus at common law can dramatically affect entitlement to fees, with the wrong approach potentially forfeiting enforceable payment rights.

Overall, the judgment serves as a reminder that in CFAs, both procedural compliance and substantive terms are decisive in determining financial outcomes.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Civil and Commercial Costs Team at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

Does a paying party have to pay VAT on costs if an insurer is no longer trading?

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The case of Shmuel Moller & Ors v One Touch Solution Limited & Anor [2026] was a routine summary assessment of costs arising from an interlocutory hearing where the Court was required to undertake a focused examination of VAT recoverability where the receiving party was in liquidation.

Background information

The proceedings arose out of a commercial claim brought by the Claimants against One Touch Solution Limited and its insurer, Hiscox Insurance Company Limited. During the litigation, the Claimants were granted permission to amend their statement of case.

The Court ordered that the Claimants should pay the Defendants’ reasonable costs of responding to the amendment, including the costs of preparing an amended defence, such costs to be assessed if not agreed.

By the time the costs issue arose, One Touch Solution Limited had entered creditors’ voluntary liquidation. This gave rise to a dispute as to whether VAT on the Defendants’ legal costs was recoverable as part of the costs order. The Claimants argued that VAT should not be included because it was recoverable by the Defendant (or its estate). The Defendants contended that liquidation meant VAT was irrecoverable and therefore payable by the Claimants.

The Court was therefore required to determine, in the context of a costs assessment, whether VAT on the relevant legal services was recoverable where the receiving party was a company in liquidation, and whether any additional costs should be awarded in relation to the VAT dispute itself.

The Parties’ arguments

The Claimants argued that VAT was only recoverable if the receiving party cannot recover it as input tax from HMRC and that the First Defendant had been VAT-registered at the relevant time legal services were supplied. They also argued that the liquidation did not change the VAT position; insolvency and VAT deregistration on liquidation does not automatically render VAT irrecoverable.

Furthermore, they argued that in respect of the First Defendant’s costs that were funded by the insurer, the insurer was not the entity that incurred the legal services and had no independent right to recover VAT as costs.

The Defendants argued that VAT was irrecoverable and therefore recoverable from the Claimants as part of the costs order. They stated that the liquidation rendered VAT irrecoverable and that VAT could not be recovered in an ordinary way.

Conclusion

The Court held that the First Defendant’s liquidators can recover VAT by filing appropriate VAT returns, meaning neither Defendant has suffered a recoverable loss for VAT in their costs. The Court’s decision was based on the wording of the Regulation 111(5) of the Value Added Tax Regulations 1995. The wording clearly supported the Claimant’s position, and it was held that the Defendants’ position flew in the face of the regulation and was unexplained.

The Claimants sought £1,000 (excluding VAT) for the costs of preparing submissions on the VAT issue. The court noted that the issue had been fully argued in correspondence, the Claimants succeeded on the point, and the Defendants could have avoided further costs by addressing it clearly at the earlier hearing.

Although the Court did not hear submissions from the Defendants on these costs, it found that the Claimants were clearly successful, that the usual CPR Part 44 costs principles applied, and that the amount claimed was reasonable and proportionate.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the Defendants to pay the Claimants’ costs of £1,000, subject to the Defendants’ right to apply in writing to set aside or vary the order, with any such application to be determined on the papers and with modest further costs expected.

Key Takeaways

Although the decision in Moller is not groundbreaking, it is a timely reminder that insolvency does not simplify VAT issues—it often complicates them. VAT recoverability turns on tax entitlement, not litigation status and insurers cannot assume VAT will be recoverable from the opposing party.

VAT on costs remains a technical issue requiring proper analysis. Treating it as an afterthought can prove an expensive mistake.

The Court rejected the common assumption that where a company is in liquidation, VAT on its legal costs must be irrecoverable and therefore payable by the opponent as part of a costs order.

Therefore, the key principle remains unchanged: VAT is only recoverable as part of costs if the receiving party cannot recover it as input tax. Liquidation or VAT deregistration does not, without more, make VAT irrecoverable.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Civil and Commercial Costs Team at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

Re ACC and Others: Guidance from the OPG

Laura SugarmanLeave a comment

On 9 January 2026, the Office of the Public Guardian published new guidance on Re ACC & Others, setting out their position on this judgement. This guidance explains how Deputies should apply the Re ACC and Others judgment from the Court of Protection and what actions the Office of the Public Guardian expects Deputies to take to remain compliant.

