Tag: COP Costs

Can The Court of Protection Keep a Patient Alive?

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It is well known, and often the cause of heated debate, that assisted suicide is illegal within the United Kingdom. If a person is terminally ill and wishes to die, that person would have no rights under UK law to end their life with dignity. However, recent case law suggests that there may be a slight shift in how the Court of Protection handles a terminally ill patient.

Recently, the Supreme Court judged that a 52 year old man (Mr Y) with an extensive brain injury should be allowed to die without Mr Y’s family being forced to apply to the Court of Protection. At the time of the application, Mr Y was receiving clinically assisted nutrition and hydration and although Mr Y had died at the time of the appeal, it was deemed necessary for the appeal to proceed due to the importance of the issues raised.

For clarity, once clinically assisted nutrition and hydration is withdrawn, a person is generally expected to survive no more than two weeks. Following on from the Supreme Court ruling, it has now been agreed that where the family and medical practitioners are in agreement, it is no longer necessary for an application to be made to the Court of Protection.

This decision had also been taken in another case where a woman (M) who had suffered with Huntington disease for over 25 years was permanently residing in hospital and was in a minimally conscious state. The Supreme Court judged that the clinically assisted nutrition and hydration was withdrawn and M died shortly after. Following the decision, Jackson stated “There was no statutory obligation to bring the case to court … A mandatory litigation requirement may deflect clinicians and families from making true best-interests decisions and in some cases lead to inappropriate treatment continuing by default. Indeed, the present case stands as an example, in that M received continued CANH that neither her doctors nor her family thought was in her best interests for almost a year until a court decision was eventually sought.”

However, it is worth noting that the decision in M related specifically to those living on life support, as opposed to all ‘right to die’ cases.

It is becoming clear that there is a shift appearing from the way in which those who are terminally ill are treated by the courts. Previously, an application to the Court of Protection would be required to make a decision on the care received, however, now it appears that the best interests of the terminally ill patient will be put first without the requirement of an application.

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To what extent should the Court consider the Protected Party’s capacity (and wishes) to consent to sexual relations and contraception?

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The Protected Party is a young woman with learning disabilities. She previously lived with her family but took part in a number of social and community activities. Concerns were raised, by reason, of her learning difficulties. She was vulnerable to sexual exploitation, pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. There is evidence that she was sexually assaulted, and it was reported that the police expressed concern that the Protected Party should not be unsupervised as she appeared to be a target for sexual exploitation.

The Protected Party has two children, who are in the care of her family. A few years ago, an application was made to the court for an order that the Protected Party be sterilised. This application was aborted and the decision was made to consider a long term method of contraception instead. The other main issue was the concerns regarding the Protected Party’s protection against sexual exploitation.

The expert evidence of a consultant psychiatrist was that the Protected Party lacked mental capacity to consent to sexual relations, to consent to contraceptive treatment and to litigate. It was also recommended that the Protected Party should be supervised at all times when in the presence of sexually active men. She received further education about sexual matters and the Protected Party was to undergo the insertion under general anaesthetic of a copper inter-uterine device (IUD). It was advised that the Protected Party would be sedated, and the IUD would be inserted without her knowledge. This contraception would last for 10 years.

During a lengthy hearing in 2012, Parker J made an order in which, having declared that the Protected Party lacked capacity to litigate and to make decisions with regard to contraceptive treatment, she further declared that it was lawful for the Protected Party (with or without her agreement) to undergo the insertion of a copper coil IUD, to receive a Depo-Provera contraceptive injection, to undergo a full sexual health screen, and to be subject to proportionate restraint if necessary, including sedation. Following the hearing, the Protected Party underwent the operation for the insertion of the IUD. No reasoned judgment was given at the hearing in 2012 and, in the event, no further hearing took place for several years.

In 2016, the Local Authority made an application to restore the proceedings, to revisit the question of the Protected Party’s capacity to engage in sexual relations. The proceedings were to assess and evaluate the clinical risks to the Protected Party’s health presented to her by any further pregnancy; to revisit the Protected Party’s capacity to consent to contraceptive treatment; to re-evaluate the options for Protected Party’s contraceptive treatment in view of the fact that the IUD inserted in 2012 has a life of approximately ten years; to reassess the best interests decision not to inform her of the fact of the insertion of the IUD in the light of any improvement of her understanding; and to authorise her Deprivation of her Liberty at her placement.

