The latest Precedent H guidance notes

The precedent H guidance notes have never aligned with the precedent S guidance notes (Phases and Tasks Reference and Lookup table in Precedent S (bill of costs)) until the update to the precedent H guidance notes which was made last month, this update has addressed some of those discrepancies.

Please find below the amendments that have been made to the guidance notes:

Pre-action: The precedent H guidance notes states that settlement discussions, advising on settlement and Part 36 offers before proceedings were issued are to be included in the Preaction phase. However, in the Precedent S guidance these discussions are included in the ADR/Settlement phase (task “Other Settlement Matters”) . The precedent H guidance notes must be followed therefore any preaction settlement discussions should be included in the preaction phase. 

Issue/statements of case: The precedent H guidance notes have been amended to include “amendments to statements of case” in this phase, the previous guidance stated that these should be excluded from this phase. This amendment has resulted in alignment with the Precedent S guidance. 

CMC: The precedent H guidance notes have been amended to include any further CMCs that have been built into the proposed directions order whereas previously the notes stated that any additional CMCs were not to be included in this phase. The position remains regarding any estimated CMCs that have not been proposed in the directions order, these are to be included as a contingent cost. Any disclosure work, i.e. list of disclosure issues, EDQ  should be included in the disclosure phase.  

Budget – The costs in relation to this phase includes inconsistencies which present numerous difficulties. The Precedent H Guidance Notes includes “correspondence with opponent to agree directions and budgets, where possible”, and “preparation for, and attendance at, the CMC”. The same applies in relation to the PTR phase, which includes “preparation of updated costs budgets and reviewing opponent’s budget”, “correspondence with opponent to agree directions and costs budgets, if possible” and “preparation for and attendance at the PTR”. While the precedent H guidance note specifically excludes preparation of the costs budget for the first CMC, it doesn’t specifically exclude preparation of Precedent R. The Precedent S description of this task is “work on budgeting between the parties following initial completion of the first budget, including the monitoring of costs incurred against the budget and any applications for variation of the budget” –  it doesn’t mention the drafting of Precedent R and seems to relate to work post CMC.

Furthermore, in para 7.2 of PD3E the 2% cap relates to all recoverable costs of the budgeting and costs management process other than the recoverable costs of initially completing the Precedent H. If some costs budgeting items are included in the CMC and PTR phases (i.e. following the Precedent H Guidance Note), practically how is the 2% figure on the front page of Precedent H calculated? Should it include the budgeting items which appear in the CMC and PTR phases of Precedent H, or is it exclusive of them? And, what exactly is meant by “budget process” in relation to this 2% cap?

Unfortunately there is no guidance regarding the budget process or “associated material” that is referred to in the guidance notes – does this include composite summaries, breakdowns of costs?

One solution for this phase is to time record in line with the precedent S guidance notes and then when it comes to preparing the budget assess what aspects of the % cap belongs in the CCMC stage. If the time is recorded as CCMC it is a more onerous task to ascertain what element of the CCMC phase is relevant to the % cap.

Trial: The guidance note has been amended to now include counsel’s brief fee in the trial preparation phase rather than the trial phase. 

Settlement phase: The precedent H guidance note previously excluded mediation from this phase, this has now been amended to include mediation. 

Definition of budgeted and incurred costs – CPR 3.15 and PD 3E para 7.4 Incurred costs are now all costs incurred up to and including the date of the first costs management order, unless otherwise ordered. Budgeted costs are all costs to be incurred after the date of the first costs management order.

Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at sue.fox@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

 

 

 

 

Revising Precedent H Costs Budgets – Don’t delay

Revising Precedent H Costs Budgets

Don’t delay in applying to revise your Costs Budget if a significant development has occurred in your litigation, and on those occasions where there may have been a delay don’t shy away from applying.

It is not left to a party to choose whether to revise its budget and to take its chances on a detailed assessment, parties must apply to revise their budget if there has been a significant development in the litigation – Sharp -v- Blank & Ors [2017] EWHC 3390 (Ch) (21 December 2017) (hereafter Sharp).

In the event that there has been a significant development in the litigation, parties are not able to defer the determination of additional incurred costs to detailed assessment – those incurred costs form part of the request for additional costs:

Master Marsh “I do not consider the rules and practice direction intended that only certain elements of the costs relating to significant developments must be dealt with as revisions with the other elements, those pre-dating the hearing or, on another view those pre-dating the application, being dealt with on a detailed assessment. This approach would run contrary to the purposes of costs management and lead to unnecessary fragmentation of the costs dealt with at a detailed assessment.