 

For background, this judgement sets out positions on issues concerning the authorities a professional Deputy will need to obtain legal services and how to manage any conflicts of interests.

 

The judgement sets out the position on the general authority of a Deputy. This is defined as the common or day to day tasks that are required to be undertaken to administer P’s estate effectively. Deputies have legal authority to act on behalf of someone who lacks capacity, but that authority is defined strictly by the court order that appointed them. The Re ACC judgment clarified what Deputies can and can’t do without asking the court for extra permission. The guidance explains how Deputies should act within those rules and manage legal work or potential conflicts of interest.

 

 

Deputies automatically have general authority to carry out everyday financial tasks if the court order includes those powers. That generally covers things like:

 

  • Managing bank accounts and investments
  • Letting or maintaining property
  • Preparing tax returns
  • Ensuring care costs are paid

 

 

However, this only applies as long as the activity is within the scope of authority granted by the court order. Deputies acting outside their authority do so at personal risk. Tasks which fall out of the general authority as outlined in the Deputyship Order template include:

 

  • Purchase of freehold or leasehold property
  • Sell, lease or charge freehold or leasehold property
  • Appoint an investment manager
  • Use P’s funds to provide for others
  • Make gifts to charity
  • Obtain a grant of representation
  • Execute or sign deeds or documents

 

It is important to note that unless specific authority is granted in the Deputyship Order, a property and affairs Deputy does not have authority to perform any of the above tasks. If a task isn’t expressly allowed by the Court Order, you must apply to the court for specific authorisation.

 

Litigation

 

Deputies cannot initiate litigation on behalf of P without specific authorisation from the Court of Protection. If a Deputy has specific authorisation to carry out certain tasks, they have authority to engage up to the point of receiving the Letter of Response, but no further.

 

If the contentious litigation may relate to personal welfare decisions, a Deputy cannot initiate litigation but can seek directions from the Court of Protection. Further, the general authority in a property and affairs Deputyship Order does not include appealing against a decision in an Education, Health and Care Plan. This is because this is a personal welfare issue.

 

Whereby urgent litigation is required, the Deputy may proceed at risk but should seek retrospective authorisation. However, this is not guaranteed to be given.

 

Conflicts of Interest

 

This guidance confirms the position on conflicts of interest should a Deputy wish to instruct a member of their own firm. To do so, prior authorisation from the Court must be obtained to carry out this work. If specific authority has not been granted, a Deputy should obtain three competitive quotes from suitable providers and choose the provider that best meets the person’s interests.

 

If these costs are expected to exceed £2,000 plus VAT, authority from the Court is required.

 

Position of the Office of the Public Guardian

 

The Office of the Public Guardian has a statutory duty to supervise all court appointed Deputies. They expect all Deputies to clearly demonstrate they have authority to undertake the work, show how conflicts of interest have been managed and include relevant decisions with respect to Re ACC in the annual Deputyship report. If a Deputy wishes to instruct a member of their own team, they must apply to the court for authorisation whereby projected costs are likely to exceed £2,000 plus VAT.

 

If a case has completed prior to the release of this judgement, the Office of the Public Guardian does not expect applications for retrospective authority to be necessary. However, the Office of the Public Guardian takes the stance that the conflict of interest set out in Re ACC extends to any instance whereby the Deputy is considering utilising services for P from their own firm and this constitutes a potential conflict of interest.

 

In Summary

 

This new guidance reinforces the importance of staying within the authority granted by the court, seeking specific court authorisation for litigation or other high value actions, managing conflicts of interest transparently and reporting properly to the Office of the Public Guardian about decisions made on behalf of P.

 

If you have any questions or would like further information about any of the above, please contact Laura Sugarman on laura.sugarman@clarionsolicitors.com

 

 

 

 

 

Breakdown of agency uplift on expert fees … a step closer to clarity?

ujjainimistryLeave a comment

In the recent case of JXX v Archibald [2025] EWHC 69 (SCCO) Costs Judge Rowley considered whether a breakdown of an expert’s fee is required when the expert is instructed by an agency.