Following the preparation of a report on future care support by the CHT, it was agreed that the IUD should remain in situ until the end of its natural life. A statement from the social worker set out four options:

(1) option A(i) – the IUD remains in place, the Protected Party is not informed of its existence, and care and supervision remains at its current level;

(2) option A (ii) – the IUD remains in place, the Protected Party is not informed of its existence, but the level of care and supervision is reduced;

(3) option B – the IUD is removed without informing the Protected Party and the risk of sexual exploitation is managed “through social means” with the current level of care and supervision;

(4) option C – the IUD remains in place and the Protected Party is informed of this.

Having analysed the benefits and disadvantages of these options, the social worker decided option 2 was in the Protected Party’s best interests.

At the hearing in 2017, the three principal issues between the parties were as follows:

(1) Does the Protected Party have capacity to consent to sexual relations?

(2) If she does, what steps should be authorised to facilitate the relationship between the Protected Party and her boyfriend, or between her and any other person with whom she wished to have a sexual relationship?

(3) Is the proposed relaxation in supervision in her best interests? In addition, however, it was thought appropriate for the court to review wider issues concerning her treatment, including the question of whether it should continue to be covert or whether the Protected Party should be informed about it.

In addition, however, it was thought appropriate for the court to review wider issues concerning her treatment, including the question of whether it should continue to be covert or whether the Protected Party should be informed about it. As there remain a number of details within the draft order which the parties have been unable to agree, it was necessary for the judge to make an order outlining the best interests of the Protected Party in relation to her capacity – general principles, capacity other than sexual relations, her capacity to consent to sexual relations, contraception, covert treatment and her sexual relationships and supervision.

In this case, there are a number of arguments against retaining the IUD. It is a clear infringement of the Protected Party’s human rights and freedom. Furthermore, this infringement has been brought about without her knowledge and without providing her with any opportunity to express her wishes and feelings. In her oral evidence, the Care Agency manager said that she thought that the Protected Party would not want to keep the IUD if asked. Secondly, although the Protected has not been expressly asked about her wishes and feelings concerning contraception, she has consistently said that she does not want to have a baby at this stage. It was necessary to consider the psychological harm that the Protected Party may encounter if; the IUD was removed and she became pregnant again or if the IUD was removed without sedation. In this instance, it was decided that it is in the Protected Party’s best interests for the IUD to remain in place until the end of its normal ten-year span. At that point, further careful consideration will have to be given as to what contraceptive treatment.

It was directed for the level of sexual supervision of the Protected Party and her boyfriend should be relaxed slightly and reviewed at a further hearing once this has been considered in more depth. Finally, the provisions of the order relating to the IUD plainly involve a Deprivation of Liberty. A clause was included within the order that such a deprivation is lawful.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Disproportionate Costs in the Court of Protection

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In the case of Hounslow v A Father & Mother (Costs in the Court of Protection – Disproportionate litigation) [2018] EWCOP 23, Judge Eldergill looked at the effects of deviating away from the simple issue at hand and the way that costs can spiral when disproportionate and unnecessary work is undertaken. It also looked at the costs consequences and the unfairness that can be encountered by a Litigant in Person.

The proceedings were in relation to a young man. The Applicant was the London Borough of Hounslow and the Respondents, were the young man’s parents.  The young man resided with his father and suffered from a severe learning disability, which rendered him unable to manage his own property and financial affairs. The financial assets were modest, and the young man received a number of benefits. At the time that the proceedings were issued, the father was the Department of Work and Pensions appointee and the mother assisted with the administration of his state benefits.

In this case, the local authority considered that a Deputyship would be more appropriate due to financial safeguarding concerns, obtained by an anonymous informant.  On 6 February 2017, the Court issued an application filed by the local authority, which asked the Court to appoint the Director of Children’s and Adult Social Services as the Deputy.

On 1 March 2017, the father filed an acknowledgement of service, opposing the application. The father stated that the local authority had failed to provide him with a copy of the application saying it was ‘confidential’. It was also stated that the local authority had not provided any more details or evidence in support of the application.

A Dispute Resolution Hearing had been listed for 2 May 2017, following which no resolution was reached. Judge Hilder listed a number of comprehensive directions in relation to the filing of evidence, position statements and the trial. The matter then came before Judge Eldergill and he stated the following;

1) A case involving the alleged misuse of state benefits has generated an enormous amount of documentation, and no doubt legal costs, quite disproportionate to the simple central issue of an alleged misuse of benefits.