Master Marsh found that the costs incurred from the costs management order and up to the application to revise the Cost Budget were not incurred costs for the purpose of the revision, they were future costs. Master Marsh focussed on the language of the CPR referring to the choice of the use of “future” rather than “budgeted costs”, as follows:

The language used in paragraph 7.6 is of critical importance because it provides the jurisdiction, on the defendants’ case to make the revisions they seek. It is notable that the language is at variance with the remainder of the rules and PD3E. It refers throughout to the revision of a “budget” (not, in accordance with the new wording, “budgeted costs”). It is explicit, however, that revision is in respect of future costs. The final sentence of this paragraph gives the court a discretion to approve, vary or disapprove the revisions “… having regard to any significant developments which have occurred since the date when the previous budget was approved or agreed”. On one view, such language points towards the last approved or agreed budget being the jumping off point for a revision because it is the budget that is being revised”.

Master Marsh concluded that the “Costs which have been incurred since the date of the last agreed or approved budget (or the antecedent date) that relate to significant developments are, for the purposes of revision, placed in the estimated columns of the revised Precedent H in one or more phase. In some cases, it may not be obvious where they go (for example a late application for security for costs) but I can see no reason why Precedent H may not be adapted as necessary to accommodate work that does not easily fit in”.

He also considered that there would be a degree of retrospectivity if the costs management regime was to work.

It is essential that you apply to revise your Costs Budget if a significant development has occurred in your litigation, to not do so puts you at risk of not being able to recover any costs that are in excess of your budget.

Sue Fox is a Senior Associate and the Head of Costs Management in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact her at sue.fox@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 336 3389, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

 

 

INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE ON AN ADDITIONAL AMOUNT AWARDED UNDER CPR 36.17(4)(d)

Where the Court awards an “additional amount” under CPR 36.17(4)(d) as a claimant / receiving party beating its own Part 36 offer, the additional amount will not attract “enhanced” interest under CPR 36.17(4)(a).

In FZO -v- Adams & Anor [2019] EWHC 1286 (QB) the court allowed an additional amount under CPR 36.17(4)(d), but held that interest under CPR 36.17(4)(a) – enhanced interest at 10% above base rate – was not payable on that amount. Giving judgment, Mrs Justice Cutts found that the construction of CPR 36.17(4)(d) was that the “additional amount” was not a “sum awarded” and that the words “additional” and “amount” mean that the award is in addition to the enhanced interest at CPR 36.17(4)(a).

It should be noted that CPR 36.17(4) states that where the claimant has beaten their own offer the court “…must, unless it considers it unjust to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to…” and thereafter lists the consequences (enhanced interest, additional amount, etc). This does not appear to accord with the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s submission that the additional amount is not a “sum awarded”. On the construction of CPR 36.17(4) it seems that those consequences are sums awarded by the court, albeit they are sums which the court is bound to award save where it considers it to be unjust.

Notwithstanding, the second strand of the judge’s reasoning appears wholly sound insofar as the “additional amount” is additional to the other consequences and therefore not itself subject to those consequences.

However, practitioners should be aware that this applies only to interest arising under CPR 36.17(4)(a). As the additional amount is a sum which a party is ordered to pay, and (as above) is a sum which the court orders that party to pay, it is a judgment debt and thus interest will, in the author’s opinion, arise under section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 at the rate of 8% should payment not be made within the prescribed period (14 days pursuant to CPR 40.11 unless otherwise ordered)

Matthew Rose is an Associate in the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at matthew.rose@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 222 3248. You can contact the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

Court of Protection Court Fees: An Update

In order to have a bill of costs assessed, it is necessary to pay a Court Fee to the Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO). Depending on the type of the bill, the fee amount varies. Currently, within the Court of Protection, the cost to have a bill assessed is £225 for a detailed bill and £115 for a short form bill of costs. A short form bill is a bill with profit costs up to £3,000 and a detailed bill of costs is a bill with profit costs above £3,000.

From the 22nd July 2019, these fees are due to change. By way of The Court Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019 there is due to be a reduction to the Court Fees due to have a bill of costs assessed. S4 (3)(a) of the Act states that the fee for filing a bill of costs to be assessed will be £85.00. This is dramatic change within the rules and something that will affect all professional Deputies who wish to have their bill of costs assessed, making it cheaper to do so.

The most significant aspect of the Act is that going forward, there will be no distinction between fees for filing short form and detailed bills of costs. As stated, this will be taking place from the 22nd July 2019 and so all professional Deputies should be aware of this when sending any bills to the SCCO to be assessed on or after this date.

There will also be changes made to application, appeal and hearing fees for all Court of Protection matters. These can be found in s3 The Court Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019.

 

What Costs Are Reasonable for a Deputy? JR v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust provides an explanation.

At a glance, the costs of a professional Deputy may seem expensive. However, the level of knowledge and work undertaken by a Deputy justifies these costs, especially in a case where the award was of substantial value. Once broken down, the costs of a Deputy are reasonable and can be justified.