The Defendant applied for a declaration that the Claimant’s bill of costs was non-compliant with the CPR and requested that the detailed assessment proceedings were stayed until the Claimant filed and served copies of the experts’ fee notes and separate breakdowns of the costs of the medical agency and experts. The application also sought that the bill of costs was to be struck out in its entirety or the claims that relate to medical evidence were to be assessed at zero.

This led to the question – is the Claimant obligated to provide a breakdown of the expert fee note to show the percentage of the fee being taken by the medical expert agency?

Background information

A Consultant Ophthalmologist was instructed by the Claimant, directly in the first instance and then through the medical agency for further evidence; with fees amounting to around £120,000. Medical and Professional Services Limited (‘MAPS’) was the agency used in this case and the Defendant’s noticed a ‘stark and shocking’ difference in the fees of the expert from when they were directly instructed, compared to when they were instructed via MAPS. The invoices provided by the expert to MAPS had been increased by approximately 60%

In the Defendant’s Points of Dispute, they stated that the “Claimant was accordingly required to file and serve a breakdown in respect of each, and every fee rendered by MAPS… and the Court can arrive at a reasonable and proportionate allowance. […] Pending this further information the Defendant puts in dispute each and every fee charged by MAPS and declines to make any offer for any such fees at this time.”

The Claimant responded to this point, in an attempt to justify their use of MAPS and submitted that all expert fees were “reasonable and proportionate on a global basis, particularly taking into account the specialist skill, knowledge and expertise of the experts involved.” The Claimant also requested a breakdown from MAPS.

The Claimant’s argument against MAPS’ approach

The Claimant argued that MAPS was instructed to prepare a medical report and to provide all relevant services, and the fee claimed was one which the Claimant was liable to pay and was appropriately invoiced and vouched for on the assessment.

Unhelpfully, MAPS declined to provide a breakdown of the expert’s fees, and the managing director claimed it was not part of MAPS’ standard policy to supply such information as it was regarded as being “unimportant and misleading when considering the overall reasonable cost of obtaining the medical expert evidence … as well as being confidential”.

Cost Judge Rowley stated that “the approach of MAPS has left the Claimant in something of a bind” on the basis that MAPS’ involvement required a ‘slight’ increase in the fee but would result in a ‘significant’ drop in the Solicitor’s own charges. The extent of MAPS’ charges was to be justified by showing the work it has done, but as there was no evidence provided, the position was not expected to change.

He also goes onto say that “if the MRO decides not to justify its charged by way of evidence, it seems to me to be likely that the composite fee would be reduced on assessment.” A justification of the charges is based on a comparison of the work done by the third party and if it would be cheaper if it was carried out by the Claimant’s solicitor.

This comparison means looking at whether it was reasonable for the report (or similar work product) to be produced by the expert without any additional quasi-legal work being carried out.

Conclusion

There are two options a Claimant could take when faced with a composite invoice; they could pursue assessment:

  1. on the basis of the expert’s evidence and the agency work in obtaining that evidence if the information sought by the Defendant is provided; or
  2. on the hypothetical basis that there has been no MAPS involvement, and the fees claimed are solely for the expert’s evidence, if no such information is provided.

The Defendant would then be entitled to produce and rely on comparative evidence, dependant on the approach taken.

On a practical level, when contemplating instructing a medical agency, calculating and comparing the additional time of the lawyer in the event of a direct instruction versus the costs of the agency, may be useful when determining the overall costs benefit.

Practitioners may opt to instruct experts directly and avoid using medical agencies altogether.

This is an example of yet another case in favour of evidencing the breakdown.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Civil and Commercial Costs Team at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Uplifted Guideline Hourly Rates from 1 January 2025

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The Guideline Hourly Rates have increased with effect from 1 January 2025.

In December 2023, the Master of the Rolls accepted the recommendations of the Civil Justice Council Costs Review, which was published in May 2023. One of the recommendations was to annually review and increase the Guideline Hourly Rates in accordance with the Services Producer Price Index (SPPI).