2) The position statements and correspondence are full of generalised assertions of abuse of process, applications being misconceived, summary judgment, etc, which no doubt partly explains why so much paper has been generated.

3) Both legally-represented parties have made basic procedural errors (filing lengthy documents electronically despite what the rules say, including references to discussions at a DRH, filing bundles that are immediately to be returned, not serving the application within the required time limits).

I make these points because of the very clear costs implications.

He then made a further order on 13 November 2017, setting out concerns and the following directions:

UPON

(1)  Considering bundles and other filed documentation concerning this application of in excess of one thousand pages.

WHEREAS

(1)  The local authority has applied to be appointed as the deputy for property and financial affairs of [the son] who is a gentleman in receipt of social security benefits that are managed under a DWP appointeeship held by the First Respondent.

(2)  The outcome of the application will be either that the First Respondent continues to act as [his son’s] appointee (if the application is dismissed) or that the local authority is appointed as [his son’s] deputy, in which case the local authority automatically becomes his appointee.

(3)  The overriding objective of the rules is to enable the court to deal with a case justly. This includes ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously, in ways which are proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues, saving expense, and allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources. The parties are required to help the court to further the overriding objective.

(4) Unfortunately, an application concerning the management of [the son’s] benefits has generated over one thousand pages of documents and a huge amount of professional time, expenditure and legal costs quite disproportionate to a simple central issue of alleged misuse of benefits. While the court acknowledges that some of the documentation and expense was required of the parties as a result of the court’s case management directions of 2 May 2017, the amount of documentation filed has nevertheless been contrary to the overriding objective.

(5) Furthermore, and notwithstanding any submissions to the contrary:

(a) The position statements and correspondence are full of generalised assertions of abuse of process, applications being misconceived, summary judgment, etc, which no doubt partly explains why so much paper has been generated.

(b) Both legally-represented parties have made basic procedural errors (filing lengthy documents electronically despite what the rules say, including references to discussions at a DRH, filing bundles that are immediately to be returned, not serving the application within the required time limits, referring inappropriately to public interest immunity, etc).

(6) The parties will be aware that such considerations and observations have clear implications in terms of the recovery of the legal costs generated by these proceedings.

(7) On the documentary evidence filed to date, the court makes the following provisional observations in order to assist the parties:

(a)  The safeguarding investigation was fundamentally flawed and unfair.

(b) The financial information filed to date suggests that there was a lack of prudent good housekeeping under the previous arrangements in force until February 2017 in relation to the way in which benefits were used for [the son’s] benefit.

(c)  The position statement dated 27 September 2017 filed on behalf of the First Respondent is in quite general terms, in particular the financial tables at (internal) pp.10-12.

(d)  A hearing in the Court of Protection regarding the redaction of the identity of the informant would be disproportionately costly. Whether the initial report was malicious or not, and whoever the informant was, it is for the local authority to establish on evidence that there has been mismanagement or misuse by the Second Respondent of [her son’s] funds, that such mismanagement or misuse means that the First Respondent (sic) cannot remain as [his son’s] appointee, and furthermore that it justifies a deputyship order in favour of the local authority.

(e) To date, and despite a prolonged safeguarding investigation, the local authority has not established that the Second Respondent has used [the son’s] funds for her own benefit or that the First Respondent is an inappropriate appointee. If the local authority cannot prove that then it follows that the informant was an unreliable informant.

(f)  In relation to that issue, the local authority has not received unredacted copies of the Second Respondent’s bank statements or had an opportunity to test the evidence of both Respondents by way of cross-examination. That being so, summary dismissal of the application (with the likely costs consequences) would not be just or appropriate at this stage.

(g) On the basis that the local authority is unwilling to withdraw its application, a short half-day final trial is appropriate with the following witness template: First Respondent Evidence-in-Chief 15 minutes, Cross-Examination 30 minutes; Second Respondent Evidence-in-Chief 15 minutes, Cross-Examination 30 minutes; Submissions 30 minutes; Judgment 30 minutes.

(h) Prior to the hearing the Second Respondent must (as she has very fairly willingly agreed to do) file and serve unredacted copies of the previously filed bank statements.

The mother provided the bank statements and details of the withdrawals and expenditure and the final hearing was on 2 February 2018. The Local Authority had withdrawn its application and left the matter of costs to be determined.