Case summary

The Protected Party is a 24-year old with severe cerebral palsy. He suffered intracranial haemorrhage and brain injury following a traumatic premature birth and during a breech delivery. His litigation friend brought a clinical negligence claim on his behalf, arguing that the Protected Party’s injuries could have been avoided by a caesarean delivery. The Defendant accepted liability as the brain injury could have been avoided.

At the settlement hearing, some heads of loss had been agreed, but the costs of the professional deputy remained in dispute.

All parties accepted that the Protected Party lacked capacity to look after his own financial affairs, and predicted that this would be the case for the remainder of his life time. Therefore, a Professional Deputy was to be appointed; the cost of which continued to be argued.

It was deemed that although the Protected Party’s parents were supportive, it was not appropriate for them to administrate the Protected Party’s financial and property affairs. They had stated that they wanted to work alongside the Deputy, not against them. The Protected Party had some level of understanding and communication, so the Deputy was obliged to liaise directly with him.

What is considered reasonable for Deputyship costs?

For annual management

Year Claimant Costs Defendant Costs Award
1 30,605 plus cost of 2 visits 14,000 inclusive of 2 visits 30,000 inclusive of visits
2 21,492 plus cost of 2 visits 9,000 inclusive of 2 visits 20,000 inclusive of visits
3 17,040 plus cost of 1 visit 8,000 inclusive of 1 visit 15,000 inclusive of visits
4 17,040 plus cost of 1 visit 8,000 inclusive of 1 visit 15,000 inclusive of visits
5 onwards 11,232 plus cost of 1 visit 7,000 inclusive of 1 visit 10,000 inclusive of visits

The parties agreed that for extras such as transfers of Deputies, Wills, co-habitation or pre-nuptial agreements and “crisis payments”, a further £38,160.00 was reasonable.

The Judge allowed a total of £898,993.00.

This judgment can then be compared to the PNBA Facts & Figures 2017/18 (pages 258-288) whereby this outlines what could be classed as reasonable when awarding damages to cover the cost of the claimants Deputyship fees. Please refer to the table below.

Year and Expected Work to be Undertaken During the Deputyship Management Estimated Costs
Deputyship Application £6,638
1st Deputyship Year £32,570
2nd Deputyship Year £23,666
3rd Deputyship Year £19,775
Thereafter annual costs of £15,959 x 21.28 £339,607
Applications for appointment of new Deputy (x2) £7,588
Statutory Will Application £14,538
Contingency for crises £6,360
Preparation of tax returns £600 p.a x 24.28 £14,568
Winding up – single payment £1,800
 

 

Total Costs

 

 

£467,110.00

Finally, it’s noteworthy that all Deputyship costs are assessed by the Senior Courts Cost Office and the fee earners are regularly limited to the SCCO Guideline Hourly Rates whilst costs are awarded for Deputyship work, this is further scrutinised on assessment based on what is reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the Protected Party’s best interests.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com

 

NB, Re (Consent to sex) [2019]- After 27 Years of marriage, did the Protected Party have capacity to marry and consent to sexual relations with her husband?

The Protected Party came to live in the UK in 1985 and married her husband in 1992. The marriage was contracted abroad. When the Protected Party first came to live in the UK she did so without her husband. There was a period in which the couple were separated whilst her husband made an application for permission to enter the UK, but in May 1996, the Protected Party travelled abroad to return to live with her husband. Following a series of applications to the Home Office throughout 1997, the couple came, eventually, to live together in London. They lived with the Protected Party’s parents and a year later their daughter was born.

The question was brought to the Court relating to the Protected Party’s capacity to marry and subsequent capacity to consent to sexual activity.

Mr Justice Hayden reviewed a letter to the Immigration Appeals department, that was brought before him by the Official Solicitor, dated March 1996, in which a clinical psychologist, Ms Suzanne Wilson, stated:

‘I believe Protected Party’s experience of her husband’s absence is stressful due to her attachment and affection towards him which has developed during their periods together. In her daily life the Protected Party consistently demonstrates her intense attachment to her husband. She often says his name with affection. She repeatedly asks where he is and pleads that he should be with her. She appears to understand the lasting nature of marriage, including that of marriage as a committed sexual bond between a man and a woman. It is my view that the Protected Party would be very unlikely to have such an affectionate attachment to her husband if this were not on a mutual basis and I therefore believe that her attachment can be taken as evidence of her husband’s positive attention and caring towards her when they are together’.

It is important to note that the Protected Party suffered from what is referred to as ‘general global learning difficulty’ and ‘an impairment’ in relation to her ability to communicate with others. She has been, at least historically, assisted using Makaton sign language and her sentences were limited.