The Guideline Hourly Rates are now as follows (the brackets reflecting the rates effective from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024):

Grade Fee Earner London 1 London 2 London 3 National 1 National 2
A Solicitors and legal executives with over 8 years’ experience £566

(£546)

 £413

(£398)

 £312

(£301)

 £288

(£278)

 £282

(£255)
B Solicitors and legal executives with over 4 years’ experience £385

(£371)

 £319

(£308)

 £256

(£247)

 £242

(£233)

 £242

(£233)
C Other solicitors or legal executives and fee earners of equivalent experience £299

(£288)

 £269

(£260)

 £204

(£197)

 £197

(£190)

 £196

(£189)
D Trainee solicitors, paralegals and other fee earners £205

(£198)

 £153

(£148)

 £143

(£138)

 £139

(£134)

 £139

(£134)

 

 

There has been an average of a 5%  increase to Grade A rates and 4% increase to Grade B, Grade C and Grade D rates.

Ujjaini Mistry is a Paralegal in the Civil and Commercial Costs Team at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Oakwood Solicitors Ltd v Menzies [2024] UKSC 34

Katie SpencerLeave a comment

Case overview

The case of Oakwood Solicitors Ltd v Menzies [2024] UKSC 34 explores a client’s right to request an assessment of legal fees, focusing on the interpretation of “payment” in Section 70(4) of the Solicitors Act 1974. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favour of the client, reinforcing protections that allow clients to review and negotiate billed costs.

Initial Proceedings

The Respondent, Oakwood Solicitors, were instructed by the Appellant, Menzies, following his involvement in a Road Traffic Accident, under a Conditional Fee Agreement.

The claim settled for £275,000, after which the Respondent issued a ‘Final Statute Bill’ outlining the fees incurred throughout the case, totalling £73,711.20. The Respondent deducted from the damages an amount to cover the shortfall in costs after deducting costs recovered from the Defendant, as agreed in the CFA.

On 1 April 2021, the Appellant initiated proceedings to request an assessment of the final bill. To determine whether the Appellant could bring these proceedings, the Costs Judge assessed the date on which payment of the bill was made. The Costs Judge decided that payment had occurred over 12 months before the assessment (apparently taking the date as being when the Final Statute Bill was delivered).

Legal Issue

Section 70(4) of the 1974 Solicitors Act states:

‘The power to order assessment conferred by subsection (2) shall not be exercisable on an application made by the party chargeable with the bill after the expiration of 12 months from the payment of the bill.’

Applying this rule, as the payment of the bill occurred over 12 months prior to the assessment application, the Appellant was barred from seeking an assessment.

Appeal to the High Court

The Appellant appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal on the grounds that there had been “no sufficient settlement of account” to warrant treating the deduction as payment under Section 70(4).

Appeal to the Court of Appeal

The Respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which found that, because the Appellant had agreed in the CFA to the deduction of monies and had been sent a Final Statute Bill no further agreement on the bill amount was necessary. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

The Appellant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Decision and Reasoning

Lord Hamblen delivered judgment on the matter, considering several key points to reach a conclusion. Section 70 was concerned with the right to assess solicitors’ bills of costs with a focus on the proper amount to be charged, having regard to whether costs have been reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount.  The client needed an opportunity to consider the bill and decide to what extent it should be paid. Section 70 envisages payment after the delivery of the bill and rather than by delivery of the bill.

 

The right to have the bill assessed is intended to protect the client’s interests, which are compromised if the client is not given the opportunity to consider the bill of costs.  Consideration of the meaning of ‘payment’ in Section 70(4) and previous authorities supported the Appellant’s case.

In considering the requirement for a settlement of account, the cases of Re Bignold (1845) and Harrion v Tew (1987) were referenced, both of which were found to support the Appellant’s position that an agreement to the bill is necessary. Lord Hamblen said, “the authorities show a long established understanding as to what payment by deduction or retention requires…both generally and with specific reference to section 70…The need for a settlement of account has been consistently stated…This requires an agreement to the sum taken or to be taken by way of payment of the bill of costs.” Therefore, there needed to be agreement as to the amount to be paid in respect of the bill of costs and mere delivery of the bill was not sufficient.