The young man had no savings so the usual rule of costs, that the costs be paid from the estate was not an option.  Judge Eldergill stated that the ‘proceedings had taken up a wholly disproportionate amount of court time and had been conducted with insufficient proportionality.’ The Judge concluded that the case could have been resolved in an efficient manner by simply reviewing bank statements and asking questions, but instead there were ‘hundreds of unnecessary and bad-tempered correspondence, witness statements, position statements and emails’ which amounted to approximately £50,000.00 plus VAT costs in respect of the Respondents costs and £15,000.00 in respect of the local authority’s costs.

Payment of costs in respect of property and financial affairs applications under Rule 19.2, state that the ‘costs should be paid by P or charged by to P’s estate’, however Rule 19.5 can be applied when there is support in departing from the general rule. The judge held that the litigation was conducted disproportionately by both sides and there was a failure to focus on the simple central issue of; whether the bank statements could indicate any misuse of funds. Furthermore, Judge Eldergill stated that he did not believe that the ‘costs incurred by the First Respondent were proportionate to the issues, complexity of the case and the son’s circumstances’.

The proportionality of the work undertaken on behalf of the First Respondent were deemed to be assessed on an item-by-item detailed assessment basis. The Local Authority would then pay 90% of those costs, with the 10% reduction reflecting the Courts findings of the conduct of the other party. The costs in relation to the Litigant in Person were much more complex and the Judge felt that they lead to an injustice. The Judge also called for the rules to be reviewed and revised so that the Court can award a Litigant in Person costs in a case such as this one. It will be interesting to see if there are any developments in this area.

Mr Justice Hayden appointed as the new Vice-President for the Court of Protection – what does this mean for the Court of Protections future?

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Further to the recent appointment of Sir Andrew McFarlane as President of the Family Division of the High Court comes the appointment of Mr Justice Hayden as the new Vice-President of the Court of Protection.

Who is Mr Justice Hayden?

Sir Anthony Paul Hayden was called to the bar at Middle Temple and was appointed as Queen’s Counsel in 2002. On 31 July 2013, he was appointed as a judge of the High Court of Justice in the Family Division.

Some of his most noteworthy cases that he has overseen include the legal challenge by the parents of Alfie Evans against Alder Hey Children’s Hospital.

What are the responsibilities of the President and Vice President?

The powers of the President and Vice President are to oversee the daily activities of the Court of Protection and to liaise with lower level judges to ensure effective performance in all aspects of the Court’s work. They require a good level of leadership, detailed knowledge of the Court’s jurisdiction and a comprehensive understanding of the Mental Capacity Act.

What does this appointment mean for the Court of Protection?

Considering the cases overseen by Mr Justice Hayden, his experience in matters relating to families and those who would be under the care of the Court of Protection is extensive, and will be invaluable in the future development of the Court.

Given the Mental Capacity Act (Amendment) Bill currently making its way through the legislative process, changes in the Court of Protection are on the horizon and Justice Hayden’s history in practice will be extremely useful in the implementation of these.

The team here at Clarion Solicitors wish to congratulate both Andrew McFarlane and Anthony Hayden.

Deprivation of Liberty Proceedings on behalf of a minor [2017] EWHC 2458 (Fam)

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The Local Authority made an Application for permission to deprive the Protected Party (a minor) where there was no secure accommodation available.

The Protected Party was a 13 year old child and had a background of very serious uncontrollable behaviour which had resulted in damage to himself and others. As a result, he had been placed in over six different accommodations for his own and others’ safety. There were a number of occasions where the staff were unable to manage his behaviour or keep themselves and the Protected Party safe.

The Local Authority had repeatedly expressed their wishes to place the Protected Party in an approved secure placement, however these were rare and they were unable to find a suitable home. As a result, they had hoped it would have been possible to place him in a unit which was not deemed an approved secure accommodation. A plan was put in place that meant the Protected Party would stay at the accommodation and if necessary, be subject to considerable restraint, including physical restraint, solely for the purpose of keeping him safe.

Section 25 of the Children Act 1989 makes express and detailed provision for the making of what are known as Secure Accommodation Orders. Such Orders may be made and, indeed, frequently are made by Courts. It is not necessary to apply to the High Court for a Secure Accommodation Order, however, as there was no approved secure accommodation available, the Local Authority required the authorisation from a Court for the Deprivation of Liberty that the Protected Party would be subjected to.