As a result of a number of remarks the Protected Party made to her dentist, in October 2014, a safeguarding enquiry was instigated. There is no record of what it was that she said to the dentist, but it was clear that it had something to do with the quality of her relationship with her husband and it was such as to give rise to a concern that she might be vulnerable to sexual exploitation. Very quickly, an education programme was put in place focusing on sex education, relationships, contraception, sexually transmitted diseases as well as more general issues relating to Protected Party’s health.

The conclusion of the assessment was that the Protected Party was unable to demonstrate an appreciation of why people got married, separated or divorced. It was concluded that she lacked the mental capacity to marry. In respect of her capacity to consent to sexual relations it was considered that she lacked an understanding of the association between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. Inevitably, it followed, that she could not link various forms of contraception to the concept of averting pregnancy. She did not have the capacity to retain information in relation to these issues. It was also considered that she was unable to communicate the concept of refusal of sex to her husband.

The Protected Party’s husband was a man in his early 50’s who has never been in any trouble with the police. It was agreed that there had been no concerns expressed by any of the professionals in relation to his behaviour either more recently or historically.

The couple found themselves in a challenging situation in which their private and sexual life was being scrutinised by a variety of professionals. Whilst the Protected Party’s husband was being analysed, he appeared both frightened and embarrassed when he came to Court. On 29 March 2019, when the matter was brought to Court there had been an agreement between the Protected Party’s husband, the Applicant and the Respondent that the case would proceed by way of the Protected Party’s husband giving an undertaking to the Court not to sleep with his wife.

Mr Justice Hayden concluded that he was “Reserving Judgment in order that I can take the time to look carefully and in some detail at the case law and its applicability to the facts of this case. It would appear, that it requires to be said, in clear and unambiguous terms that I do so in order to explore fully Protected Party’s right to a sexual life with her husband and he with her, if that is at all possible.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Georgia Clarke (georgia.clarke@clarionsolicitors.com) or the team at COPCosts@clarionsolicitors.com.

Court of Protection Costs – Types of Assessments for your Costs.

The previous blog in this series focused on the process of what goes into a Bill of Costs in the Court of Protection world. This blog will instead look at the process of an assessment in the Court of Protection and the different types of assessment that can occur.

Firstly, authority for the cost’s assessment must be established, as all Orders as to costs are at the discretion of the Court of Protection. There are three main methods of evaluating costs; agreed costs, fixed costs and summary/detailed assessment of Costs.

  • Agreed Costs

These kinds of costs Order are not regularly available in Court of Protection cases. As a principle, all bills of costs must be assessed, except where fixed costs are available. However, the Court may authorise parties to agree costs, where appropriate to do so. This is often used upon the death of a Protected Party whereby the Deputy is expected to agree costs with the Executor of the estate.

  • ­Fixed Costs

­Found within Practice Direction 19B, fixed costs are available to solicitors and professionals acting as Deputy. The general rule is that costs of the proceedings should be paid by P or charged to their estate, but this rule can be departed from.

In Cases where fixed costs are not appropriate, professional Deputies may, if preferred, apply to the SCCO for a detailed assessment of costs. However, this does not apply if P’s net assets are below £16,000. In these cases, the option for detailed assessment will only arise if the Court makes a specific order.

  • Detailed Assessment

The detailed assessment of costs under Orders or Directions of the Court of Protection is dealt with in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules. Professional Deputies should lodge a request for detailed assessment with the SCCO (not the Court of Protection or the Office of Public Guardian) using the N258B (request for detailed assessment), accompanied by:

  • The bill of costs;
  • Documents giving the right to detailed assessment;
  • Copies of all the orders;
  • Fee notes of counsel or experts;
  • Details of other disbursements;
  • Postal Address of any person who has a financial interest in the outcome of assessment;
  • Relevant assessment fee (£115 or £225);
  • The OPG105 (if applicable).

Part 27 of the Practice Direction 17.2(2) states that cases over £100,000.00, complex or other cases are to be dealt with by a Master. The relevant papers in support of the bill must only be lodged if requested by the Master.

Once the bill of costs is lodged in the correct manner, the Costs Officer will review the bundle of documents and assess the costs. The Costs Officer will review the bill of costs alongside the files of papers and decide whether costs have been reasonably, necessarily and proportionately incurred, making reductions, where necessary based on relevant case law and judicial decisions. The bill of costs is thereafter returned to the Deputy for consideration.

Clarion can also assist with requests for reassessment if the outcome is not as expected. If you would like further information about this process, then please do not hesitate to get in contact.

Joshua Sidding is a Paralegal in the Court of Protection Team of the Costs and Litigation Funding Department at Clarion Solicitors. You can contact him at Joshua.sidding@clarionsolicitors.com and 0113 222 3245, or the Clarion Costs Team on 0113 246 0622.

You can also take advantage of our free telephone advice service – available outside of office hours – by calling 07764 501252.