 

Lord Hamblen felt that the Respondent’s submissions as to practical implications of this conclusion were overstated, in any event these could not dictate the correct interpretation of ‘payment’ in the legislation, and the need for agreement by way of a settlement of account was long established.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed which restored Bourne J’s order for assessment.

 

Katie Spencer is a Paralegal in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact the team at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com

ACC & Others – A Useful Recap

Leah MorrisLeave a comment

Introduction

The case of ACC & Others [2020] EWCOP 9 was a landmark judgment by HHJ Hilder in the Court of Protection that clarifies the authority required by Deputies to obtain legal services and the management of conflicts of interest.

This judgment arose from three separate proceedings involving Deputies connected to the law firm Irwin Mitchell. In two of these cases, the Deputy was the Irwin Mitchell Trust Corporation and in the third case the Deputy was a partner in the firm. Notably, the Deputyship Orders did not explicitly grant or deny authority to instruct solicitors or initiate legal actions, leading to questions about litigation costs and potential conflicts of interest in a Deputy connected to Irwin Mitchell appointing Irwin Mitchell to act in litigation.

‘General Authority’

HHJ Hilder sets out the background to the three sets of proceedings, the position of the parties and the relevant law, explaining that the Orders appointing the Deputies contained a general authority and that these proceedings had arisen “…because the Court had concerns about what the Applicants regard as a reasonable interpretation of ‘general’ authority.”  The three cases “demonstrate a clear need for further amplification of the Court’s approach” but the learned Judge approached that task cautiously, stating that “‘General’ authority is not susceptible to exhaustive definition.”

In order to amplify the Court’s approach, HHJ Hilder asked a series of questions in relation to authorisation required to conduct litigation on behalf of P, further proceedings in the Court of Protection, to what extent ‘general authority’ encompassed authority to take legal advice on behalf of P, the line between seeking advice and conducting litigation, urgent matters, the addressing of conflicts of interest, cases where the Deputy is not the instructing party, acting as litigation friend and where P has capacity to give instructions for the work in question.

The Conclusions of HHJ Hilder

HHJ Hilder’s conclusions on these questions are set out in an Appendix to the Judgment and are stated below.

  1.  The “general” authority to manage property and affairs which is granted by the standard Deputyship order encompasses those common or ordinary tasks which are required to administer P’s estate efficiently.
  2. Authority to make a decision / do an act in respect of P’s property and affairs encompasses such ordinary non-contentious legal tasks, including obtaining legal advice, as are ancillary to giving effect to that authority.
  3. In particular:

a) authority to purchase or sell property includes conveyancing

b) authority to let property includes dealing with leases or tenancy agreements

c) authority to conduct P’s business includes dealing with employment contracts of that business

d) “general” authority encompasses:

i) the preparation of an annual tax return, and therefore obtaining advice as to completion of the return

ii) discharging P’s financial responsibilities under a tenancy, and therefore obtaining advice as to liabilities under the tenancy.

iii) applying P’s funds so as to ensure that the costs of his care arrangements are met, and therefore dealing with employment contracts of directly employed carers

What does this mean for Deputies in practical terms?

As alluded to above, general authority for the management of property and financial affairs will usually encompass tasks such as conveyancing, managing leases, business and associated employment contracts, preparing tax returns (excluding complex returns), taking advice on any tenancy issues, arranging care and where authority encompasses steps in contemplation of contentious litigation, which includes obtaining Counsel’s opinion.

The Court Order appointing the Deputy will specifically state the authorities allowed for the most part. Where work looks to fall outside of the general authority, specific further authority may be required.

Outside the general authority of property and financial affairs Deputies, specific authority is required to conduct litigation. Deputies can take advice on ‘contentious litigation’ on a matter but only up to receiving a letter of response and no further. This has been further clarified to include non-contentious work too including conveyancing work. Specific authority is also required to make payment to a third party and includes any costs incurred by a member of the Protected Party’s family. A property and affairs Deputy also has no authority to make decisions in relation to a health and welfare matter.

Additional authority from the Court should be sought where litigation is required for continuing healthcare appeals, education appeals and appeals against health and care plans, as these fall outside the scope of the general authority. Authority is also required from the Court of Protection to let property including taking steps to form a view as to whether there are grounds to evict a tenant.