Mr Justice Holman delivered his concern over the way in which applications of this kind were handled, saying that “the device of resort to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is operating to by-pass the important safeguard under the regulations of approval by the Secretary of State of establishments used as secure accommodation. There is a grave risk that the safeguard of approval by the Secretary of State is being denied to some of the most damaged and vulnerable children. This is a situation which cannot go on, and I intend to draw it to the attention of the President of the Family Division.”

The Judge ordered that the child now be joined as a party to these proceedings and a guardian must be appointed to act on his behalf. A further hearing was fixed for a months time, as the Judge was concerned the Protected Party had been deprived of his liberty for the past 3 months. The Judge advised further “in view of the gravity of the subject matter and the age of the child, I propose to order that he must be enabled to attend the hearing if he expresses a wish to do so unless the guardian states that in his opinion it would be damaging to the health, wellbeing or emotional stability of the child to do so. In my view it is very important that ordinarily in these situations, which in plain language involve a child being ‘locked up’, the child concerned should, if he wishes, have an opportunity to attend a court hearing. The exception to that is clearly if the child is so troubled that it would be damaging to his health, wellbeing or emotional stability to do so. But subject to that exception, if a child of sufficient age, which includes a child of this or any older age, wishes to attend a hearing of this kind, then in my view he must be enabled to do so.”

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

Indemnity Basis Costs in the Court of Protection; The Public Guardian v Matrix Deputies Limited & London Borough of Enfield (2017) EWCOP 14

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Costs within the Court of Protection are generally assessed on the standard basis as per Part 44.3 1 (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules. However, this recent case has highlighted that the Courts will order costs to be assessed on the Indemnity basis, Part 44.3 1 (b) in particularly egregious situations.

The Proceedings concerned 44 individuals, whose property and financial affairs were either managed by a Court appointed Deputy or were subject to an application for such an appointment. There was an additional 8 individuals who had been subjected to these proceedings, but had unfortunately passed away during the course of the litigation. This meant the Court only retained a residual jurisdiction in respect of costs.

The Court identified that the common link between all the individuals was Matrix Deputies Limited, or a person who worked for the organisation, such as DW and OM.

The Public Guardian made a number of applications which sought the discharge of Matrix Deputies Limited and DW and OM as property and affairs Deputies, the refusal of any pending applications and the appointment of either the Local Authority or a Panel Deputy instead.

OM was discharged on 17 February 2016 and DW was discharged on 18 May 2016. However, Matrix Deputies Limited contested the applications until shortly before the final hearing upon which an agreement was reached. Issues as to the costs remained between Matrix Deputies and the London Borough of Enfield.

Background

The history was complex and it involved an arrangement between the London Borough of Enfield and Matrix Deputies Limited for referrals to be made where there was a Statutory Duty. Relations between the two broke down and thereafter the Local Authority terminated the arrangement.

The Public Guardian raised concerns in November 2015. An Independent Auditor was instructed to investigate Matrix Deputies Limited. A report was produced and this was used as evidence by the Public Guardian on the first day of the hearing. The allegations within the report were as follows;

Excessive Fee Charging
. Fees excessively charged to individuals in excess of what the Deputyship appointment permitted or in relation to what works had actually been undertaken.

Inappropriate/inadequate arrangements for holding/recording client funds and transactions
. All client funds were held in one single account. There were unexplained discrepancies between closing and opening balances and no clear record of opening balances

Conflict of interest for, inappropriate relations with other bodies
. No evidence of tendering and best interest’s decisions being made

Failure to provide information requested/comply with order for disclosure
. Various applications had to be made to the Court

Matrix Deputies denied many allegations, however they did admit to some accounting discrepancies and the receipt of payments from an estate agent in respect of property sales of the Protected Parties. This amounted to Matrix Deputies receiving a financial benefit from the property sales themselves at the expense of someone whom they owed a fiduciary duty to.

Paragraph 8.58 of the Code of Practice states,

A fiduciary duty means that Deputies must not take advantage of their position. Nor should they put themselves in a position where their personal interests conflict with their duties. They cannot cause their personal position for a personal benefit, whether or not it is at the persons expense.

Therefore, the breach of duty had clearly been broken.

Determination

After 20 months of litigation and limited admissions, Matrix Deputies Limited conceded the applications. The Court determined that on the basis of the allegations Matrix Deputies Limited were not a suitable organisation for either continued or new appointments as property and affairs Deputies and any appointments should be discharged or refused.

The Judge stated that individual orders would be made in respect of each person named to appoint a permanent Deputy. Where a security bond was effective, directions would be given to the new Deputy to investigate and report any losses to the estate as a result of the actions of the discharged Deputy.