For prospective Deputies they should consider whether there is a need to instruct somebody else to provide legal advice at the time they apply to be appointed. Three quotes should be provided including one from their own firm, if desired, then the Deputy should make a best interest decision as to which provider meets the needs of the Protected Party.

For existing Deputies, there is a continuing expectation to consider the limits of their own specific authority and to address any conflicts of interest. Where costs are likely to exceed £2,000, authorisation is required and as for prospective Deputies three quotes should also be obtained. The quotes should be included within the annual Deputyship report, providing justification as to why the chosen firm was instructed. Both monetary and non-monetary significance to the Protected Party will be relevant. If the Deputy wishes for the work to remain in-house and the quote is over £2,000, an Order will be required from the Court.

Conclusion

Overall, this case has had significant implications for the governance of Deputyships, contributing to the amended Deputyship Standards published by the Office of the Public Guardian on 13 February 2023. The principles established in this judgment aim to safeguard the interests of vulnerable individuals and provide clearer guidelines for Deputies in their legal and financial responsibilities.

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Can the paying party go to prison for not paying costs owed?

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The appeal of Smith v Kirkegaard [2024] EWCA Civ 698 involved a contempt application and consideration of whether non-compliance with an order for costs amounted to a contempt of court punishable by committal to prison.

Case Background

In 2018, Respondent – Mr Kirkegaard, discontinued his original claim for libel against Appellant – Mr Smith, because four allegedly defamatory blogs, published by Mr Smith, were deemed to be ‘expressions of opinion’ at a preliminary hearing in 2019. This meant that a claim for libel was likely to fail. Mr Kirkegaard was ordered to pay half of Mr Smith’s costs, which were summarily assessed in the sum of £13,500 and payable within 14 days of the order. But this was not paid.

Following discontinuance of the claim in May 2020, Mr Smith was thereby entitled to his costs of the action. A final costs certificate was issued by the SCCO in September 2021 in the sum of £26,668.43 to be paid by Mr Kirkegaard; this was endorsed with a penal notice. This was also not paid.

Mr Kirkegaard failed to make any payments under the costs orders despite several attempts by Mr Smith to enforce them, including initiating enforcement proceedings in Denmark and Germany, investigating public records, and filing an application to be questioned about assets. Mr Smith alleged that Mr Kirkegaard evaded service by hiding his location generally.

Application to commit for contempt.

In July 2023 Mr Smith proceeded to file a contempt application, alleging that Mr Kirkegaard had made a false statement regarding his named address and had failed to pay two costs orders. This was dismissed by the judge for a range of issues. Permission to appeal this decision was however granted by Warby LJ in March 2024.

Was the failure to pay costs enforceable in contempt proceedings?

It was determined that a failure to pay a costs order could not be pursued by contempt proceedings.

Mr Smith relied on Australian case law (PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2020] FCA 685) to argue that the court could treat a deliberate failure to pay a judgment debt as contempt if they had the means to pay. This argument was based on the fact that in March 2020, Mr Kirkegaard had proffered to have an annual income of £72,000 and could make £500 monthly instalments.

The Appeal Decision

Lord Justice Dingemans dismissed Mr Smith’s line of argument on the basis there is a different procedural and statutory regime relating to non-payment of judgment debts in England and Wales.

Although CPR 81.4 provides for enforcement by an order for committal for disobedience of a judgement or order, the Debtors Acts 1869, effectively abolished committal to prison for non-payment of judgment debts, apart from some exceptions in sections 4 and 5.

LJ Dingemans suggested that the section 4 exceptions and Section 5 as a whole, did not apply in this case. The default remains a contempt in these circumstances, but not punishable by committal.

Conclusion

LJ Dingemans, LJ Bean and LJ Asplin all agreed that the non-payment of the costs order was a contempt of court, but it could not be enforced by imprisonment for contempt.

The courts have developed other remedies, such as the freezing order, to help creditors enforce judgment debts. The courts may also exercise a discretion not to permit a defaulting party to participate in further proceedings – but that did not arise in this case.

Clarion’s Costs and Litigation Funding team can be contacted at civilandcommercialcosts@clarionsolicitors.com