Costs of the Proceedings

The Public Guardian and Matrix Deputies Limited agreed to bear their own costs and no costs would be claimed from the estate of any person listed in the schedules. The Judge noted that this was a departure from the standard rule, Rule 156 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, which states,

Where the proceedings concern P’s property and affairs the general rule is that the costs of the proceedings or of that part of the proceedings that concerns P’s property and affairs, shall be paid by P or charged to his estate

The Judge, having Regard to Rule 159 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, was satisfied that the circumstances justified the departure as he applied the rule and looked at the following;

 (a)the conduct of the parties;

(b)whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful; and

(c)the role of any public body involved in the proceedings.

(2) The conduct of the parties includes–

(a)conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings;

(b)whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular issue;

(c)the manner in which a party has made or responded to an application or a particular issue; and

(d)whether a party who has succeeded in his application or response to an application, in whole or in part, exaggerated any matter contained in his application or response.
The position as to costs between the London Borough of Enfield and Matrix Deputies Limited was not agreed. The Local Authority sought an order that Matrix Deputies Limited should pay its costs including the costs incurred in the investigations and on an indemnity basis. Matrix Deputies contented that London Borough of Enfield should bear its own costs.

Local Authority Arguments

London Borough of Enfield’s costs were said to amount to approximately £250,000.00. The bulk of the costs were made up of the independent auditor’s reports. The Local Authority identified that the reports were necessary and the Court had requested the same. Two reports and subsequent applications were required because of Matrix Deputies Limited’s failure to supply full documentation as directed in a timely manner.

The Judge was referred to the case of JS v KB & MP (2014) and R (Boxall) v Waltham Forest LBC (2001) where it was determined that the Court had the power to make a costs order when substantive proceedings had been resolved at trial, but when parties had not agreed costs, specifically in relation to compromised cases. It was observed that there would be different degrees of success and how far the Court will be prepared to look into the previously unresolved substantive issues will depend on the circumstances of a particular case, not least the amount of costs at stake and the conduct of parties.

The Judge in this case, contended that it was not reasonable for Matrix Deputies Limited to resist the applications due to the investigations and the conduct of Matrix Deputies Limited afterwards which elongated the Proceedings and led to an increase in the costs.

The Judge also looked at the conduct of Matrix Deputies Limited before Proceedings had been issued.

Matrix Deputies Response

The position of Matrix Deputies Limited was that it should not bear any responsibility for the Local Authority’s costs. They argued that the costs of the independent auditor were excessive. They also sought to rely on correspondences from the Local Authority marked as “without prejudice save as to costs.” The Judge was unimpressed by these arguments.  The proceedings themselves were brought by the Public Guardian, not the London Borough of Enfield and full disclosure was only obtained following an application for an enforcement type order.

The Judge stated that having regard to Rule 159 of the Court of Protection Rules, he was satisfied that the circumstances of the case justified the departure from Rule 156. The conduct of Matrix Deputies before and after proceedings had fallen below the standard of what was expected of a Court appointed Deputy. Matrix had admitted to a breach of their fiduciary duties and had failed to comply with the Court Orders. Therefore, it was determined that Matrix Deputies Limited should bear the costs of the London Borough of Enfield to be assessed by the Senior Courts Costs Office.

Standard or Indemnity Basis Costs

The effect of an indemnity based costs order as stated in Siegel v Pummell (2015)

” To disapply the requirement that, in addition to costs being reasonably incurred, they should also be proportionate to the sums and issues at stake in the litigation and that, in the event of the assessment Judge having a doubt as to whether or not an item of cost has been incurred reasonably, the benefit of such doubt should go to the receiving rather than the paying party. “.

The purpose of indemnity costs is not to punish the paying party, but to provide the receiving party with a more generous measure of recoverable costs. They should only be awarded where a case it outside of the normal realms.

The Judge stated that he was satisfied that this case was wholly “outside of the norm” of proceedings before the Court of Protection. This was based on the number of Protected Parties involved in the litigation, the scope of the allegations, the investigative steps required and the nature of the admitted breach of duty by a paid Deputy. All in accordance with Part 44.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

The London Borough of Enfield were advised to recover their costs on the indemnity basis.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates that the Courts have the ultimate discretion as to the assessment of costs and that they will look at all factors throughout the duration of the litigation to determine the basis of assessment.